This text will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it, or similar thoughts. Its meaning could be summed up somewhat as follows: whatever can be said at all, can be said clearly by any speaker who is part of the world that is spoken about, and who speaks from its perspective. \noindent Of course others far better than us have already been around here. But we feel some details have been left out, which quantum phenomena have brought into sharp light, and these bring further clarity. Whoever understands us recognizes again the following propositions as senseless. After climbing through these, over them so to speak, will kick away the ladder, once more. Thanks to this futility, we feel shamelessly entitled to parrot a Master. Inspired not by his preaching but rather by his example (and not in small part by its later reflections), we have written all this, as we actually think that not to remain silent, even whereof one cannot speak, is not such a bad idea after all, maybe only, as we learned from him, to keep the warning alive that there are questions that have no meaning. What we hold onto is not knowledge of an absolute order, but the fleeting grasp of a perspective on perspectives. Hence this is at most just a manifesto for a picture of the world suggested by quantum mechanics. Each proposition attempts to show a possible way of formulating questions about nature in a manner coherent with what we have recently learned about it. A manner aware of its own partiality. Good philosophy, seems to us, dismantles idols, rather than creating them, and, like a gentle friend, reminds us with indirect hints, over and over again, that the answer to the riddle is that there is no riddle.
This text will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it, or similar thoughts. Its meaning could be summed up somewhat as follows: whatever can be said at all, can be said clearly by any speaker who is part of the world that is spoken about, and who speaks from its perspective. \noindent Of course others far better than us have already been around here. But we feel some details have been left out, which quantum phenomena have brought into sharp light, and these bring further clarity. Whoever understands us recognizes again the following propositions as senseless. After climbing through these, over them so to speak, will kick away the ladder, once more. Thanks to this futility, we feel shamelessly entitled to parrot a Master. Inspired not by his preaching but rather by his example (and not in small part by its later reflections), we have written all this, as we actually think that not to remain silent, even whereof one cannot speak, is not such a bad idea after all, maybe only, as we learned from him, to keep the warning alive that there are questions that have no meaning. What we hold onto is not knowledge of an absolute order, but the fleeting grasp of a perspective on perspectives. Hence this is at most just a manifesto for a picture of the world suggested by quantum mechanics. Each proposition attempts to show a possible way of formulating questions about nature in a manner coherent with what we have recently learned about it. A manner aware of its own partiality. Good philosophy, seems to us, dismantles idols, rather than creating them, and, like a gentle friend, reminds us with indirect hints, over and over again, that the answer to the riddle is that there is no riddle.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
Our goal in this treatment of quantum theory is to provide those aspects of the theory which are most needed for a modem understanding of the world of our experience. Central to this are the many approximations which have turned out to be successful for estimating the properties of matter and predicting the events which occur on a microscopic scale. In that sense the goal is entirely pragmatic, but any study of quantum theory cannot help but raise deep philosophical questions. Perhaps the only real understanding of the theory is through a familiarity with how it works out for many different problems. It seems unlikely that understanding comes from thinking about some complicated extreme case, such as Schroedinger's cat. The approach we take here bypasses much of the question by starting with a single premise of wave-particle duality, from which follows all of quantum theory and its interpretation. Any remaining problems are made moot by the quantum-mechanical view that questions are meaningful only if there is some conceivable experimental way to test the answers. In keeping with this pragmatic approach we will not emphasize mathematical derivations, nor carry out the detailed analysis of harmonic-oscillator states, hydrogen wavefunctions, or angular momentum, which are part of almost all texts in quantum theory. We treat the simplest case in detail, state the general results, and see that they are the plausible generalizations. We leave the more detailed analysis to other texts. The one we used for the course at Stanford was Kroemer's Quantum Mechanics for Engineers and Materials Scientists , which served very well.
If You feel that scientific theories should reveal facts about the world, you will, of course, be profoundly dissatisfied with quantum mechanics! For, as it is generally interpreted, the formalism is a tool for making predictions about outcomes of possible experiments and nothing more. Quantum mechanics has nothing to say about the nature of the physical processes that bring about the very experimental results that it predicts, yet it is supposed to be the whole story of the phenomena it speaks of (i.e. it is supposed to be "complete").
formalism, which, like propositional dictum, general and unmarked. In this understanding of interpretation, an interpreta tion always an example of more general preexisting truths, an ex emplary part for whole of truth. Moreover, this conception pre serves our common-sense idea of referential function of interpre tation and sign systems more generally: world to language refers preexists (objectively, substantially) language that de scribes it just as necessities of formal logic preexist phenom ena that exemplify those logical necessities. Interpretation, then, con sists of finding a language conforms to preexisting forms. The second concept of interpretation, Greimas and Courtes argue, is completely different. Within this perspective (which they identify with Saussurian linguistics, Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis—all intellectual movements contemporaneous with quantum theory), no longer a matter of attributing a given to a would otherwise lack one; rather, it a paraphrase formulates in another fashion equivalent con This downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 06:27:46 UTC All use to http://about.jstor.org/terms 300 Ronald Schleifer tent of a element within a given semiotic (Semiot ics and Language, 159). In this second understanding of inter pretation, and are not distinct, but rather every form is, alternatively, a semantic content as well, a signifying form, so that offers an analogical paraphrase of something already within a system of signification. Such para phrases are alternatively and different from their model, and as such raise serious questions about referential truth value that seems to govern linguistic dicta and science. That is, alternativeness of paraphrase offers what Jacques Derrida calls without paradigm ... [in elements are] at once analogous (hence series) and utterly different, offering no guaran tee of (Living On, 130). The opposition between modality and dictum presents just this seriality without paradigm. This espe cially clear in extreme case of negation of modal articulation: negation of a statement taken to be modally inflected—e.g., It not true that atom in left half of box or It not true that multiplication of two negative numbers equals a number—presents metonymic iteration without paradigm, para phrase as Like Heisenberg's between quantum theory and levels of language, this understanding of interpretation presents form of an example, yet, by virtue of fact that what it exempli fies necessarily semanticized, it offers an analogy rather than an example. Even abstract formalism of mathematics, from vantage of classical logic without content, carries meanings that be translated and paraphrased. Although number i operates like any ordinary number, when apprehended modally—when understood as a paraphrase of \J-1—it alternatively seems to be no number at all. All these difficult definitions and dis tinctions, Heisenberg writes, can be avoided if one confines lan guage to description of facts, i.e., experimental results (Physics and Philosophy, 185). In this, Heisenberg suggesting that as soon as one interprets facts—and elsewhere he defines facts of quan tum mechanics positivistically as the black spots on a photographic plate or water droplets in a cloud chamber (Physics and Philoso phy, 179)—one enters realm of dualism of alternation and paraphrase. Positivism—in facts are assumed to be simple entities like water droplets in a cloud chamber—does not admit negation. The droplets are either present or absent, there or not there, and when they are not there nothing signifies. As Jacques La This downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 06:27:46 UTC All use to http://about.jstor.org/terms Analogy and Example 301 says, the real, whatever upheaval we it to, always in its place,26 and it so precisely because, unlike symbolic systems (to Lacan opposes real), it does not admit negation. The ab sence of droplets only signifies in logic of semantics in ab sence takes on complex positive meaning within a symbolic system just as unmarked of engagement of vocal chords takes on meaning in phonological system of English in absence of voicing distinguishes phoneme /t/ from /d/. These two traditions of interpretation—one classical, other modernist—themselves present a complex double articulation in same way twentieth-century linguistics and Bohr's description of complementarity do. In this complexity, distinction between these traditions not absolute, but rather alternates as a function of questions asked so that interpretation itself remains undecided. Interpretation and understanding, in Emile Benveniste's terms, are cultural phenomena which have characteristic that they never be taken as simple or defined in order of their own na ture but must always be understood as double from fact that they are to something else, whatever their 'referent' may be.27 In an analogical way, nature of data of physics, at least at subatomic scales, cannot simply be defined in order of their own nature. Instead, in same way that even most straight forward, self-evident literal propositions of a sentence—even pure informative (or non-modalized) utterances Greimas and Courtes describe (Semiotics and Language, 10)—can always also be taken to be a figure for something metonymically of them (such as being behind doing, force behind events, very subject articulating propositions that Nietzsche describes), so of quantum physics also always be taken to be connected to something else outside that data: of (modally in flected) knowledge, quality of spatial and temporal position, semiotic system that governs interpretation.
ENERAL philosophy claims to be the critical subject which lays down for all of us what we may be allowed to think, and yet it has played no part whatever in the great revolutions of human thought of the present century-those connected with relativity and the quantum theory. It might have been expected that the scientists would have been constantly consulting the philosophers as to the legitimacy of their various speculations, but nothing of the kind has happened. Since no one can dispense with some sort of metaphysic, each scientist has made one for himself, and no doubt they contain many crudities, but it would seem that a deep interest in metaphysic is a disadvantage rather than an advantage to the physicist-at least I have the impression that those of my friends who are most inclined to speculate on the ultimate things appear to be the ones whose scientific work is most hampered by doing so. Now I propose to risk a similar indiscretion. I want to embody in it the practical philosophy of a physicist, and I do not mean it as an attack on the pure philosophers, who are very reasonable people, only chargeable with the minor offence of not having made me want to read their books! I had better begin by stating shortly the ideas I intend to discuss. There is a notable contrast between the way we think about things and the way we think we ought to think about them.
Many chapters in this book are followed by problems (see page 10) that pertain specifically to that chapter. This appendix contains questions of a more general character. These questions are designed either to consolidate your understanding or to extend your knowledge. The latter sort of question will require further study, such as through reading books listed in the references. But answering the questions will generally require considerable analytic thought and not just parroting a book from the library. D.1 Is God a deceiver ? A central element of René Descartes's philosophy is that we can usually trust our sensual perceptions because God is not a deceiver. The macroscopic world seems to obey the deterministic laws of Newton, yet quantum mechanics maintains that this is just an appearance: the actual laws of physics are probabilistic not deterministic. Does this mean that Descartes was wrong and that God is a deceiver? D.2 Is quantum mechanics really strange ? Throughout this account (beginning with its title) I have emphasized that I find quantum mechanics to be strange. My question here: Is quantum mechanics intrinsically weird, or do I find it weird only because of the way I was brought up? For example, in the Middle Ages most people were brought up believing the earth to be flat. The round earth model must have seemed extraordinarily strange to them when it was first broached. (For example, it must have seemed paradoxical that you could travel always due east and yet eventually arrive back at your starting point.) Yet today even children find nothing unnatural about the round earth because they have heard about it from infancy.