An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy that, once adopted by a population, cannot be invaded by any sufficiently rare alternative (mutant) strategy. We analyse evolutionary stability in an Eisert--Wilkens--Lewenstein (EWL) quantization of a symmetric
2×2 coordination game, whose classical mixed equilibrium
p∗=1/2 is not an ESS. In the restricted two-parameter EWL strategy space, the corresponding quantum strategy is a strict symmetric Nash equilibrium and an ESS for every entanglement strength
γ>0. In the full
SU(2) strategy space it remains a Nash equilibrium, but in the unreduced game, in which every unitary is a distinct strategy, exact payoff duplicates preclude strictness and ESS for every pure strategy. For the agreement-payoff class, the payoff factors through a Bloch map; identifying payoff-equivalent unitaries gives the reduced space
U(1)\SU(2)≅S2, where strictness and ESS are restored for
γ>0. An arbitrarily small perturbation outside this class that preserves
p∗=1/2 yields a profitable deviation, so the reduced-space result is not generic.
Theory of quantum games is a new area of investigation that has gone through rapid development during the last few years. Initial motivation for playing games, in the quantum world, comes from the possibility of re-formulating quantum communication protocols, and algorithms, in terms of games between quantum and classical players. The possibility led to the view that quantum games have a potential to provide helpful insight into working of quantum algorithms, and even in finding new ones. This thesis analyzes and compares some interesting games when played classically and quantum mechanically. A large part of the thesis concerns investigations into a refinement notion of the Nash equilibrium concept. The refinement, called an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), was originally introduced in 1970s by mathematical biologists to model an evolving population using techniques borrowed from game theory. Analysis is developed around a situation when quantization changes ESSs without affecting corresponding Nash equilibria. Effects of quantization on solution-concepts other than Nash equilibrium are presented and discussed. For this purpose the notions of value of coalition, backwards-induction outcome, and subgame-perfect outcome are selected. Repeated games are known to have different information structure than one-shot games. Investigation is presented into a possible way where quantization changes the outcome of a repeated game. Lastly, two new suggestions are put forward to play quantum versions of classical matrix games. The first one uses the association of De Broglie's waves, with travelling material objects, as a resource for playing a quantum game. The second suggestion concerns an EPR type setting exploiting directly the correlations in Bell's inequalities to play a bi-matrix game.
This expanded Urdu-language review introduces classical and quantum game theory with particular attention to Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stability. It adds worked examples of the Prisoner's Dilemma and Hawk--Dove games, a concise introduction to qubits and measurement, quantum protocol construction, noise robustness, multiplayer games, a bilingual glossary, and guided questions for learners. It explains the role of quantum protocols, entanglement, admissible strategy spaces, and payoff equivalence, while distinguishing mathematical game-theoretic conclusions from claims of physical implementation. Detailed new sections distinguish equilibrium from ESS and from stability of payoff-equivalence classes, derive the instability of a classical mixed coordination equilibrium, discuss the Bloch-sphere quotient for a special quantum game, analyze noise and perturbations, and propose a reproducible research framework. The article ends with limitations and open research questions. .
Quantum evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) are considered as stable solutions to population games on the molecular level. The distributive diagram of the games is brought out in the light of their rescaled games, so that a convenient way to look for quantum ESSs of 2×2 symmetric games can be obtained. It is found that transpositions may take place when a game is quantized. They are related to the parameters in the classical payoff matrix and those of the initial quantum states. One can easily find quantum ESSs by referring to the tables and the figure shown in the main body. This paper draws an overall outline of NEs (Nash equilibria) and ESSs of this kind of game in the classical version as well as in the quantum version.
It is well-known that the evolutionary dynamics is widely studied in classical game settings. In this work, for the first time, the notion of evolutionary dynamics is studied in the context of quantum Cournot duopoly game using a modified EWL scheme. Unlike the well-known Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein scheme and the Marinatto-Weber scheme, the modified EWL scheme admits a wide range of two-qubit entangling operators which are essential to understand game theory from the perspective of quantum operators. By applying this scheme and by using replicator dynamics, it is observed that these exists only one evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Further, the identified stable strategy plays a crucial role in replacing the strategy-profit maximization (played by majority of the population) with the mutant strategy-revenue maximization. Also, these results highlight the insignificance of the entangling operators in deciding the ESS.