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Applied Mechanics and Materials

Influence of Path Attacks on Security of Six-State Scheme

Yue Hong Peng, Jia Wang Li, Jin Hao Liu, Yu Min Liu

Published Dec 1, 2012• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The safety of the six-state scheme in the practical communication systems was studied based on an effective eavesdropping method, which called path attacks adopted by eavesdroppers. In the practical systems, eavesdropper can select appropriate path to eavesdrop on legitimate users to obtain some information. This method will keep photon number distribution in the laser pulses, and the eavesdropper can be hidden by the losses of quantum channel without being detected. The results show that eavesdropper can get more information with the increase of transmission distance and the average number of photons.

DOI
10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.263-266.3114

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The safety of the six-state scheme in the practical communication systems was studied based on an effective eavesdropping method, which called path attacks adopted by eavesdroppers. In the practical systems, eavesdropper can select appropriate path to eavesdrop on legitimate users to obtain some information. This method will keep photon number distribution in the laser pulses, and the eavesdropper can be hidden by the losses of quantum channel without being detected. The results show that eavesdropper can get more information with the increase of transmission distance and the average number of photons.
This paper introduces an effective eavesdropping mode that eavesdropper may adopt in the practical quantum cryptography communication,and studies the security of six states protocol.In the practical communication system,Eve can select appropriate path to eavesdrop on some information.The attack will not only keep photon number distribution in the laser pulses,but also can be hidden by the loss of quantum channel without being aware of.The results showed that Eve can get more information than in the ideal QKD systems.
The security of quantum key distribution(QKD) networks based on weak coherent pulses and optical node is analyzed.In this QKD network,an eavesdropper can launch a path-attack on the quantum channel to eavesdrop quantum information.Path-attack will not change quantum key generation rate and not destroy the photon number distribution in a weak coherent pulse,moreover,it can not be detected under the high quantum channel loss.The result indicates that even the decoy states skills cannot detect this kind of threat,also this threat is proportional to the average photon number.Therefore,the influence of the path-attack must be considered when designing the quantum key distribution networks.
In the paper on the basis of methods of the quantum information theory the most powerful photon number splitting attack (the attack with replacement of the quantum channel with losses on ideal channel) on the protocol of quantum key distribution with six states is analyzed. It is shown that security of the protocol with six states to photon number splitting attack is higher for some percent, than security of the BB84 protocol, at any values of mean photon number in an impulse and transmission efficiency of the channel. It is also shown that, as well as for the BB84 protocol, security decreases both at increase in mean photon number, and at decrease in transmission efficiency.
Any imperfections in a practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system may be exploited by an eavesdropper to collect information about the key without being discovered. We propose a modified photon-number-splitting attack scheme against QKD systems based on weak laser pulses taking advantage of possible multiphoton pulses. Proof-of-principle experiments are demonstrated. The results show that the eavesdropper can get information about the key generated between the legitimate parties without being detected. Since the equivalent attenuation introduced by the eavesdropper for pulses of different average photon numbers are different, the decoy-state method is effective in fighting against this kind of attack. This has also been proven in our experiments.
In this paper so-called ‘large pulse attack’ is investigated. This attack is one of the possible methods of conventional optical eavesdropping, a new strategy of eavesdropping on quantum cryptosystems, which eliminates the need of immediate interaction with transmitted quantum states. It allows the eavesdropper to avoid inducing transmission errors that disclose her presence to the legal users. As an object of the eavesdropping, phase-state fibre optic schemes are considered. With large pulse attack, settings of transmitting and/ or receiving apparatus are interrogated by external high-power light pulses. Applicability conditions of this method are given. Type and amount of information learned by the eavesdropper is estimated, depending on parameters of the interrogating pulse and apparatus. An experimental set-up for an eavesdropping experiment is proposed and results of successful preliminary measurements are presented. It is concluded that additional protection is necessary for currently implemented quantum key distribution systems. The paper suggests several security measures against this kind of attack.
The single-photon sources used in most of the practical QKD systems are obtained through attenuating the weak laser pulse.It is not a perfect single-photon source,but is a quasisingle-photon source which follows the Poissonian distribution.The probability of every nonempty light pulse containing multiphoton is nonzero,the powerful eavesdropper(Eve) can take advantage of this to obtain some information about the final key.So it is necessary to study the security of the practical QKD system.Supposing,Eve launches photon-number-splitting(PNS) attack on multiphoton signals,and optimal attack(OA) on single-photon signals,adopting Shannon′s information theory to analyze the security of the practical QKD system based on weak coherent light.The result shows that the practical QKD system is secure against the attacks of PNS and OA,and the upper bound of the error rate that the legitimate users(Alice and Bob) can tolerate is also derived from are study.