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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Time's arrow and the quantum measurement problem

Anthony J. Leggett

Published Aug 24, 1995• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

More them any other topic in the foundations of physics, the problem of the arrow (or arrows!) of time seems to be characterized by a unique ‘slipperiness’: it is not only difficult to find answers to the questions once posed, but difficult to find meaningful questions to ask in the first place. Perhaps this is because an asymmetry with respect to the sense of time is built into us at an even deeper level than other ‘synthetic a priori’ conceptions about the world such as the continued existence of unknown objects. However that may be, in this situation, rather than trying to pose general questions which may turn out in the end to be ill-defined, there may be something to be said for trying to formulate much less speculative, indeed perhaps in retrospect trivial questions to which at least we have a hope of finding a definite answer. This is what I shall do in this essay: to be specific, I shall ask whether a test which is currently being designed concerning the validity of a certain ‘common-sense’ view of the macroscopic world (‘macrorealism’) would be affected if we were to relax our common-sense assumptions about the direction of causality in time.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511622861.006

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Conclusions and outlook

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If even some of the ideas presented here are correct, the world is different from what it seems. The major theses of the book, on time's arrows and on quantum measurement theory, are unified by the notion of cryptic constraints. We see, sense, specify, macroscopic states, but what we predict about these states depends on an important assumption concerning their microscopic situation. The assumption is that the actual microstate is equally likely to be any of those consistent with the macrostate. And I say, not so. For various reasons, both classical and quantum, many otherwise-possible microstates are eliminated. As presented in detail in previous chapters, such elimination impacts many areas of physics, from the cosmos to the atom. But we also make the point that this elimination can be difficult to notice and in particular there is no experimental evidence that confirms the usual assumption. By an explicit example on a model (Fig. 4.3.2), we show that a future constraint eliminating 98% of the microstates can go completely unnoticed.

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The measurement problem of quantum mechanics was probably born in 1926: ‘Thus Schrödinger’s quantum mechanics gives a very definite answer to the question of the outcome of a collision; however, this does not involve any causal relationship. One obtains no answer to the question “what is the state after the collision,” but only to the question “how probable is a specific outcome of the collision” (in which the quantum-mechanical law of [conservation of] energy must of course be satisfied). This raises the entire problem of determinism. From the standpoint of our quantum mechanics, there is no quantity that could causally establish the outcome of a collision in each individual case; however, so far we are not aware of any experimental clue to the effect that there are internal properties of atoms that enforce some particular outcome. Should we hope to discover such properties that determine individual outcomes later (perhaps phases of the internal atomic motions)? Or should we believe that the agreement between theory and experiment concerning our inability to give conditions for a causal course of events is some pre-established harmony that is based on the non-existence of such conditions? I myself tend to relinquish determinism in the atomic world. But this is [also] a philosophical question, for which physical arguments alone are not decisive.’ (Born, 1926a, p. 866; translation by the author) These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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It is brought forward that viable theories of the physical world that have no variable at all that can play the role of time, do not exist; some notion of time is one of the very first ingredients a candidate theory should possess. Almost by definition, time has an arrow. In contrast, time reversibility, or even the possibility to run the equations of motion backwards in time, is not at all a primary requirement. This means that the direction of the arrow of time may well be uniquely defined in the theory, even locally. It is explained that a rigorous definition of time, as well as a formulation of the causality and locality concepts, can only be given when one has a model for the physical phenomena described. The only viable causality condition is one that is symmetric under time reversal. We explain these statements in terms of the author’s favoured deterministic cellular automaton interpretation of quantum mechanics, also to be referred to as 'vector space analysis', and expand on these ideas. It is also summarised how our more rigorous causality condition affects Bell’s theorems. What distinguishes quantum systems from classical ones is our fundamental inability to control the microscopic details of the initial state when phenomena are studied in the light of some theoretical model.

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Reinhold Bertlmann’s reminiscences of John Bell (Physics Today, July 2015, page 40) are a pleasure to read and faithfully summarize the generally accepted wisdom on the topic. However, the article ends at a seemingly insurmountable theoretical impasse: the conclusions of Bell’s 1980 review describing the apparent incompatibility of quantum correlations with Lorentz invariance. It would perhaps be preferable to conclude on a more optimistic note, by emphasizing the tacit underlying assumption—the causal arrow of time. After all, the quantum correlations are incompatible not with Lorentz invariance per se but with relativistic causality, a time-asymmetric notion. The culprit, apparently, is in the manner that time asymmetry is introduced into the context of a microscopic theory.Bell himself fully acknowledged the relevance of causality in his 1990 review of the topic,11. J. S. Bell, in Between Science and Technology: Proceedings of the International Conference Between Science and Technology, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, 29–30 June, 1989, A. Sarlemijn, P. Kroes, eds., North-Holland, 1990), p. 97. though he remained unwilling to consider the alternative of retrocausation. He clarified that the “locality” of local realism is merely shorthand for “local causality.” In his concluding paragraph he wrote, “The more closely one looks at the fundamental laws of physics the less one sees of the laws of thermodynamics. The increase of entropy emerges only for large complicated systems, in an approximation depending on ‘largeness’ and ‘complexity.’ Could it be that causal structure emerges only in something like a ‘thermodynamic’ approximation, where the notions ‘measurement’ and ‘external field’ become legitimate approximations?” That is the question Bell left us with.Is there hope for a more palatable theoretical description?11. J. S. Bell, in Between Science and Technology: Proceedings of the International Conference Between Science and Technology, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, 29–30 June, 1989, A. Sarlemijn, P. Kroes, eds., North-Holland, 1990), p. 97. Bell’s theorem tells us that it would require either abandoning local causality or abandoning the causal arrow of time altogether, perhaps replacing it with a weaker temporal arrow, an arrow of information or entropy. At the level of a simplistic toy model, an explicit retrocausal (but otherwise local) formulation can reproduce Bell-type correlations.22. N. Argaman, Am. J. Phys. 78, 1007 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.3456564 The challenge remains to formulate a general retrocausal and spacetime-local description of quantum phenomena. Such a reformulation of quantum theory, if achieved, is likely to have important ramifications, perhaps comparable to those following from Feynman’s development of path integrals.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. S. Bell, in Between Science and Technology: Proceedings of the International Conference Between Science and Technology, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, 29–30 June, 1989, A. Sarlemijn, P. Kroes, eds., North-Holland, 1990), p. 97. Google ScholarCrossref2. N. Argaman, Am. J. Phys. 78, 1007 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.3456564, Google ScholarCrossref, ISI© 2016 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Mar 1, 2016•0 citations

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Introduction In this chapter I attempt to review a few somewhat loosely connected themes, which figure in recent work by physicists on decoherence and irreversibility in quantum mechanics. The looseness is forced upon us by the subject – any proper discussion inevitably drags in questions about thermodynamic reversibility and the various arrows of time, about the foundations of quantum mechanics and quantum measurement, about the nature of quantum coherence, and about the relationship between quantum and classical mechanics. There are inevitably many gaps in our understanding of these questions, both for the physicist and for the philosopher. Some philosophers may feel that the subject is too immature to be interesting to them – that it is not yet ripe for philosophical analysis. Indeed I have recently heard the opinion expressed that quantum mechanics in its entirety was still not amenable to such analysis – that if the physicists could not yet understand it, there was no point in philosophers trying! I hope this feeling is not too widespread amongst philosophers of science – I suspect that it may arise in part because the philosophical community (along with a good part of the scientific community) is unaware of some important advances that have been made in the last decade in understanding the physics of quantum processes at the macroscopic level, as well as the relation between classical and quantum mechanics. Much of the chapter is therefore unashamedly tutorial in nature; however, given the wide range of topics covered, I imagine that even physicists will find at least some of the material to be novel.

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Decoherence, macrorealism and the causal arrow of time: there is more than meets the eye

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In an attempt to test the limits of the current interpretation of quantum mechanics, according to which microscopic systems are always in a superposition of states, A. Leggett has proposed the thesis of macrorealism, according to which quantum mechanical superpositions of macroscopically distinct states never occur. Leggett has also shown the basic features of some experimental tests that would decide definitively between quantum mechanics and macrorealism. In this paper I develop an interpretation of macrorealism from which the experimental results can be understood as examples of violations of the principle of induction in which macrorealism rests, opening the door for solving the tension between QM and macrorealism in terms of the backwards causation. According to this interpretation there is no need for appealing to any special role played by either observers or measurement apparatuses in order to explain what differentiates quantum systems from macroscopic ones, a difference that could now be defined partly in terms of their causal and temporal directionality.

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More them any other topic in the foundations of physics, the problem of the arrow (or arrows!) of time seems to be characterized by a unique ‘slipperiness’: it is not only difficult to find answers to the questions once posed, but difficult to find meaningful questions to ask in the first place. Perhaps this is because an asymmetry with respect to the sense of time is built into us at an even deeper level than other ‘synthetic a priori’ conceptions about the world such as the continued existence of unknown objects. However that may be, in this situation, rather than trying to pose general questions which may turn out in the end to be ill-defined, there may be something to be said for trying to formulate much less speculative, indeed perhaps in retrospect trivial questions to which at least we have a hope of finding a definite answer. This is what I shall do in this essay: to be specific, I shall ask whether a test which is currently being designed concerning the validity of a certain ‘common-sense’ view of the macroscopic world (‘macrorealism’) would be affected if we were to relax our common-sense assumptions about the direction of causality in time.
If even some of the ideas presented here are correct, the world is different from what it seems. The major theses of the book, on time's arrows and on quantum measurement theory, are unified by the notion of cryptic constraints. We see, sense, specify, macroscopic states, but what we predict about these states depends on an important assumption concerning their microscopic situation. The assumption is that the actual microstate is equally likely to be any of those consistent with the macrostate. And I say, not so. For various reasons, both classical and quantum, many otherwise-possible microstates are eliminated. As presented in detail in previous chapters, such elimination impacts many areas of physics, from the cosmos to the atom. But we also make the point that this elimination can be difficult to notice and in particular there is no experimental evidence that confirms the usual assumption. By an explicit example on a model (Fig. 4.3.2), we show that a future constraint eliminating 98% of the microstates can go completely unnoticed.
The measurement problem of quantum mechanics was probably born in 1926: ‘Thus Schrödinger’s quantum mechanics gives a very definite answer to the question of the outcome of a collision; however, this does not involve any causal relationship. One obtains no answer to the question “what is the state after the collision,” but only to the question “how probable is a specific outcome of the collision” (in which the quantum-mechanical law of [conservation of] energy must of course be satisfied). This raises the entire problem of determinism. From the standpoint of our quantum mechanics, there is no quantity that could causally establish the outcome of a collision in each individual case; however, so far we are not aware of any experimental clue to the effect that there are internal properties of atoms that enforce some particular outcome. Should we hope to discover such properties that determine individual outcomes later (perhaps phases of the internal atomic motions)? Or should we believe that the agreement between theory and experiment concerning our inability to give conditions for a causal course of events is some pre-established harmony that is based on the non-existence of such conditions? I myself tend to relinquish determinism in the atomic world. But this is [also] a philosophical question, for which physical arguments alone are not decisive.’ (Born, 1926a, p. 866; translation by the author) These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
It is brought forward that viable theories of the physical world that have no variable at all that can play the role of time, do not exist; some notion of time is one of the very first ingredients a candidate theory should possess. Almost by definition, time has an arrow. In contrast, time reversibility, or even the possibility to run the equations of motion backwards in time, is not at all a primary requirement. This means that the direction of the arrow of time may well be uniquely defined in the theory, even locally. It is explained that a rigorous definition of time, as well as a formulation of the causality and locality concepts, can only be given when one has a model for the physical phenomena described. The only viable causality condition is one that is symmetric under time reversal. We explain these statements in terms of the author’s favoured deterministic cellular automaton interpretation of quantum mechanics, also to be referred to as 'vector space analysis', and expand on these ideas. It is also summarised how our more rigorous causality condition affects Bell’s theorems. What distinguishes quantum systems from classical ones is our fundamental inability to control the microscopic details of the initial state when phenomena are studied in the light of some theoretical model.
Reinhold Bertlmann’s reminiscences of John Bell (Physics Today, July 2015, page 40) are a pleasure to read and faithfully summarize the generally accepted wisdom on the topic. However, the article ends at a seemingly insurmountable theoretical impasse: the conclusions of Bell’s 1980 review describing the apparent incompatibility of quantum correlations with Lorentz invariance. It would perhaps be preferable to conclude on a more optimistic note, by emphasizing the tacit underlying assumption—the causal arrow of time. After all, the quantum correlations are incompatible not with Lorentz invariance per se but with relativistic causality, a time-asymmetric notion. The culprit, apparently, is in the manner that time asymmetry is introduced into the context of a microscopic theory.Bell himself fully acknowledged the relevance of causality in his 1990 review of the topic,11. J. S. Bell, in Between Science and Technology: Proceedings of the International Conference Between Science and Technology, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, 29–30 June, 1989, A. Sarlemijn, P. Kroes, eds., North-Holland, 1990), p. 97. though he remained unwilling to consider the alternative of retrocausation. He clarified that the “locality” of local realism is merely shorthand for “local causality.” In his concluding paragraph he wrote, “The more closely one looks at the fundamental laws of physics the less one sees of the laws of thermodynamics. The increase of entropy emerges only for large complicated systems, in an approximation depending on ‘largeness’ and ‘complexity.’ Could it be that causal structure emerges only in something like a ‘thermodynamic’ approximation, where the notions ‘measurement’ and ‘external field’ become legitimate approximations?” That is the question Bell left us with.Is there hope for a more palatable theoretical description?11. J. S. Bell, in Between Science and Technology: Proceedings of the International Conference Between Science and Technology, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, 29–30 June, 1989, A. Sarlemijn, P. Kroes, eds., North-Holland, 1990), p. 97. Bell’s theorem tells us that it would require either abandoning local causality or abandoning the causal arrow of time altogether, perhaps replacing it with a weaker temporal arrow, an arrow of information or entropy. At the level of a simplistic toy model, an explicit retrocausal (but otherwise local) formulation can reproduce Bell-type correlations.22. N. Argaman, Am. J. Phys. 78, 1007 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.3456564 The challenge remains to formulate a general retrocausal and spacetime-local description of quantum phenomena. Such a reformulation of quantum theory, if achieved, is likely to have important ramifications, perhaps comparable to those following from Feynman’s development of path integrals.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. S. Bell, in Between Science and Technology: Proceedings of the International Conference Between Science and Technology, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, 29–30 June, 1989, A. Sarlemijn, P. Kroes, eds., North-Holland, 1990), p. 97. Google ScholarCrossref2. N. Argaman, Am. J. Phys. 78, 1007 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.3456564, Google ScholarCrossref, ISI© 2016 American Institute of Physics.
Introduction In this chapter I attempt to review a few somewhat loosely connected themes, which figure in recent work by physicists on decoherence and irreversibility in quantum mechanics. The looseness is forced upon us by the subject – any proper discussion inevitably drags in questions about thermodynamic reversibility and the various arrows of time, about the foundations of quantum mechanics and quantum measurement, about the nature of quantum coherence, and about the relationship between quantum and classical mechanics. There are inevitably many gaps in our understanding of these questions, both for the physicist and for the philosopher. Some philosophers may feel that the subject is too immature to be interesting to them – that it is not yet ripe for philosophical analysis. Indeed I have recently heard the opinion expressed that quantum mechanics in its entirety was still not amenable to such analysis – that if the physicists could not yet understand it, there was no point in philosophers trying! I hope this feeling is not too widespread amongst philosophers of science – I suspect that it may arise in part because the philosophical community (along with a good part of the scientific community) is unaware of some important advances that have been made in the last decade in understanding the physics of quantum processes at the macroscopic level, as well as the relation between classical and quantum mechanics. Much of the chapter is therefore unashamedly tutorial in nature; however, given the wide range of topics covered, I imagine that even physicists will find at least some of the material to be novel.
In an attempt to test the limits of the current interpretation of quantum mechanics, according to which microscopic systems are always in a superposition of states, A. Leggett has proposed the thesis of macrorealism, according to which quantum mechanical superpositions of macroscopically distinct states never occur. Leggett has also shown the basic features of some experimental tests that would decide definitively between quantum mechanics and macrorealism. In this paper I develop an interpretation of macrorealism from which the experimental results can be understood as examples of violations of the principle of induction in which macrorealism rests, opening the door for solving the tension between QM and macrorealism in terms of the backwards causation. According to this interpretation there is no need for appealing to any special role played by either observers or measurement apparatuses in order to explain what differentiates quantum systems from macroscopic ones, a difference that could now be defined partly in terms of their causal and temporal directionality.