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arXiv:2606.01349

Non-Absoluteness, Tracking, and Intersubjectivity in Perspectival Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics: A Conceptual and Formal Analysis

Herve Zwirn

quant-phSubmitted May 31, 2026• Announced Jun 2, 2026• 2 citations• Revised Oct 7, 2026 (v3)
v1 · May 31, 2026v2 · Aug 23, 2026v3 · Oct 7, 2026
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Abstract

This paper offers a conceptual and formal analysis of non-absoluteness in perspectival interpretations of quantum mechanics. Extended Wigner-type experiments reveal a fundamental tension between the universality of quantum mechanics, the absoluteness of observed events, and the possibility of intersubjective agreement. I argue that denying observer-independent events cannot remain a mere interpretive slogan: it requires a precise account of how perspectival statements, tracking assumptions, meta-level descriptions, and intersubjective communication are to be formulated. Many existing approaches either implicitly reintroduce observer-independent structure or leave key notions underdetermined. Within this framework, Convivial Solipsism provides a coherent account of non-absolute events, preserving the universality of quantum mechanics while rejecting the need for a global viewpoint. To make this claim precise, the paper introduces the basic elements of a formal perspectival logic designed to distinguish well-formed perspectival statements from illegitimate unindexed or absolutizing statements. The paper concludes that scientific objectivity need not rest on observer-independent facts, but can instead be grounded in the internal coherence of perspectival structures.

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33 pages, 1 figure, 2 tables

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This paper offers a conceptual and formal analysis of non-absoluteness in perspectival interpretations of quantum mechanics. Extended Wigner-type experiments reveal a fundamental tension between the universality of quantum mechanics, the absoluteness of observed events, and the possibility of intersubjective agreement. I argue that denying observer-independent events cannot remain a mere interpretive slogan: it requires a precise account of how perspectival statements, tracking assumptions, meta-level descriptions, and intersubjective communication are to be formulated. Many existing approaches either implicitly reintroduce observer-independent structure or leave key notions underdetermined. Within this framework, Convivial Solipsism provides a coherent account of non-absolute events, preserving the universality of quantum mechanics while rejecting the need for a global viewpoint. To make this claim precise, the paper introduces the basic elements of a formal perspectival logic designed to distinguish well-formed perspectival statements from illegitimate unindexed or absolutizing statements. The paper concludes that scientific objectivity need not rest on observer-independent facts, but can instead be grounded in the internal coherence of perspectival structures.
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Abstract It has been claimed that Massimi’s recent perspectival approach to science sits in tension with a realist stance. I shall argue that this tension can be defused in the quantum context by recasting Massimi’s perspectivalism within a phenomenological framework. I shall begin by indicating how the different but complementary forms of the former are manifested in the distinction between certain so-called ‘-epistemic’ and ‘-ontic’ understandings of quantum mechanics, namely QBism and Relational Quantum Mechanics, respectively. A brief consideration of Dieks’ perspectivism will then lead to a consideration of the much-maligned and typically dismissed role of the observer in the measurement process. This opens the door to London and Bauer’s presentation of a form of ‘phenomenological quantum perspectivalism’ that brings together Massimi’s two forms and explicitly eschews the ‘naïve’ realism that creates the above tension. I shall conclude with some reflections on how intersubjectivity can still be established within this framework, focusing in particular on how Massimi’s idea of ‘interlacing’ scientific perspectives can be accommodated, using the example of a ‘new cosmopolitanism’ that gave rise to Bose-Einstein statistics.
Recent no-go theorems challenging the absoluteness of events have highlighted the possibility that dynamical facts in quantum theory are observer-relative. This thesis examines the metaphysical and conceptual foundations of quantum relativism, focusing on Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). It analyzes arguments for relativism through Wigner’s Friend and Extended Wigner’s Friend thought experiments, explores the link between relative physical facts and experiences, and offers the first metaphysical definition of "relative facts." The thesis argues: RQM supports a perspectival retro-determination of past events based on later acquisition of information; Quantum relativists must also relativize facts about observers’ experiences; the strongest arguments for relativism lead to unbounded higher-order relativity, precluding any absolute 'view from nowhere'; Only a metaphysical framework that relativized the composition of reality itself can accommodate such an unrestricted iteration. These conclusions deepen our grasp of a thoroughly perspectival quantum world.
Quantum mechanics is often perceived as conceptually paradoxical because it appears to conflict with deeply rooted intuitions about fixed reality, determinism, and observation. This paper does not propose a new physical theory. Instead, it offers an epistemological reframing of quantum mechanics: not as a direct mathematical unveiling of a fully fixed pre-existing reality, but as a highly precise description of phenomenological structures emerging through observational conditions and interaction. The paper explores: the distinction between mathematical predictive success and ontological completeness, the role of human perception in constructing “fixed reality” intuitions, the phenomenological nature of qualities such as color and temperature, the possibility that some conceptual tensions in quantum mechanics arise from assumptions inherited from macroscopic cognition, and how quantum theory may be interpreted as describing observable structures rather than fixed hidden states. The work intentionally avoids mystical, anti-scientific, or consciousness-centric interpretations of quantum mechanics. It does not deny the existence of reality, nor reject modern physics. Rather, it attempts to clarify what exactly mathematical models are describing when applied to quantum phenomena. This text is positioned as a conceptual and phenomenological reorganization of perspective — a small doorway toward reconsidering how humans frame “reality” itself.
Abstract Perspectivist positions have been proposed in physics, notably in order to address the interpretive difficulties of quantum mechanics. Recently, some versions of perspectivism have also been proposed in general philosophy of science to account for the plurality of scientific practice. Both kinds of views share the rejection of what they metaphorically call the “view from nowhere”. However, beyond this superficial similarity, they are very different: while quantum perspectivism entertains a concrete notion of perspective associated with individual agents or systems or concrete contexts, perspectival realism adopts a more abstract notion associated with explanatory aims or conceptual schemes. The aim of this paper is to clarify what is at stake with perspectivism in general. The general notion of a perspective, as well as the various attitudes one can entertained towards them, are characterised using the concepts of harmless contradiction and cross-perspectival accessibility. A taxonomy of positions ranging from absolutism to relativism is proposed on this basis. Then the framework is applied to quantum perspectivism and perspectival realism to show its fruitfulness. Finally, I argue that abstract versions of perspectivism are bound to be metaphysically weaker than concrete versions.