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arXiv:2607.21103 · Quantum Information Processing

Evolutionary stability and payoff equivalence in an Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein quantum game

Azhar Iqbal, Derek Abbott

quant-phSubmitted Jul 23, 2026• Announced Jul 24, 2026• 1 citation• Revised Oct 14, 2026 (v2)
v1 · Jul 23, 2026v2 · Oct 14, 2026
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Abstract

An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy that, once adopted by a population, cannot be invaded by any sufficiently rare alternative (mutant) strategy. We analyse evolutionary stability in an Eisert--Wilkens--Lewenstein (EWL) quantization of a symmetric $2\times2$ coordination game, whose classical mixed equilibrium $p^*=1/2$ is not an ESS. In the restricted two-parameter EWL strategy space, the corresponding quantum strategy is a strict symmetric Nash equilibrium and an ESS for every entanglement strength $γ>0$. In the full $SU(2)$ strategy space it remains a Nash equilibrium, but in the unreduced game, in which every unitary is a distinct strategy, exact payoff duplicates preclude strictness and ESS for every pure strategy. For the agreement-payoff class, the payoff factors through a Bloch map; identifying payoff-equivalent unitaries gives the reduced space $U(1)\backslash SU(2)\cong S^2$, where strictness and ESS are restored for $γ>0$. An arbitrarily small perturbation outside this class that preserves $p^*=1/2$ yields a profitable deviation, so the reduced-space result is not generic.

Journal reference
Quantum Information Processing, Volume 25, article number 348 (2026)
DOI
10.1007/s11128-026-05373-0
Comments
Revised, 22 pages, to appear in Quantum Information Processing

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It is well-known that the evolutionary dynamics is widely studied in classical game settings. In this work, for the first time, the notion of evolutionary dynamics is studied in the context of quantum Cournot duopoly game using a modified EWL scheme. Unlike the well-known Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein scheme and the Marinatto-Weber scheme, the modified EWL scheme admits a wide range of two-qubit entangling operators which are essential to understand game theory from the perspective of quantum operators. By applying this scheme and by using replicator dynamics, it is observed that these exists only one evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Further, the identified stable strategy plays a crucial role in replacing the strategy-profit maximization (played by majority of the population) with the mutant strategy-revenue maximization. Also, these results highlight the insignificance of the entangling operators in deciding the ESS.
Abstract Quantum strategies can alter the equilibrium structure of classical games, but apparent improvements may depend on arbitrary strategy labels or on the particular quantum operations admitted. Here, we characterize payoff improvement across all permissible three-strategy extensions of renaming-symmetric 2×22 \times 22×2 games within the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein framework. We preserve the classical game as a subgame and add one fixed unitary strategy, restricting attention to the three extension classes that remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. Across six canonical payoff orderings, including coordination, anti-coordination, and dominant-strategy dilemmas, we derive the conditions under which the extended games admit pure Nash equilibria whose payoffs are no lower than those of the corresponding symmetric classical equilibrium. The classical-type A0A_0A0​ extension produces no strict improvement, while B0B_0B0​ does so only in restricted regions and generally asymmetrically. By contrast, the genuinely quantum C0C_0C0​ extension supports non-inferior equilibria across all six classes and yields strict, mutually beneficial improvements in identifiable payoff regions. These results move beyond isolated game examples by showing precisely when representation-invariant quantum extensions can improve equilibrium payoffs and when they cannot. These conditions provide a design map for quantum-enabled multi-agent protocols by identifying the payoff structures under which an added quantum strategy can improve equilibrium outcomes without altering the players' underlying preferences.
This expanded Urdu-language review introduces classical and quantum game theory with particular attention to Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stability. It adds worked examples of the Prisoner's Dilemma and Hawk--Dove games, a concise introduction to qubits and measurement, quantum protocol construction, noise robustness, multiplayer games, a bilingual glossary, and guided questions for learners. It explains the role of quantum protocols, entanglement, admissible strategy spaces, and payoff equivalence, while distinguishing mathematical game-theoretic conclusions from claims of physical implementation. Detailed new sections distinguish equilibrium from ESS and from stability of payoff-equivalence classes, derive the instability of a classical mixed coordination equilibrium, discuss the Bloch-sphere quotient for a special quantum game, analyze noise and perturbations, and propose a reproducible research framework. The article ends with limitations and open research questions. .
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