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Physics World

Radical steps towards a quantum ontology

Constantine Pagonis

Published Jul 1, 1994• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

If You feel that scientific theories should reveal facts about the world, you will, of course, be profoundly dissatisfied with quantum mechanics! For, as it is generally interpreted, the formalism is a tool for making predictions about outcomes of possible experiments and nothing more. Quantum mechanics has nothing to say about the nature of the physical processes that bring about the very experimental results that it predicts, yet it is supposed to be the whole story of the phenomena it speaks of (i.e. it is supposed to be "complete").

DOI
10.1088/2058-7058/7/7/35

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If You feel that scientific theories should reveal facts about the world, you will, of course, be profoundly dissatisfied with quantum mechanics! For, as it is generally interpreted, the formalism is a tool for making predictions about outcomes of possible experiments and nothing more. Quantum mechanics has nothing to say about the nature of the physical processes that bring about the very experimental results that it predicts, yet it is supposed to be the whole story of the phenomena it speaks of (i.e. it is supposed to be "complete").
According to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, the apparent paradoxes of quantum theory require no change either in our philosophical attitude toward scientific theories or in the formalism of quantum mechanics itself. Rather, the unaltered theory can be understood as a literal description of physical reality. But the physical reality thus described is one of many noninteracting, approximately classical worlds. These worlds enter the theory not at the fundamental level—they are nowhere to be found in the basic formalism—but at a higher, emergent level; in this sense they are (ontologically speaking) on a par with the ontology of the special sciences.
When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory.
This essay seeks to understand just what it is that modern science tells us about nature. For the longest time the story told by science appeared to be fully reflective of our common experience: nature was discovered as a collection of reciprocally influencing objects governed by laws which were consistent with that experience. And then, about a hundred years ago, the story suddenly became obscure. Science introduced into nature quantum objects which were supposed to look nothing like anything we had ever seen before and the laws governing them no longer appeared to make much sense to us. Thereafter, what science told us about nature was no longer quite as clear. This shift in the story is conspicuous and bespeaks of an earlier moment in the development of science when the project might have inadvertently taken a step which would eventually make her strange. The essay suggests that the scientific community had in fact made a fateful decision which inevitably led it to the strangeness of quantum mechanics and specifically identifies it as the decision to experimentally observe the constituents of matter as if they were real objects. It then proceeds to determine just what those constituents are if not objectively real and to specify the unique manner in which such objects are what they are. This focus on what constituents of matter are, rather than on how they constitute the inside of natural objects, classifies the essay as an investigation of the ontological side of modern science. Finally, the essay considers the alternative ontologies which could have been entertained for these objects at the time the decision was made to experimentally observe them and shows how 'skipping over' such alternatives generated the specific ways in which quantum mechanics, the theory describing the results of such experiments, had to be strange.
Despite its enormous practical success, quantum theory is so contrary to intuition that, even after 45 years, the experts themselves still do not all agree what to make of it. The area of disagreement centers primarily around the problem of describing observations. Formally, the result of a measurement is a superposition of vectors, each representing the quantity being observed as having one of its possible values. The question that has to be answered is how this superposition can be reconciled with the fact that in practice we only observe one value. How is the measuring instrument prodded into making up its mind which value it has observed?
Abstract Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics (QM) works perfectly well for all practical purposes. Once one admits, however, that a successful scientific theory is supposed not only to make predictions but also to tell us a story about the world in which we live, a philosophical problem emerges: in the specific case of QM, it is not possible to associate with the theory a unique scientific image of the world; there are several images. The fact that the theory may be compatible with distinct ontologies, and that those ontologies may themselves be associated with a plurality of metaphysical approaches, gives rise to the problem of metaphysical underdetermination. This paper concludes that the available metametaphysical criteria fail to deliver objectivity in theory choice, and it puts forward its own criterion based on a tension between two methods of metaphysical inquiry: one that is closely related to science and another that is not.