Many chapters in this book are followed by problems (see page 10) that pertain specifically to that chapter. This appendix contains questions of a more general character. These questions are designed either to consolidate your understanding or to extend your knowledge. The latter sort of question will require further study, such as through reading books listed in the references. But answering the questions will generally require considerable analytic thought and not just parroting a book from the library. D.1 Is God a deceiver ? A central element of René Descartes's philosophy is that we can usually trust our sensual perceptions because God is not a deceiver. The macroscopic world seems to obey the deterministic laws of Newton, yet quantum mechanics maintains that this is just an appearance: the actual laws of physics are probabilistic not deterministic. Does this mean that Descartes was wrong and that God is a deceiver? D.2 Is quantum mechanics really strange ? Throughout this account (beginning with its title) I have emphasized that I find quantum mechanics to be strange. My question here: Is quantum mechanics intrinsically weird, or do I find it weird only because of the way I was brought up? For example, in the Middle Ages most people were brought up believing the earth to be flat. The round earth model must have seemed extraordinarily strange to them when it was first broached. (For example, it must have seemed paradoxical that you could travel always due east and yet eventually arrive back at your starting point.) Yet today even children find nothing unnatural about the round earth because they have heard about it from infancy.
Many chapters in this book are followed by problems (see page 10) that pertain specifically to that chapter. This appendix contains questions of a more general character. These questions are designed either to consolidate your understanding or to extend your knowledge. The latter sort of question will require further study, such as through reading books listed in the references. But answering the questions will generally require considerable analytic thought and not just parroting a book from the library. D.1 Is God a deceiver ? A central element of René Descartes's philosophy is that we can usually trust our sensual perceptions because God is not a deceiver. The macroscopic world seems to obey the deterministic laws of Newton, yet quantum mechanics maintains that this is just an appearance: the actual laws of physics are probabilistic not deterministic. Does this mean that Descartes was wrong and that God is a deceiver? D.2 Is quantum mechanics really strange ? Throughout this account (beginning with its title) I have emphasized that I find quantum mechanics to be strange. My question here: Is quantum mechanics intrinsically weird, or do I find it weird only because of the way I was brought up? For example, in the Middle Ages most people were brought up believing the earth to be flat. The round earth model must have seemed extraordinarily strange to them when it was first broached. (For example, it must have seemed paradoxical that you could travel always due east and yet eventually arrive back at your starting point.) Yet today even children find nothing unnatural about the round earth because they have heard about it from infancy.
In the Preface to this book, we started with Alice and Bob having very different views of their observations. Alice used an optical telescope and reported nothing unusual about a distant galaxy that she could see. Bob, on the other hand, detected intense radio activity in that galaxy. Our question was: who has the true view of that galaxy? We advised the reader that the answer is not Alice . Neither is it Bob . The answer is not both of them , nor is it neither of them . It is not a trick question either. So what is the answer that this book would supply? Our answer will come presently. While this book has set forth a definite mathematical perspective on empirical physics, it has contained quite a lot of commentary that might be disparaged as metaphysics or philosophy. Such commentary is generally frowned on in science, because it has no empirical content. It is vacuous. In our defense, we point out the obvious: science is not a robotic activity; it is carried out by humans and these are driven by their metaphysical, philosophical, and emotional imperatives. For instance, the hard-core scientific view that quantum theory needs no interpretation but only application is itself a philosophy. It is no more than a conditioned response, based on opinion and subscription to current scientific norms. It is, indeed, a philosophy of how to do quantum mechanics. So we all do it, in one way or another. Our concern in this book is that the way that we do it should be based soundly on scientific principles. The quantized detector approach that we describe and use in this book is our attempt to do just that. There is an excellent paper on all of this that has the provocative title “Quantum Theory Needs No Interpretation,” by Fuchs and Peres (2000). It seems on the face of it to dismiss any sort of “interpretation” of quantum mechanics. In fact, close reading of it confirms (to us at least) the agenda that we have set out in this book. Yes, quantum mechanics needs no interpretation, when it is being applied to processes that take place in the information void .
У раду су размотрени квантни ефекти за које се вјерује да могу имати важну улогу у одвијању неких биохемијских процеса у живој ћелији. Укратко су размотрени аргументи који говоре у прилог опстајању квантних ефеката у биомолекуларним системима. Приказани су неки важни примјери чије објашњење се заснива на постојању квантних ефеката. У првом реду, представњени су модели који обја- шњавају стабилност и високу ефикасност пријеноса неких типова побу- ђења на субмолекуларном нивоу, важних у процесима тзв. ћелијског дисања и уопште у биоенергетици. Након тога је размотрена могућа улога квантно сплетених стања пара електрона, који могу бити одго- ворни за орјентацију живих организама у вањском магнетном пољу.
A physics-based understanding of how our conscious thoughts can affect our physically described brains is presented. This understanding depends on the shift from the mechanical conception of nature that prevailed in science from the time of Isaac Newton until the dawn of the twentieth century to the psychophysical conception that emerged from the findings of Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, and von Neumann. This shift converted the role of our conscious thoughts from that of passive observers of a causally closed physically described universe to that of active participants in an essentially psychophysical understanding of nature. 1. The Basic Question and Why It Is Important. Science’s conception of the physical world changed radically during the twentieth century. At the end of the nineteenth century most scientists still viewed the physical universe as essentially a giant machine. This mechanical view emerged from the seventeenth century work of Isaac Newton, who built his conception of nature on the ideas of Rene Descartes. According to Descartes, the universe is composed of two kinds of elements, the first consisting of elements each of which occupies at each instant of time a definite region in space, and the second consisting of elements that include our human thoughts. Descartes allowed these two parts of nature to interact causally within our brains, but Newton specified that the motions of the elements of the first kind are completely determined by laws of motion that refer exclusively to elements of this kind. In Newtonian-type physics these elements of the first kind are, moreover, essentially mechanical, in the sense that they have been stripped of the experiential qualities that characterize our thoughts, such as the conscious awareness of feelings, and the capacity to grasp meanings. Consequently there is in Newtonian-type physics no possibility for any causally effective role for any aspects of our being that are essentially different in kind from the mechanical elements that occur in that type of physics. Descartes’ views accommodated our intuitive feeling that our conscious thoughts can influence our bodily movements – my conscious intent to raise my arm seems to cause my arm to rise – whereas Newton’s physics leads to the contrary conclusion that, in spite of what may seem to be the case, the notion that human thoughts, per se, can affect human actions is a deeply misleading illusion. Newton’s ideas led eventually to the classical physics of the late nineteenth century. Its main premises are these: 2 1. There exists a material universe that develops over the course of time by means of interactions of its tiny mechanical parts with neighboring tiny mechanical parts. 2. These interactions are governed by mathematical laws. 3. These laws entail that the mechanically described future is completely determined by the mechanically described past, with no reference to human thoughts, choices, or
Abstract The strange behaviour of photons described in the last chapter immediately raises all sorts of difficult questions about the meaning of quantum theory. We might be encouraged to look for this meaning by going back to the theory’s mathematical formalism, perhaps by trying to find out how we might better interpret some of its elements. However, it is a central argument of this book that, no matter where we look, we are always led back to philosophy. At first sight, this might seem to be an odd thing to claim. After all, modem textbooks on quantum physics and chemistry rarely (if ever) discuss philosophy. We accept that the behaviour of photons is strange, but surely it is something that we can at least study experimentally—do we need philosophy in these circumstances? The answer is most certainly yes. Quantum theory directly challenges our understanding of the nature of matter and radiation, and the process of measurement at their most elementary levels, and we cannot go forward unless we adopt some kind of interpretation, some way of trying to make sense of it all. As we will see, this interpretation has to be based on some philosophical position.