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Journal of Yunnan Normal University

Study on Six States Protocol Security under Path Attack

Yingxin Wang

Published Jan 1, 2010• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This paper introduces an effective eavesdropping mode that eavesdropper may adopt in the practical quantum cryptography communication,and studies the security of six states protocol.In the practical communication system,Eve can select appropriate path to eavesdrop on some information.The attack will not only keep photon number distribution in the laser pulses,but also can be hidden by the loss of quantum channel without being aware of.The results showed that Eve can get more information than in the ideal QKD systems.

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This paper introduces an effective eavesdropping mode that eavesdropper may adopt in the practical quantum cryptography communication,and studies the security of six states protocol.In the practical communication system,Eve can select appropriate path to eavesdrop on some information.The attack will not only keep photon number distribution in the laser pulses,but also can be hidden by the loss of quantum channel without being aware of.The results showed that Eve can get more information than in the ideal QKD systems.
The safety of the six-state scheme in the practical communication systems was studied based on an effective eavesdropping method, which called path attacks adopted by eavesdroppers. In the practical systems, eavesdropper can select appropriate path to eavesdrop on legitimate users to obtain some information. This method will keep photon number distribution in the laser pulses, and the eavesdropper can be hidden by the losses of quantum channel without being detected. The results show that eavesdropper can get more information with the increase of transmission distance and the average number of photons.
The security of quantum key distribution(QKD) networks based on weak coherent pulses and optical node is analyzed.In this QKD network,an eavesdropper can launch a path-attack on the quantum channel to eavesdrop quantum information.Path-attack will not change quantum key generation rate and not destroy the photon number distribution in a weak coherent pulse,moreover,it can not be detected under the high quantum channel loss.The result indicates that even the decoy states skills cannot detect this kind of threat,also this threat is proportional to the average photon number.Therefore,the influence of the path-attack must be considered when designing the quantum key distribution networks.
The single-photon sources used in most of the practical QKD systems are obtained through attenuating the weak laser pulse.It is not a perfect single-photon source,but is a quasisingle-photon source which follows the Poissonian distribution.The probability of every nonempty light pulse containing multiphoton is nonzero,the powerful eavesdropper(Eve) can take advantage of this to obtain some information about the final key.So it is necessary to study the security of the practical QKD system.Supposing,Eve launches photon-number-splitting(PNS) attack on multiphoton signals,and optimal attack(OA) on single-photon signals,adopting Shannon′s information theory to analyze the security of the practical QKD system based on weak coherent light.The result shows that the practical QKD system is secure against the attacks of PNS and OA,and the upper bound of the error rate that the legitimate users(Alice and Bob) can tolerate is also derived from are study.
We introduce an attack scheme for eavesdropping freely the ping-pong quantum communication protocol proposed by Boström and Felbinger [ Phys. Rev. Lett. 89 , 187902 (2002)] in a noise channel. The vicious eavesdropper, Eve, intercepts and measures the travel photon transmitted between the sender and the receiver. Then she replaces the quantum signal with a multi-photon signal in the same state, and measures the returned photons with the measuring basis, with which Eve prepares the fake signal except for one photon. This attack increases neither the quantum channel losses nor the error rate in the sampling instances for eavesdropping check. It works for eavesdropping the secret message transmitted with the ping-pong protocol. Finally, we propose a way for improving the security of the ping-pong protocol.
In the paper on the basis of methods of the quantum information theory the most powerful photon number splitting attack (the attack with replacement of the quantum channel with losses on ideal channel) on the protocol of quantum key distribution with six states is analyzed. It is shown that security of the protocol with six states to photon number splitting attack is higher for some percent, than security of the BB84 protocol, at any values of mean photon number in an impulse and transmission efficiency of the channel. It is also shown that, as well as for the BB84 protocol, security decreases both at increase in mean photon number, and at decrease in transmission efficiency.
Losses in a quantum channel do not allow deterministic communication. We propose a two-way six-state deterministic secure quantum communication scheme that is robust in a lossy channel. Our protocol can be used for two purposes: (a) establishment of a deterministic key, and (b) direct communication of a secret message. Our protocol is directly integrable with the decoy state method while achieving deterministic communication without using a quantum memory. In our protocol, a legitimate party has the control to assign a desired bit value to a successfully transmitted qubit in the public discussion step. Before the public discussion, no information is leaked to the eavesdropper (Eve) even if all the qubits are measured or prepared by her. Hence, our scheme is used as a quantum direct communication (QDC) protocol, to meet the quality of service requirement of swift data communication. We compare the security of our protocol against the photon number splitting attack in the absence of the decoy state method with two QDC protocols. We compute the success probability of Eve when our protocol is used as a multiparty key distribution scheme. We also propose the criteria to compute the efficiency of QDC protocols.