Introduction In this chapter I attempt to review a few somewhat loosely connected themes, which figure in recent work by physicists on decoherence and irreversibility in quantum mechanics. The looseness is forced upon us by the subject – any proper discussion inevitably drags in questions about thermodynamic reversibility and the various arrows of time, about the foundations of quantum mechanics and quantum measurement, about the nature of quantum coherence, and about the relationship between quantum and classical mechanics. There are inevitably many gaps in our understanding of these questions, both for the physicist and for the philosopher. Some philosophers may feel that the subject is too immature to be interesting to them – that it is not yet ripe for philosophical analysis. Indeed I have recently heard the opinion expressed that quantum mechanics in its entirety was still not amenable to such analysis – that if the physicists could not yet understand it, there was no point in philosophers trying! I hope this feeling is not too widespread amongst philosophers of science – I suspect that it may arise in part because the philosophical community (along with a good part of the scientific community) is unaware of some important advances that have been made in the last decade in understanding the physics of quantum processes at the macroscopic level, as well as the relation between classical and quantum mechanics. Much of the chapter is therefore unashamedly tutorial in nature; however, given the wide range of topics covered, I imagine that even physicists will find at least some of the material to be novel.
Introduction In this chapter I attempt to review a few somewhat loosely connected themes, which figure in recent work by physicists on decoherence and irreversibility in quantum mechanics. The looseness is forced upon us by the subject – any proper discussion inevitably drags in questions about thermodynamic reversibility and the various arrows of time, about the foundations of quantum mechanics and quantum measurement, about the nature of quantum coherence, and about the relationship between quantum and classical mechanics. There are inevitably many gaps in our understanding of these questions, both for the physicist and for the philosopher. Some philosophers may feel that the subject is too immature to be interesting to them – that it is not yet ripe for philosophical analysis. Indeed I have recently heard the opinion expressed that quantum mechanics in its entirety was still not amenable to such analysis – that if the physicists could not yet understand it, there was no point in philosophers trying! I hope this feeling is not too widespread amongst philosophers of science – I suspect that it may arise in part because the philosophical community (along with a good part of the scientific community) is unaware of some important advances that have been made in the last decade in understanding the physics of quantum processes at the macroscopic level, as well as the relation between classical and quantum mechanics. Much of the chapter is therefore unashamedly tutorial in nature; however, given the wide range of topics covered, I imagine that even physicists will find at least some of the material to be novel.
As we have seen [chapter 21], there can be spontaneous decoherence, such that the interference terms fall to zero in a relatively short time. It is natural to ask: Is it possible to generalize that model in order to build a microtheory in which the interference is lost and a deterministic history is gained? This is the aim of the consistent or decoherent- histories approach. The question is very interesting on the cosmological level, because, if the answer is affirmative, then we can describe quantum mechanically a consistent history of our universe. Another problem is the following: von Neumann assumed two types of evolution, an unitary reversible evolution and the reduction of the wave-packet. In part V we have showed how is possible to overcome the gap between micro- and macro-world postulated by von Neumann. But a problem remains: the basic equations of QM seem reversible, while decoherence seems to presuppose some type of reversibility. How to solve such a problem? Summing up: • In chapter 25 we analyse different proposals to build cosmological decoherent wave functions. • Then the ‘delayed choice’ issue is analysed theoretically and experimentally [ chapter 26 ], because of its enormous consequence on the theory, and in particular on the interpretation of QM. • While in chapter 26 time is treated of as an external parameter, in chapter 27 we discuss the problem of the reversibility and irreversibility of quantum systems, i.e. treating time as a dynamical observable of the system itself, following the discussion of the time operator [see subsection 10.2.3]. Even if the theme of this part has only taken a central place in scientific debate since the seventies, its connection with the preceding part and its importance for the successive two parts, justify its treatment here.
These notes are an elaboration on: (i) a short course that I gave at the IPhT-Saclay in May-June 2012; (ii) a previous letter on reversibility in quantum mechanics. They present an introductory, but hopefully coherent, view of the main formalizations of quantum mechanics, of their interrelations and of their common physical underpinnings: causality, reversibility and locality/separability. The approaches covered are mainly: (ii) the canonical formalism; (ii) the algebraic formalism; (iii) the quantum logic formulation. Other subjects: quantum information approaches, quantum correlations, contextuality and non-locality issues, quantum measurements, interpretations and alternate theories, quantum gravity, are only very briefly and superficially discussed. Most of the material is not new, but is presented in an original, homogeneous and hopefully not technical or abstract way. I try to define simply all the mathematical concepts used and to justify them physically. These notes should be accessible to young physicists (graduate level) with a good knowledge of the standard formalism of quantum mechanics, and some interest for theoretical physics (and mathematics). These notes do not cover the historical and philosophical aspects of quantum physics.
During the past two or three centuries western philosophy and science have confirmed each other in their ontological attitude towards external reality. The particular opinion that physical objects have an existence completely independent of observation was established as the necessary basis for all scientific investigation. The discovery in quantum physics that the phenomena ultimately constituting the stability of the material world cannot be separated from the instruments of observation was necessarily felt disastrous to the scientific world-picture, and many philosophers and scientists, including celebrated physicists, are still trying by all means to save ontology in quantum physics. The motive power behind this activity is the belief that the objectivity of science can be maintained only if the elementary particles of matter can be objectified in the usual way. The present chapter deals with the fundamental conditions in quantum physics which entail a complete breakdown of the conceptual frame of classical mechanics
Quantum Mechanics represents one of the greatest triumphs of the scientific enterprise of the twentieth century. The stunning success of quantum theory has led to many revolutionary inventions and its extraordinary concepts describe the heart of several important real world applications like transistors and lasers. The theory makes accurate predictions about a wide range of physical phenomena and has historically withstood the tests and scrutiny of every experimental investigation. However, inspite of the fact that quantum theory is widely regarded by the scientific establishment as the fundamental theory of nature and is immensly successful and useful, its conceptual framework makes many predictions which are difficult to comprehend “classically. The theory is, pardoxically, powerful and confusing at the same time. Quantum theory’s unusual predictions originate from its basic formailsm which involves concepts like probability amplitudes and the linear superposition principle(Dirac, 1947). The quantum view appears abstract and counterintuitive and at odds with classical perceptions. Many of the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics are encompassed in what is known as the quantum measurement problem(Peres, 1986; von Neumann, 1932; Wheeler & Zurek, 1983). Conventionally, the measurement paradox is supposedly ’resolved’ by forcing a notion of a sudden collapse of the state vector of the system being measured. However, the nature of this mechanism is at odds with the basic tenets of quantum mechanics and hence may lie outside its realm thus questioning the validity of the theory it self. Closely related with the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics is the question of its connection with the emergence of classicality and the elusive boundary between quantum and classical worlds. What is the connection between the ‘classical’ and the ‘quantum’ worlds? Is there a definite relationship? Are classical mechanics and quantum mechanics two mutually exclusive incompatible theories or are they two aspects of the same underlying philosophy? Classical objects are eventually composed of elements of the microworld which can be described quantum mechanically. So, how and where can there be a boundary between the two worlds? In the following section we begin by introducing the quantum measurement problem. In the next section we will discuss attempts to understand and explain away the underlying paradoxes in quantum theory as highlighted in the quantum measurement problem and the question of the quantum-classical connection. From among the various explanations that seek a resolution to the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics, we focus on the ‘environment induced decoherence theory’ an approach that employs the methods developed by several authors to analyse the quantum mechanics of Measurement in Quantum Mechanics: Decoherence and the Pointer Basis
The previous chapters contain many examples of the successful application of quantum mechanics to the solution of real physical problems. These represent only a small sample of the wide range of experimental results, spanning just about all areas of physics and chemistry and beyond, that have been successfully explained by quantum theory. So far at least, no quantum-mechanical prediction has been experimentally falsified. Despite these successes, however, many scientists have considered the basic conceptual framework of the subject to be unsatisfactory, and repeated attempts have been made to reinterpret quantum mechanics, or even replace it with a different theory whose philosophical and conceptual basis could be considered more acceptable. In the present chapter we shall explain the reasons for this dissatisfaction and outline some of the reinterpretations and alternative approaches that have been devised. Inevitably many of the questions that arise in this area are matters of opinion rather than fact and, for this reason, some physicists consider that they belong more properly to the realm of philosophy than of physics. However, the conceptual basis of quantum mechanics is so fundamental to our whole understanding of the nature of the physical universe that it should surely be important for physicists to understand the nature of the problems involved, if nothing else.1,2 16.1 THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS In this section we outline some of the main areas of difficulty with a view to more detailed discussion later in the chapter.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.