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Ukrainian Scientific Journal of Information Security

Photon number splitting attack on the quantum key distribution protocol with six states

Євген Вікторович Васіліу

Published Oct 9, 2014• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In the paper on the basis of methods of the quantum information theory the most powerful photon number splitting attack (the attack with replacement of the quantum channel with losses on ideal channel) on the protocol of quantum key distribution with six states is analyzed. It is shown that security of the protocol with six states to photon number splitting attack is higher for some percent, than security of the BB84 protocol, at any values of mean photon number in an impulse and transmission efficiency of the channel. It is also shown that, as well as for the BB84 protocol, security decreases both at increase in mean photon number, and at decrease in transmission efficiency.

DOI
10.18372/2225-5036.20.7300

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In the paper on the basis of methods of the quantum information theory the most powerful photon number splitting attack (the attack with replacement of the quantum channel with losses on ideal channel) on the protocol of quantum key distribution with six states is analyzed. It is shown that security of the protocol with six states to photon number splitting attack is higher for some percent, than security of the BB84 protocol, at any values of mean photon number in an impulse and transmission efficiency of the channel. It is also shown that, as well as for the BB84 protocol, security decreases both at increase in mean photon number, and at decrease in transmission efficiency.
Problem statement. Classical methods of cryptographic protection are vulnerable to attacks using quantum computers and algorithms. One solution to this problem is the deployment of quantum key distribution systems, in which key secrecy is guaranteed by the fundamental laws of quantum physics. However, imperfections in the technical implementation of such systems can lead to key compromise. The aim of this work is to analyze the influence of the parameters of real single-photon sources and detectors on the rate and range of key distribution in a system operating under the BB84 protocol. Results. The influence of losses in the quantum channel, quantum efficiency, and dark count rate of single-photon detectors on the key generation rate and range is analyzed. It is shown that the use of a laser diode as a source opens up the possibility of a photon-number-splitting attack, reducing the key generation rate and range. Methods are presented for calculating the key distribution rate and range taking into account the real parameters of detectors, the probability of multi-photon pulse generation when using a laser diode, and the feasibility of a photon-number-splitting attack. Practical significance. The presented methods for calculating the key distribution rate and range with allowance for the real characteristics of the equipment can be used in the design of quantum key distribution systems.
Secure quantum key distribution (QKD) promises a revolutionizing in optical applications such as encryption, and imaging. However, their implementation in real-world scenarios continues to be challenged. The goal of this work is to verify the presence of photon number splitting (PNS) attack in quantum cryptography system based on BB84 protocol and to obtain a maximum secure key length as possible. This was realized through randomly interleaving decoy states with mean photon numbers of 5.38, 1.588, and 0.48 between the signal states with mean photon numbers of 2.69, 0.794, and 0.24. Experiment results show that a maximum secure key length obtained from our system, which ignores eavesdropping cases, is 125 with 20% decoy states and 82 with 50% decoy states for mean photon number of 0.794 for signal states and 1.588 for decoy states.
In the last ten years, quantum computing has made substantial progress, presenting a strong challenge to traditional encryption methods that depend on solving discrete algorithmic problems. With the advent of the quantum era, conventional encryption methods are becoming more susceptible to attacks. This paper investigates possible attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in quantum cryptography, specifically investigating weaknesses in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. The text thoroughly explores advanced attack strategies of photon number splitting highlight the existing vulnerabilities. The goal is to highlight the need for strong safeguards to protect against these threats, which requires continuous research and development to improve the robustness of quantum cryptography algorithms. The experimental investigation includes analyzing crucial parameters, including quantum channel length, loss, QKD protocol, quantum bit error rate (QBER), signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), as well as attack parameters such as probability of photon number splitting (PNS), eavesdropper distance, and detection efficiency. The evaluation includes performance indicators such as secure key rate, quantum bit error rate (QBER) vs distance, vulnerability to photon number splitting (PNS) attacks, and the influence on the pace of key generation.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an innovative technology, which exploits the laws of quantum mechanics to generate and distribute unconditionally secure shared cryptographic keying material between two geographically separated parties. The unique nature of QKD that ensures eavesdropping on the key distribution channel necessarily introduces detectable errors and shows promise for high-security environments, such as banking, government, and military. However, QKD systems are vulnerable to advanced theoretical and experimental attacks. In this paper, the photon number splitting (PNS) attack is studied in a specialized QKD modeling and simulation framework. First, a detailed treatment of the PNS attack is provided with emphasis on practical considerations, such as performance limitations and realistic sources of error. Second, ideal and non-ideal variations of the PNS attack are studied to measure the eavesdropper's information gain on the QKD-generated secret key bits and examine the detectability of PNS attacks with respect to both quantum bit error rate and the decoy state protocol. Finally, this paper provides a repeatable methodology for efficiently studying advanced attacks, both realized and notional, against QKD systems and more generally quantum communication protocols.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides an innovative approach for secure communication by utilizing the principles of quantum mechanics. Among various QKD protocols, the BB84 protocol remains the most widely studied and implemented due to its simplicity and theoretical security guarantees. However, practical implementations of BB84 are vulnerable to several eavesdropping attacks and channel imperfections. This paper presents a comprehensive study on the detection and analysis of eavesdropping attacks in the BB84 protocol. The work focuses on common attacks such as intercept-resend attack, photon-number splitting attack, Trojan horse attack, and phase-covariant cloning attack. The effect of these attacks on Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) is analyzed in detail. Simulation-based observations are discussed to demonstrate how QBER increases under malicious interference. The study further explores statistical methods for detecting eavesdropping and examines practical countermeasures including decoy states, privacy amplification, and error correction techniques. The paper concludes that BB84 remains robust against eavesdropping when proper detection and mitigation mechanisms are employed.