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Journal of Modern Optics

Large pulse attack as a method of conventional optical eavesdropping in quantum cryptography

Artem Vakhitov, Vadim Makarov, Dag Roar Hjelme

Published Nov 1, 2001• 191 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper so-called ‘large pulse attack’ is investigated. This attack is one of the possible methods of conventional optical eavesdropping, a new strategy of eavesdropping on quantum cryptosystems, which eliminates the need of immediate interaction with transmitted quantum states. It allows the eavesdropper to avoid inducing transmission errors that disclose her presence to the legal users. As an object of the eavesdropping, phase-state fibre optic schemes are considered. With large pulse attack, settings of transmitting and/ or receiving apparatus are interrogated by external high-power light pulses. Applicability conditions of this method are given. Type and amount of information learned by the eavesdropper is estimated, depending on parameters of the interrogating pulse and apparatus. An experimental set-up for an eavesdropping experiment is proposed and results of successful preliminary measurements are presented. It is concluded that additional protection is necessary for currently implemented quantum key distribution systems. The paper suggests several security measures against this kind of attack.

DOI
10.1080/09500340108240904

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In this paper so-called ‘large pulse attack’ is investigated. This attack is one of the possible methods of conventional optical eavesdropping, a new strategy of eavesdropping on quantum cryptosystems, which eliminates the need of immediate interaction with transmitted quantum states. It allows the eavesdropper to avoid inducing transmission errors that disclose her presence to the legal users. As an object of the eavesdropping, phase-state fibre optic schemes are considered. With large pulse attack, settings of transmitting and/ or receiving apparatus are interrogated by external high-power light pulses. Applicability conditions of this method are given. Type and amount of information learned by the eavesdropper is estimated, depending on parameters of the interrogating pulse and apparatus. An experimental set-up for an eavesdropping experiment is proposed and results of successful preliminary measurements are presented. It is concluded that additional protection is necessary for currently implemented quantum key distribution systems. The paper suggests several security measures against this kind of attack.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information‐theoretic security by leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics. This means the security is independent of all future advances in algorithm or computational power. However, due to the non‐availability of single‐photon sources, most traditional QKD protocols are vulnerable to various attacks, such as photon number‐splitting (PNS) attacks. Also, the imperfections in the measuring devices open a loophole for side channels that an eavesdropper may exploit to launch attacks such as large‐pulse attacks. As a result, this compromises the security of transmitted information. To address these challenges, the authors present a QKD protocol that is secure against both large‐pulse attacks and PNS attacks at zero‐error, in which the eavesdropper does not introduce any error, but still, the legitimate users of the system cannot distil a secure key. A notable feature of the proposed protocol is that it promotes greater robustness against both attacks than the Bennett‐Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol or the Scarani‐Acin‐Ribordy‐Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol.
Quantum mechanics is the pillar that holds the security of quantum key distribution and it has been proven that perfect security can be done with some non-ideal component. In this paper we experimentally demonstrate the Trojan horse attack, which is one of the possible methods of conventional optical eavesdropping. It eliminates the need of immediate interaction with transmitted quantum states. We will demonstrates method to distinguish between phase settings of Alice's or Bob's phase modulator, depending on parameters of the interrogating pulse and apparatus.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a quantum technology which creates a common secret key between two distant users without any technological and computational assumptions about the eavesdropper. Nevertheless, not all the QKD protocols have tight upper and lower security bounds, thus the study of eavesdropping strategies and countermeasures is important. Using large number of symmetric coherent states is one of possible technologies in quantum key distribution against unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack. Here we propose an attack based on heterodyne measurement, which is relatively simple for practical implementation and which becomes more powerful than USD attack when the number of states in the protocol is large enough. We study the performance of this attack for various symmetric coherent states QKD protocol parameters and for various distances between the legitimate users.
Quantum communication protocols are considered secure provided that all devices included in the system are fully characterized, and side channels are closed. However, as a result of laser radiation exposure, it is possible to change quantum communication systems components’ characteristics. This leads to vulnerabilities appearing in the quantum key distribution system. In this paper, we consider the effect of pulsed laser radiation on fiber-optic isolators used in quantum communication systems. Isolators protect the source of the system from attacking optical radiation coming from the “eavesdropping” side via the quantum channel. Lowering the isolation factor can bring the entire system out of a secure state. This gives an eavesdropper access to information about the secret key. The scenario of the most probable attack to the source of the quantum key distribution system via a pulsed laser was simulated. The experimental setup provided exposure of fiber isolators with pulsed laser radiation at a wavelength of 1064 nm (within the transparency window of the isolators) with a mean power up to 840 mW in four different pulse generation modes. The isolation factor and throughput of tested samples were monitored using a laser diode with a wavelength of 1550 nm and average power of 10.5 mW. Spectrally selective splitters were used to separate the lasers. It is shown that the isolation factor (isolator attenuation in the direction from the quantum channel to the system) at a wavelength of 1550 nm decreases from the initial value of 59.1 dB to 24.5 dB. The throughput (in the direction from the system to the quantum channel) at the same wavelength decreases from 0.6 dB to 1.2–12.3 dB or remains the same, depending on the acting pulsed laser radiation parameters. Temperature monitoring showed that the temperature of the isolator body changes insignificantly when exposed to pulsed radiation. The obtained effects of changing the isolation coefficient and throughput can be explained by the presence of nonlinear effects in the magneto-optical crystal of the isolator. The results of the work can be applicable in the practical evaluation of quantum communication systems security, in particular, the security evaluation of quantum key distribution systems. The results can be used to prepare the standards for certification procedures for assessing the security of quantum communication systems. The work gives recommendations for enhancing signal source unit security in quantum communication systems. Namely, as countermeasures to protect against the effects of pulsed laser radiation, it is proposed to set optical fuses with a limited threshold power, detectors for monitoring input optical radiation power, and narrow-band optical filters at the entrance of the quantum communication system.
We analyze application of bright reference pulses to prevent the photon-number-splitting attack in weak-pulse quantum key distribution. Under the analyzed eavesdropping strategy, the optimal parameters of bright reference and signal pulses can ensure a secure transmission distance up to 146km146\phantom{\rule{0.3em}{0ex}}\mathrm{km}146km. To realize the quantum key distribution scenario with up-present techniques, we present an experimentally feasible scheme to create a large splitting ratio between bright reference and signal pulses, and to switch the bright reference pulses away from signal pulses to avoid the after-pulse disturbance.
All existing quantum cryptosystems use nonorthogonal states as the carriers of information. Nonorthogonal states cannot be cloned (duplicated) by an eavesdropper. As a result, any eavesdropping attempt must introduce errors in the transmission, and, therefore, can be detected by the legal users of the communication channel. Orthogonal states are not used in quantum cryptography, since they can be faithfully cloned without altering the transmitted data. We present a cryptographic scheme based on orthogonal states, which also assures the detection of any eavesdropper.