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arXiv:quant-ph/0106056 · Communications in Theoretical Physics

Stability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Quantum Games

Azhar Iqbal, A. H. Toor

Published Sep 15, 2004• 18 citations
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Abstract

In bimatrix games the Bishop–Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit initial quantum states when a switch-over to a quantum version of the game also changes the evolutionary stability of a mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium.

DOI
10.1088/0253-6102/42/3/335

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In bimatrix games the Bishop–Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit initial quantum states when a switch-over to a quantum version of the game also changes the evolutionary stability of a mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Quantum evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) are considered as stable solutions to population games on the molecular level. The distributive diagram of the games is brought out in the light of their rescaled games, so that a convenient way to look for quantum ESSs of 2×2 symmetric games can be obtained. It is found that transpositions may take place when a game is quantized. They are related to the parameters in the classical payoff matrix and those of the initial quantum states. One can easily find quantum ESSs by referring to the tables and the figure shown in the main body. This paper draws an overall outline of NEs (Nash equilibria) and ESSs of this kind of game in the classical version as well as in the quantum version.
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy that, once adopted by a population, cannot be invaded by any sufficiently rare alternative (mutant) strategy. We analyse evolutionary stability in an Eisert--Wilkens--Lewenstein (EWL) quantization of a symmetric 2×22\times22×2 coordination game, whose classical mixed equilibrium p∗=1/2p^*=1/2p∗=1/2 is not an ESS. In the restricted two-parameter EWL strategy space, the corresponding quantum strategy is a strict symmetric Nash equilibrium and an ESS for every entanglement strength γ>0γ>0γ>0. In the full SU(2)SU(2)SU(2) strategy space it remains a Nash equilibrium, but in the unreduced game, in which every unitary is a distinct strategy, exact payoff duplicates preclude strictness and ESS for every pure strategy. For the agreement-payoff class, the payoff factors through a Bloch map; identifying payoff-equivalent unitaries gives the reduced space U(1)\SU(2)≅S2U(1)\backslash SU(2)\cong S^2U(1)\SU(2)≅S2, where strictness and ESS are restored for γ>0γ>0γ>0. An arbitrarily small perturbation outside this class that preserves p∗=1/2p^*=1/2p∗=1/2 yields a profitable deviation, so the reduced-space result is not generic.
We quantize the Hawk–Dove game by using the most general form of a pure initial state to investigate the existence of pure and mixed evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). An example is considered to draw a comparison between the classical and quantum version of the game. Our choice of the most general initial quantum state enables us to make the game symmetric or asymmetric. We show that for a particular set of game parameters where there exists only mixed ESS in the classical version of the game, quantization allows even a pure strategy to be an ESS for the symmetric game in addition to mixed ESS. On the other hand only pure strategy ESS can exist for the asymmetric quantum version of the Hawk–Dove game.
With respect to probabilistic mixtures of the strategies in non-cooperative games, quantum game theory provides guarantee of fixed-point stability, the so-called Nash equilibrium. This permits players to choose mixed quantum strategies that prepare mixed quantum states optimally under constraints. We show here that fixed-point stability of Nash equilibrium can also be guaranteed for pure quantum strategies via an application of the Nash embedding theorem, permitting players to prepare pure quantum states optimally under constraints.