It is brought forward that viable theories of the physical world that have no variable at all that can play the role of time, do not exist; some notion of time is one of the very first ingredients a candidate theory should possess. Almost by definition, time has an arrow. In contrast, time reversibility, or even the possibility to run the equations of motion backwards in time, is not at all a primary requirement. This means that the direction of the arrow of time may well be uniquely defined in the theory, even locally. It is explained that a rigorous definition of time, as well as a formulation of the causality and locality concepts, can only be given when one has a model for the physical phenomena described. The only viable causality condition is one that is symmetric under time reversal. We explain these statements in terms of the author’s favoured deterministic cellular automaton interpretation of quantum mechanics, also to be referred to as 'vector space analysis', and expand on these ideas. It is also summarised how our more rigorous causality condition affects Bell’s theorems. What distinguishes quantum systems from classical ones is our fundamental inability to control the microscopic details of the initial state when phenomena are studied in the light of some theoretical model.
It is brought forward that viable theories of the physical world that have no variable at all that can play the role of time, do not exist; some notion of time is one of the very first ingredients a candidate theory should possess. Almost by definition, time has an arrow. In contrast, time reversibility, or even the possibility to run the equations of motion backwards in time, is not at all a primary requirement. This means that the direction of the arrow of time may well be uniquely defined in the theory, even locally. It is explained that a rigorous definition of time, as well as a formulation of the causality and locality concepts, can only be given when one has a model for the physical phenomena described. The only viable causality condition is one that is symmetric under time reversal. We explain these statements in terms of the author’s favoured deterministic cellular automaton interpretation of quantum mechanics, also to be referred to as 'vector space analysis', and expand on these ideas. It is also summarised how our more rigorous causality condition affects Bell’s theorems. What distinguishes quantum systems from classical ones is our fundamental inability to control the microscopic details of the initial state when phenomena are studied in the light of some theoretical model.
When investigating theories at the tiniest conceivable scales in nature, almost all researchers today revert to the quantum language, accepting the verdict from the Copenhagen doctrine that the only way to describe what is going on will always involve states in Hilbert space, controlled by operator equations. Returning to classical, that is, non quantum mechanical, descriptions will be forever impossible, unless one accepts some extremely contrived theoretical constructions that may or may not reproduce the quantum mechanical phenomena observed in experiments. Dissatisfied, this author investigated how one can look at things differently. This book is an overview of older material, but also contains many new observations and calculations. Quantum mechanics is looked upon as a tool, not as a theory. Examples are displayed of models that are classical in essence, but can be analysed by the use of quantum techniques, and we argue that even the Standard Model, together with gravitational interactions, might be viewed as a quantum mechanical approach to analyse a system that could be classical at its core. We explain how such thoughts can conceivably be reconciled with Bell's theorem, and how the usual objections voiced against the notion of `superdeterminism' can be overcome, at least in principle. Our proposal would eradicate the collapse problem and the measurement problem. Even the existence of an "arrow of time" can perhaps be explained in a more elegant way than usual. Discussions added in v3: the role of the gravitational force, a mathematical physics definition of free will, and an unconventional view on the arrow of time, amongst others.
In present-day physics the fundamental dynamical laws are taken as a time-translation-invariant and time-reversal-invariant one-parameter groups of automorphisms of the underlying mathematical structure. In this context-independent and empirically inaccessible description there is no past, present or future, hence no distinction between cause and effect. To get the familiar description in terms of causes and effects, the time-reversal symmetry of the fundamental dynamics has to be broken. Thereby one gets two representations, one satisfying the generally accepted rules of retarded causality (no effect can precede its cause). The other one describes the strange rules of advanced causality. For entangled (but not necessarily interacting) quantum systems the arrow of time must have the same direction for all subsystems. But for classical systems, or for classical subsystems of quantum systems, this argument does not hold. As a cosequence, classical systems allow the conceptual possibility of advanced causality in addition to retarded causality. Every mathematically formulated dynamics of statistically reproducible events can be extended to a description in terms of a one-parameter group of automorphisms of an enlarged mathematical structure which describes a fictitious hidden determinism. Consequently, randomness in the sense of mathematical probability theory is only a weak generalization of determinism. The popular ideas that in quantum theory there are gaps in the causal chain which allow the accommodation of the freedom of human action are fantasies which have no basis in present-day quantum mechanics. Quantum events are governed by strict statistical laws. Freedom of action is a constitutive necessity of all experimental science which requires a violation of the statistical predictions of physics. We conclude that the presently adopted first principles of theoretical physics can neither explain the autonomy of the psyche nor account for the freedom of action necessary for experimental science.
One of the basic assumptions underlying Bell's theorem is the causal arrow of time, having to do with temporal order rather than spatial separation. Nonetheless, the physical assumptions regarding causality are seldom studied in this context, and often even go unmentioned, in stark contrast with the many different possible locality conditions which have been studied and elaborated upon. In the present work, some retrocausal toy-models which reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics for Bell-type correlations are reviewed. It is pointed out that a certain toy-model which is ostensibly superdeterministic-based on denying the free-variable status of some of quantum mechanics' input parameters-actually contains within it a complete retrocausal toy-model. Occam's razor thus indicates that the superdeterministic point of view is superfluous. A challenge is to generalize the retrocausal toy-models to a full theory-a reformulation of quantum mechanics-in which the standard causal arrow of time would be replaced by a more lenient one: an arrow of time applicable only to macroscopically-available information. In discussing such a reformulation, one finds that many of the perplexing features of quantum mechanics could arise naturally, especially in the context of stochastic theories.
Modern approaches to causal modeling give a central role to interventions, which require the active input of an observer and introduces an explicit `causal arrow of time'. Causal models typically adopt a mechanistic interpretation, according to which the direction of the causal arrow is intrinsic to the process being studied. Here we investigate whether the direction of the causal arrow might be a contribution from the observer, rather than an intrinsic property of the process. Working within a counterfactual and non-mechanistic interpretation of causal modeling developed in arXiv:1806.00895, we propose a definition of a `quantum observational scheme' that we argue characterizes the observer-invariant properties of a causal model. By restricting to quantum processes that preserve the maximally mixed state (unbiasedness) we find that the statistics is symmetric under reversal of the time-ordering. The resulting model can therefore accommodate the idea that the causal arrow is observer-dependent, indicating a route towards reconciling the causal arrow with time-symmetric laws of physics.
Causality has never gained the status of a 'law' or 'principle' in physics. Some recent literature has even popularized the false idea that causality is a notion that should be banned from theory. Such misconception relies on an alleged universality of the reversibility of the laws of physics, based either on the determinism of classical theory, or on the multiverse interpretation of quantum theory, in both cases motivated by mere interpretational requirements for realism of the theory. Here, I will show that a properly defined unambiguous notion of causality is a theorem of quantum theory, which is also a falsifiable proposition of the theory. Such a notion of causality appeared in the literature within the framework of operational probabilistic theories. It is a genuinely theoretical notion, corresponding to establishing a definite partial order among events, in the same way as we do by using the future causal cone on Minkowski space. The notion of causality is logically completely independent of the misidentified concept of 'determinism', and, being a consequence of quantum theory, is ubiquitous in physics. In addition, as classical theory can be regarded as a restriction of quantum theory, causality holds also in the classical case, although the determinism of the theory trivializes it. I then conclude by arguing that causality naturally establishes an arrow of time. This implies that the scenario of the 'block Universe' and the connected 'past hypothesis' are incompatible with causality, and thus with quantum theory: they are both doomed to remain mere interpretations and, as such, are not falsifiable, similar to the hypothesis of 'super-determinism'.This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Foundations of quantum mechanics and their impact on contemporary society'.
The nature of time has long been debated in human history and nowadays is considered of central importance for understanding quantum gravity. We focus on and advocate the relational concept of time, which was put forward in the 17th century in opposition to Newton's absolute time, and only in 1990 explored in a quantum mechanical framework by Carlo Rovelli. After a historical introduction the mathematical models of time are carefully analyzed in chapter 1, followed by a discussion of the role of time played in fundamental theories. Using as an example nonrelativistic mechanics, the process of parametrization is explained, leading to a separation of a 'canonical time coordinate' from an arbitrary evolution parameter. The discussion of the role of time in special and general relativity as well as in quantum mechanics shows that more fundamental theories use less structure of time. This is followed by an exposition of the history of the relational concept of time, which negates the existence of an absolute duration and therefore often is called "timeless". Next it is shown how fundamental theories can be formulated and re-interpreted using this concept. We put emphasis on the hitherto neglected connection between relationalism and non-extensibility, while absolute time is shown to be unproblematic in classical mechanics just because of the possibility to extend the system without changing its nature. We conclude chapter 1 with a new axiomatic basis for the construction of time observables based on a simultaneity relation between 'observations', which are treated as a primitive concept and intuitively correspond to measurement events, but without knowing 'when' these events occur. There is no fundamental time observable; any observable qualifies as a time observable, if it allows to separate all instants. Chapter 2 gives a brief account of three main problems connected with time: a) The problem of the arrow of time. This has to be disentangled from the problem of irreversibility: a solution of the latter essentially excludes cyclic motions and is required for a solution of the former, which consists in showing that a fundamental direction between any two non-identical instants is physically meaningful. We give a formal definition of the arrow of time. This classical analysis is followed by a review of the problem of the arrow of time in quantum theory, where the situation becomes more complicated because of indeterminism. The discussion shows that there is no experimental evidence for a fundamental arrow of time, so that no contradiction with the relational concept of time arises. b) The problem of time measurement, which is of particular importance for the relational approach, in which time has no reality except if measured by a clock. In quantum theory useful time operators seem to be possible only within the more general formalism of positive operator valued measures (POVM). Clocks based on an oscillation mechanism do however require phase measurements; quantum phase operators can be defined as certain POVMs. Phase difference operators do also exist in the traditional Hilbert space formalism, if another quantization is used, as is done with relational quantization. c) The problem of quantum gravity is sketched only briefly. Chapter 3 introduces and discusses a model of Rovelli consisting of two oscillators with no external time. In this model one oscillator is considered as a clock and defines a relational time for the other one. In the first section we introduce this model and generalize it to a free massless scalar field in one dimension. We establish the relation between a single field mode and the infrared behaviour of the field through constants of motion. In the second section after a short review of canonical quantization we review Rovelli's quantization and generalize it to the free field. We could not prove the existence of the quantization map, but calculations using computer algebra indicate that the quantization does exist. For an enlarged algebra we are able to prove the nonexistence of a quantization map similar to a proof by Groenewold and van Hove. In chapter 4 we observe that a clock time always requires infinitely many degrees of freedom, and we make the hypothesis that a time observable is given by the infrared behaviour of quantum fields, leading to a classical notion of time when using algebraic quantum mechanics. This does however not solve the main problem of quantum relationalism: Which conditions determine a particular evolution?