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arXiv:quant-ph/0106135

Equilibria of Replicator Dynamics in Quantum Games

Azhar Iqbal, A. H. Toor

quant-phnlin.AOSubmitted Jun 24, 2001• Announced Jun 26, 2001• 15 citations• Revised Nov 2, 2026 (v3)
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Abstract

We analyse two-population replicator dynamics for asymmetric $2\times2$ games implemented with the Marinatto--Weber (MW) identity/bit-flip protocol. The effective payoff matrices are explicit convex combinations of relabelled classical matrices. Consequently, the dynamics depends on the initial state only through its four computational-basis probabilities: quantum phases, coherences and entanglement cannot be distinguished from classical shared randomness by the payoffs or trajectories in this protocol. At each pure-strategy vertex, the local eigenvalues equal the negatives of the corresponding unilateral payoff advantages; a vertex is asymptotically stable precisely when it is a strict Nash equilibrium, and thus an evolutionarily stable strategy pair in the asymmetric-game sense. Explicit examples show how varying the initial distribution changes which vertex is stable. When an isolated interior rest point exists, it is a saddle or a nonlinear centre according to the sign of the product of the classical payoff cross-differences; the sign cannot change under the MW mapping, although the point can enter or leave the strategy square. We give all four vertex-stability conditions explicitly in a single table, obtain a closed-form logistic solution on the parity-balanced hyperplane $S=0$, classify the degenerate cases, and give a first integral for the nondegenerate flow. All results concern the MW payoff protocol and its classically simulable family of bimatrix games; none constitutes evidence of an inherently quantum evolutionary advantage.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0106135
Comments
Revised, 14 pages, one figure

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We analyse two-population replicator dynamics for asymmetric 2×22\times22×2 games implemented with the Marinatto--Weber (MW) identity/bit-flip protocol. The effective payoff matrices are explicit convex combinations of relabelled classical matrices. Consequently, the dynamics depends on the initial state only through its four computational-basis probabilities: quantum phases, coherences and entanglement cannot be distinguished from classical shared randomness by the payoffs or trajectories in this protocol. At each pure-strategy vertex, the local eigenvalues equal the negatives of the corresponding unilateral payoff advantages; a vertex is asymptotically stable precisely when it is a strict Nash equilibrium, and thus an evolutionarily stable strategy pair in the asymmetric-game sense. Explicit examples show how varying the initial distribution changes which vertex is stable. When an isolated interior rest point exists, it is a saddle or a nonlinear centre according to the sign of the product of the classical payoff cross-differences; the sign cannot change under the MW mapping, although the point can enter or leave the strategy square. We give all four vertex-stability conditions explicitly in a single table, obtain a closed-form logistic solution on the parity-balanced hyperplane S=0S=0S=0, classify the degenerate cases, and give a first integral for the nondegenerate flow. All results concern the MW payoff protocol and its classically simulable family of bimatrix games; none constitutes evidence of an inherently quantum evolutionary advantage.
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An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy that, once adopted by a population, cannot be invaded by any sufficiently rare alternative (mutant) strategy. We analyse evolutionary stability in an Eisert--Wilkens--Lewenstein (EWL) quantization of a symmetric 2×22\times22×2 coordination game, whose classical mixed equilibrium p∗=1/2p^*=1/2p∗=1/2 is not an ESS. In the restricted two-parameter EWL strategy space, the corresponding quantum strategy is a strict symmetric Nash equilibrium and an ESS for every entanglement strength γ>0γ>0γ>0. In the full SU(2)SU(2)SU(2) strategy space it remains a Nash equilibrium, but in the unreduced game, in which every unitary is a distinct strategy, exact payoff duplicates preclude strictness and ESS for every pure strategy. For the agreement-payoff class, the payoff factors through a Bloch map; identifying payoff-equivalent unitaries gives the reduced space U(1)\SU(2)≅S2U(1)\backslash SU(2)\cong S^2U(1)\SU(2)≅S2, where strictness and ESS are restored for γ>0γ>0γ>0. An arbitrarily small perturbation outside this class that preserves p∗=1/2p^*=1/2p∗=1/2 yields a profitable deviation, so the reduced-space result is not generic.
Abstract Quantum strategies can alter the equilibrium structure of classical games, but apparent improvements may depend on arbitrary strategy labels or on the particular quantum operations admitted. Here, we characterize payoff improvement across all permissible three-strategy extensions of renaming-symmetric 2×22 \times 22×2 games within the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein framework. We preserve the classical game as a subgame and add one fixed unitary strategy, restricting attention to the three extension classes that remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. Across six canonical payoff orderings, including coordination, anti-coordination, and dominant-strategy dilemmas, we derive the conditions under which the extended games admit pure Nash equilibria whose payoffs are no lower than those of the corresponding symmetric classical equilibrium. The classical-type A0A_0A0​ extension produces no strict improvement, while B0B_0B0​ does so only in restricted regions and generally asymmetrically. By contrast, the genuinely quantum C0C_0C0​ extension supports non-inferior equilibria across all six classes and yields strict, mutually beneficial improvements in identifiable payoff regions. These results move beyond isolated game examples by showing precisely when representation-invariant quantum extensions can improve equilibrium payoffs and when they cannot. These conditions provide a design map for quantum-enabled multi-agent protocols by identifying the payoff structures under which an added quantum strategy can improve equilibrium outcomes without altering the players' underlying preferences.
We study how strategic interaction can arise from controlled quantum dynamics rather than being imposed as an external mathematical structure. We introduce a class of interaction-defined quantum games in which players are represented by distinguishable quantum walkers, strategies correspond to local coin operations, and payoffs are defined as expectation values of physical observables. Using interacting discrete-time quantum walks as a concrete platform, we demonstrate numerically that competitive, cooperative, and asymmetric games admit stable stationary strategy profiles when the walkers are coupled, while no non-trivial equilibria exist in the absence of interaction. To clarify the game-theoretic structure, we derive an analytic perturbative decomposition of the payoff function in the weak-interaction regime, showing explicitly that strategic coupling originates from interaction-induced interference terms in the joint probability distribution. For a collision-based phase interaction, the payoff becomes non-separable at first order in the interaction strength and generically admits stationary points satisfying the Nash conditions. Our results provide a physically explicit realization of strategic interdependence in quantum transport processes and establish interacting quantum walks as a minimal platform for studying game-theoretic behavior emerging from unitary dynamics.
Quantum evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) are considered as stable solutions to population games on the molecular level. The distributive diagram of the games is brought out in the light of their rescaled games, so that a convenient way to look for quantum ESSs of 2×2 symmetric games can be obtained. It is found that transpositions may take place when a game is quantized. They are related to the parameters in the classical payoff matrix and those of the initial quantum states. One can easily find quantum ESSs by referring to the tables and the figure shown in the main body. This paper draws an overall outline of NEs (Nash equilibria) and ESSs of this kind of game in the classical version as well as in the quantum version.