formalism, which, like propositional dictum, general and unmarked. In this understanding of interpretation, an interpreta tion always an example of more general preexisting truths, an ex emplary part for whole of truth. Moreover, this conception pre serves our common-sense idea of referential function of interpre tation and sign systems more generally: world to language refers preexists (objectively, substantially) language that de scribes it just as necessities of formal logic preexist phenom ena that exemplify those logical necessities. Interpretation, then, con sists of finding a language conforms to preexisting forms. The second concept of interpretation, Greimas and Courtes argue, is completely different. Within this perspective (which they identify with Saussurian linguistics, Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis—all intellectual movements contemporaneous with quantum theory), no longer a matter of attributing a given to a would otherwise lack one; rather, it a paraphrase formulates in another fashion equivalent con This downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 06:27:46 UTC All use to http://about.jstor.org/terms 300 Ronald Schleifer tent of a element within a given semiotic (Semiot ics and Language, 159). In this second understanding of inter pretation, and are not distinct, but rather every form is, alternatively, a semantic content as well, a signifying form, so that offers an analogical paraphrase of something already within a system of signification. Such para phrases are alternatively and different from their model, and as such raise serious questions about referential truth value that seems to govern linguistic dicta and science. That is, alternativeness of paraphrase offers what Jacques Derrida calls without paradigm ... [in elements are] at once analogous (hence series) and utterly different, offering no guaran tee of (Living On, 130). The opposition between modality and dictum presents just this seriality without paradigm. This espe cially clear in extreme case of negation of modal articulation: negation of a statement taken to be modally inflected—e.g., It not true that atom in left half of box or It not true that multiplication of two negative numbers equals a number—presents metonymic iteration without paradigm, para phrase as Like Heisenberg's between quantum theory and levels of language, this understanding of interpretation presents form of an example, yet, by virtue of fact that what it exempli fies necessarily semanticized, it offers an analogy rather than an example. Even abstract formalism of mathematics, from vantage of classical logic without content, carries meanings that be translated and paraphrased. Although number i operates like any ordinary number, when apprehended modally—when understood as a paraphrase of \J-1—it alternatively seems to be no number at all. All these difficult definitions and dis tinctions, Heisenberg writes, can be avoided if one confines lan guage to description of facts, i.e., experimental results (Physics and Philosophy, 185). In this, Heisenberg suggesting that as soon as one interprets facts—and elsewhere he defines facts of quan tum mechanics positivistically as the black spots on a photographic plate or water droplets in a cloud chamber (Physics and Philoso phy, 179)—one enters realm of dualism of alternation and paraphrase. Positivism—in facts are assumed to be simple entities like water droplets in a cloud chamber—does not admit negation. The droplets are either present or absent, there or not there, and when they are not there nothing signifies. As Jacques La This downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 06:27:46 UTC All use to http://about.jstor.org/terms Analogy and Example 301 says, the real, whatever upheaval we it to, always in its place,26 and it so precisely because, unlike symbolic systems (to Lacan opposes real), it does not admit negation. The ab sence of droplets only signifies in logic of semantics in ab sence takes on complex positive meaning within a symbolic system just as unmarked of engagement of vocal chords takes on meaning in phonological system of English in absence of voicing distinguishes phoneme /t/ from /d/. These two traditions of interpretation—one classical, other modernist—themselves present a complex double articulation in same way twentieth-century linguistics and Bohr's description of complementarity do. In this complexity, distinction between these traditions not absolute, but rather alternates as a function of questions asked so that interpretation itself remains undecided. Interpretation and understanding, in Emile Benveniste's terms, are cultural phenomena which have characteristic that they never be taken as simple or defined in order of their own na ture but must always be understood as double from fact that they are to something else, whatever their 'referent' may be.27 In an analogical way, nature of data of physics, at least at subatomic scales, cannot simply be defined in order of their own nature. Instead, in same way that even most straight forward, self-evident literal propositions of a sentence—even pure informative (or non-modalized) utterances Greimas and Courtes describe (Semiotics and Language, 10)—can always also be taken to be a figure for something metonymically of them (such as being behind doing, force behind events, very subject articulating propositions that Nietzsche describes), so of quantum physics also always be taken to be connected to something else outside that data: of (modally in flected) knowledge, quality of spatial and temporal position, semiotic system that governs interpretation.
formalism, which, like propositional dictum, general and unmarked. In this understanding of interpretation, an interpreta tion always an example of more general preexisting truths, an ex emplary part for whole of truth. Moreover, this conception pre serves our common-sense idea of referential function of interpre tation and sign systems more generally: world to language refers preexists (objectively, substantially) language that de scribes it just as necessities of formal logic preexist phenom ena that exemplify those logical necessities. Interpretation, then, con sists of finding a language conforms to preexisting forms. The second concept of interpretation, Greimas and Courtes argue, is completely different. Within this perspective (which they identify with Saussurian linguistics, Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis—all intellectual movements contemporaneous with quantum theory), no longer a matter of attributing a given to a would otherwise lack one; rather, it a paraphrase formulates in another fashion equivalent con This downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 06:27:46 UTC All use to http://about.jstor.org/terms 300 Ronald Schleifer tent of a element within a given semiotic (Semiot ics and Language, 159). In this second understanding of inter pretation, and are not distinct, but rather every form is, alternatively, a semantic content as well, a signifying form, so that offers an analogical paraphrase of something already within a system of signification. Such para phrases are alternatively and different from their model, and as such raise serious questions about referential truth value that seems to govern linguistic dicta and science. That is, alternativeness of paraphrase offers what Jacques Derrida calls without paradigm ... [in elements are] at once analogous (hence series) and utterly different, offering no guaran tee of (Living On, 130). The opposition between modality and dictum presents just this seriality without paradigm. This espe cially clear in extreme case of negation of modal articulation: negation of a statement taken to be modally inflected—e.g., It not true that atom in left half of box or It not true that multiplication of two negative numbers equals a number—presents metonymic iteration without paradigm, para phrase as Like Heisenberg's between quantum theory and levels of language, this understanding of interpretation presents form of an example, yet, by virtue of fact that what it exempli fies necessarily semanticized, it offers an analogy rather than an example. Even abstract formalism of mathematics, from vantage of classical logic without content, carries meanings that be translated and paraphrased. Although number i operates like any ordinary number, when apprehended modally—when understood as a paraphrase of \J-1—it alternatively seems to be no number at all. All these difficult definitions and dis tinctions, Heisenberg writes, can be avoided if one confines lan guage to description of facts, i.e., experimental results (Physics and Philosophy, 185). In this, Heisenberg suggesting that as soon as one interprets facts—and elsewhere he defines facts of quan tum mechanics positivistically as the black spots on a photographic plate or water droplets in a cloud chamber (Physics and Philoso phy, 179)—one enters realm of dualism of alternation and paraphrase. Positivism—in facts are assumed to be simple entities like water droplets in a cloud chamber—does not admit negation. The droplets are either present or absent, there or not there, and when they are not there nothing signifies. As Jacques La This downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 06:27:46 UTC All use to http://about.jstor.org/terms Analogy and Example 301 says, the real, whatever upheaval we it to, always in its place,26 and it so precisely because, unlike symbolic systems (to Lacan opposes real), it does not admit negation. The ab sence of droplets only signifies in logic of semantics in ab sence takes on complex positive meaning within a symbolic system just as unmarked of engagement of vocal chords takes on meaning in phonological system of English in absence of voicing distinguishes phoneme /t/ from /d/. These two traditions of interpretation—one classical, other modernist—themselves present a complex double articulation in same way twentieth-century linguistics and Bohr's description of complementarity do. In this complexity, distinction between these traditions not absolute, but rather alternates as a function of questions asked so that interpretation itself remains undecided. Interpretation and understanding, in Emile Benveniste's terms, are cultural phenomena which have characteristic that they never be taken as simple or defined in order of their own na ture but must always be understood as double from fact that they are to something else, whatever their 'referent' may be.27 In an analogical way, nature of data of physics, at least at subatomic scales, cannot simply be defined in order of their own nature. Instead, in same way that even most straight forward, self-evident literal propositions of a sentence—even pure informative (or non-modalized) utterances Greimas and Courtes describe (Semiotics and Language, 10)—can always also be taken to be a figure for something metonymically of them (such as being behind doing, force behind events, very subject articulating propositions that Nietzsche describes), so of quantum physics also always be taken to be connected to something else outside that data: of (modally in flected) knowledge, quality of spatial and temporal position, semiotic system that governs interpretation.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative
In dieser Arbeit wird ein Klassifikations-Schema prasentiert, anhand dessen die Eigenheiten der verschiedenen Interpretationen der Quantenmechanik bezuglich des Formalismus, der Deutung, der verwendeten Konzepte und der Ontologie verglichen werden konnen. Mithilfe des Schemas wird die Einsteinsche Konzeption von Realitat im Kontext mit dem EPR Paradoxon untersucht. Dabei wird der Begriff der
Vollstandigkeit, der bei dem EPR-Argument von zentraler Bedeutung ist, analysiert und in seiner vielfaltigen Verwendung definiert. Begleitet wird die Darstellung von einem Uberblick zu den Schematas verwandter Konzeptionen zu der Strukturen von wissenschaftlichen Theorien. Diese entwickelten sich mit dem Aufkommen des logischen Empirismus und erfuhren eine wesentliche Entwicklung und Wandlung im Hinblick auf die Realismus-Debatte.
Die Anwendbarkeit von Ockham's razor in den Interpretationen der Quantenmechanik wird anhand einer historischen Analyse der Ursprunge dieser Heuristik untersucht und hinterfragt. Die Anwendung in ontologischen Aussagen und Argumenten von verschiedenen Interpretationen wird einer kritischen Analyse unterzogen.
Die verschiedenen Konzepte von Realitat die in der klassischen Physik, im EPRArgument, den Bell-Ungleichungen, und dem Kochen-Specker-Theorem verwendet werden, werden definiert und gebrauchlichen Realitatskonzepten in der Wissenschaftstheorie gegenubergestellt. Dabei zeigt sich der strukturelle Realismus als vielversprechender Ansatz um die weltanschaulichen Probleme der Quantenmechanik zu bewaltigen, indem auf die primare Rolle von Objekten verzichtet wird.
Anhand des Klassifikationsschemas wird der ontologische Gehalt der verschiedenen Interpretationen untersucht und gegenubergestellt. Dabei wird die jeweilige Konzeption von Realitat prasentiert.
Purpose The paper aims to provide a semiotic interpretation of the role played by entanglement in quantum-based models aimed to information retrieval and suggests possible improvements. Actual models are capable of retrieving documents relevant to a query composed of a keyword and its acceptation expressed by a given context. The paper also considers some analogies between this technique and quantum-based approaches in other disciplines to discuss the consequence of this quantum turn, as epistemology and philosophy of language are concerned. Design/methodology/approach We use quantum geometry to design a formal model for textual semiotics. In particular, the authors refer to Greimas’s work on semantics and information theory, to Eco’s writings on semantic memory and to Lotman’s work on a cybernetic notion of culture. Findings Quantum approaches imply a particular point of view on meaning. Meaning is not a real, positive quality of a given word. It is a net of relations constructed in the text, whose value is progressively determined during the reading process. Furthermore, reading is not a neutral operation: to read is to determine meaning. If it is said that, from a general semiotic point of view, meaning is stored in quantum semantic memories and is read/written by semantic machines, then the operation of “reading/writing” is analogous to the operation of measuring in quantum theory: in other terms, meaning is a value, and this implies an instance (not necessarily human) according to which values are valuable. Research limitations/implications The authors are not proposing a complete quantum semantics. At the present, quantum information retrieval can detect the presence of semantic relations. The authors suggest a way to characterize them, leaving open the problem on how to formalize the document as a vector in four-state semantic space. Practical implications A quantum turn shows deep semiotic implications on the approach to language, which shows an immanent semantic organization not reducible to syntax and morphology. This organization is probabilistic and indeterministic and explains to what extent text fixes the meaning of its lexical units. Social implications In the authors’ perspective, signification is not the exclusivity of a human subject. Criticizing Turing test, the great semiotic and cybernetic scholar Jurij Lotman wrote that if we identify “intelligent” and “human”, we raise the failings of an actual form of intelligence to the rank of an essential characteristic. On this line, meaning is considered as a feature of social, artificial and biological systems. Originality/value The adoption of quantum formalism seems in line with cybernetic framework, involving a probabilistic, non-cartesian point of view on meaning aimed to critically discuss the human–machine relation. Furthermore, Quantum theory (QT) implies a phenomenological point of view on the conditions of possibility of meaning.
The complete and atomic orthomodular lattice structure which is formed by the projectors (or equivalently, by the closed subspaces) of a complex and separable Hilbert space will be indicated in this paper by LG (H), where H is the Hilbert space. (We take operations and distinct elements for granted.) LG (H) is, classically considered, the “typical” logic of quantum mechanics, in the following sense: if H is the space associated with physical system S, then H’s rays, the ultramaximal operators, etc., represent typical properties of S, such as observable states and magnitudes. LG (H) is simply an element in model sets of more general theories such as the orthomodular lattice set, which we formalize in § 2, using a second-order logic. This generalization, which we call “formal” because it consists merely of giving more permissive axioms that facilitate the apparition of new structures other than LG (H), can yet be extended. In § 2 we use infinitarian logics, where a numerable number of conjunctions and quantificators is permitted, to express the theory of orthomodular partially ordered sets (posets). That formulation uses essentially the logic called (omega-1, omega-1), and a conjecture is raised about proving it cannot be realized within a weaker logic. The way to prove this, it is suggested, should be analogous to the way the indefinability of well-ordering is proved. Such generalizations are analogous to those obtained when we pass, e.g., from the field of real numbers to any commutative, Archimedian, etc., field; then to a commutative ring with and unity, and so on. They are, therefore, formal, in the sense that (1) they do not “say” much about the initial structure which motivated the generalization and that (2) in generalizing, we allow the “entrance” of new structures that have little to do with the original motivation. For instance, in the theory of orthomodular lattices, besides Hilbert-space logics (or those based on other topological vectorial spaces), new models appear, such as finite or orthomodular lattices, for which the name “quantum logic” has little sense. In § 3 we study the modifications, and eventual generalizations, of the basic structure that generates quantum logic, i.e., the infinite-dimensional separable complex Hilbert space structure. A first way seems to be the generalizing of the field, and it is analyzed in § 3.1. In principle, it seems natural to admit that the field must contain some copy of the field of real numbers, or have at least an expressive force as great as theirs. This is why the use of real fields —and for a greater certainty, of complex fields— in the H spaces of quantum mechanics seems to be fully justified. They study of quaternions, carried on by Emch and others, but not clearly completed yet, could lead to an equivalent quantum mechanics, notwithstanding the non-commutativity of this field. Anyway, real, complex and quaternions seem to be only fields with a “natural” right to sustentate these spaces. The incompleteness of rational fields, and their undesirable properties as to dimension and measurability, cause them to be rejected. Other proposals are studied. Leaving aside Hensel’s bodies, that seem to be wholly different in nature, we are left with p-adics Qp and Galois’ fields as the only reasonable candidates. Know algebraic results are then invoked, according to which an extension or completion of these bodies would not lead to the desired results. Quite simply, we would not, save on trivial instances, have any logic at all. It is a well-known fact that by completing p-adic fields (let K be such a completion) we arrive at space (V, K) upon that field, which does not allow to define hermitian forms for dimensions greater than 4. Actually, no involutory anti-automorphism of the field (such as complex conjugation) permits to associate any quadratic form for a dimension greater than or equal to 5. Things are even worse in the case of Galois’ fields where limitative results begin to appear already in dimensions greater than 2. In § 3.2 we choose to accept the complex numbers body C as a canonic body, and see whether it is possible to generalize space into a class that need not be Hilbert’s. There are various possibilities: to consider Banach spaces, or else more or less general local convex spaces, and particularly, to focus analysis on Mackey spaces. For Banach spaces there appear Maczynski’s limitative results; for Mackey spaces, “analogous” results from Wilbur. (Cf. references at the end of the essay.) As a matter of fact, only infinite-dimensional spaces can be of any interest. In this case, if a Mackey space has an “acceptable” topology, i.e., a stronger one than the so-called weak convergence topology, and its LG (M) is really a logic, then M is once again a Hilbert space. Several of these results to the conclusion that we can hardly obtain a different logic (a more general or anyway more informative one) by taking the class LG (E) of some non-Hilbert space E. Rayski’s proposition about substituting Schwartz space for Hilbert space is also considered, but although such a substitution would modify actual work “within” the space in the interests of formalization, it is natural to expect the apparition of a logic LG (S), equivalent to former logics. Maybe the part special logics play in quantum mechanics will be entirely unnecessary when the axiomatizing of a physical system can be done in terms of some kind of spaces that leaves no doubt about its usefulness. [C.L.]
Le débat sur l'interprétation de la mécanique quantique est, aujourd'hui, sensiblement différent de ce qu'il était dans la période de «fondation» de cette théorie. Cette modification tient à deux causes : l'ancrage des conceptions quantiques dans la pensée des physiciens, favorisé par l'utilisation systématique et fructueuse de la théorie quantique en physique atomique et subatomique, d'une part et, d'autre part, les développements théoriques et expérimentaux survenus au cours des vingt dernières années, qui ont amené à considérer comme des faits physiques des énoncés qui paraissaient naguère relever davantage de l'interprétation, avec liberté d'options, voire de la spéculation. Quelle est la signification des énoncés et des concepts théoriques de la physique quantique ? et comment celle-ci s'est-elle modifiée ? Qu'entend-on par «interprétation» ? Telles sont les questions qui servent de guide à ce travail. Nous nous proposons de clarifier ce qui, dans les questions de signification, relève respectivement de la physique (essentiellement les contenus conceptuels et théoriques), et de perspectives philosophiques. Cette distinction est plus nette aujourd'hui qu'elle ne l'était au moment de l'établissement de la mécanique quantique, ce qui permet d'approfondir notre compréhension de chacun de ces deux aspects, qui s'enrichissent mutuellement de cette clarification. Nous nous interrogeons, pour terminer, sur ce que peut être une conception réaliste en termes d'un «monde d'objets quantiques».
Niels Bohr thought that what quantum mechanics has taught us is not only to understand something new, but also a new meaning of the term “to understand”. Bohr wanted to free himself from ontology by putting emphasis on epistemology; i.e. on certain conditions for observation and description. He believed that the epistemological lesson of quantum mechanics was a crucial one. Basically it has two important aspects. 1. Bohr's philosophy leads to a break with the so-called correspondence theory for truth and meaning. It states that true propositions are descriptions of a world that is independent of our observations; i.e. that on a regular basis one can compare with reality, that is, in compare the two areas against each other. Bohr believed that this did not make sense, since in many situations cannot add meaning to a world that has a sich structure (the thing-in-itself), which in turn can be depicted when observed. 2. All knowledge is attained under certain conditions for description. Bohr thought that the long-lasting criterion for valid knowledge is that can communicate it unambiguously to each other. When Bohr emphasised that we are suspended in language in the sense that all knowledge determines what can say about the world in an understandable way, and not what the world actually is, this must be understood in the sense that only know the world as recognised; i.e., structured on the basis of the conditions for description, to which are, as part of the world, necessarily are subjected to. Bohr's emphasis on conditions for descriptions invalidates the well-known distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. An important feature of the descriptive use of ordinary language, as well as in classical physics, is that description is based on a dividing line between subject and object. This results in idealism and materialism not being tenable positions. Furthermore, it is such that cannot use the designation of things independently of the designation of time and space. Logical principles are only meaningfully applied in situations relating to our conditions for observation. So based on inspiration from Bohr, Favrholdt developed a more adequate and comprehensive philosophy, where he, among other things, states that all humans possess a fundamental language, underlying all languages. This constitutes a number of concepts – the core – where the correct use is dictated by the structure of the world, which humans learn through sensory perception and action.