Recent no-go theorems challenging the absoluteness of events have highlighted the possibility that dynamical facts in quantum theory are observer-relative. This thesis examines the metaphysical and conceptual foundations of quantum relativism, focusing on Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). It analyzes arguments for relativism through Wigner’s Friend and Extended Wigner’s Friend thought experiments, explores the link between relative physical facts and experiences, and offers the first metaphysical definition of "relative facts." The thesis argues: RQM supports a perspectival retro-determination of past events based on later acquisition of information; Quantum relativists must also relativize facts about observers’ experiences; the strongest arguments for relativism lead to unbounded higher-order relativity, precluding any absolute 'view from nowhere'; Only a metaphysical framework that relativized the composition of reality itself can accommodate such an unrestricted iteration. These conclusions deepen our grasp of a thoroughly perspectival quantum world.
Recent no-go theorems challenging the absoluteness of events have highlighted the possibility that dynamical facts in quantum theory are observer-relative. This thesis examines the metaphysical and conceptual foundations of quantum relativism, focusing on Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). It analyzes arguments for relativism through Wigner’s Friend and Extended Wigner’s Friend thought experiments, explores the link between relative physical facts and experiences, and offers the first metaphysical definition of "relative facts." The thesis argues: RQM supports a perspectival retro-determination of past events based on later acquisition of information; Quantum relativists must also relativize facts about observers’ experiences; the strongest arguments for relativism lead to unbounded higher-order relativity, precluding any absolute 'view from nowhere'; Only a metaphysical framework that relativized the composition of reality itself can accommodate such an unrestricted iteration. These conclusions deepen our grasp of a thoroughly perspectival quantum world.
The idea that the dynamical properties of quantum systems are invariably relative to other systems has recently regained currency. Using Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) for a case study, this paper calls attention to a question that has been underappreciated in the debate about quantum relativism: the question of whether relativity iterates. Are there absolute facts about the properties one system possesses relative to a specified reference, or is this again a relative matter, and so on? It is argued that RQM (in its best-known form) is committed to what I call the Unrestricted Iteration Principle (UIP), and thus to an infinite regress of relativisations. This principle plays a crucial role in ensuring the communicability and coherence of interaction outcomes across observers. It is, however, shown to be incompatible with the widespread, conservative reading of RQM in terms of relations, instead necessitating the adoption of the more unorthodox notion of perspectival facts. I conclude with some reflections on the current state of play in perspectivist versions of RQM and quantum relativism more generally, underscoring both the need for further conceptual development and the importance of the iteration principle for an accurate cost-benefit analysis of such interpretations.
Recent no-go theorems for absolute facts in single-world interpretations are widely considered the strongest arguments in favour of ‘quantum relativism’: interpretations according to which measurement results are observer-relative. In this article, however, I show that relativist interpretations are themselves vulnerable to mathematically identical ‘revenge’ theorems, unless they assume a particularly radical form. To this end, a novel distinction between tame and feral varieties of quantum relativism is introduced, where a relativist interpretation counts as tame if and only if it postulates absolute facts about relative facts (absolute facts of second order) and the possibility of communication across perspectives. While at first sight preferable to feral views, tame relativism turns out to be subject to revenge problems: arguments against absolute measurement outcomes can be modified and turned against absolute facts about which outcome a measurement has relative to a particular observer. This observation is developed in detail for the case of the ‘local friendliness’ extended Wigner’s friend theorem. Moreover, it is shown to generalize to absolute facts about the facts that obtain relative to sequences of specified reference systems of arbitrary length. This suggests that only the most radical types of relativist interpretations have a hope of being motivated with recourse to extended Wigner’s friend scenarios.
I take a pragmatist perspective on quantum theory. This is not a view of the world described by quantum theory. In this view quantum theory itself does not describe the physical world, nor our observatons, experiences or opinions of it. Instead, the theory offers reliable advice on when to expect an event of one kind or another, and on how strongly to expect each possible outcome of that event. The actual outcome is a perspectival fact: a fact relative to a physical context of assessment. Measurement outcomes and quantum states are both perspectival. By noticing that each must be relativized to an appropriate physical context one can resolve the measurement problem and the problem of nonlocal action. But if the outcome of a quantum measurement is not an absolute fact, then why shoud the statistics of such outcomes give us any objective reason to accept quantum theory? One can describe extensions of the scenario of Wigner's friend in which a statement expressing the outcome of a quantum measurement would be true relative to one such context but not relative to another. However, physical conditions in our world prevent us from realizing such scenarios. Since the outcome of every actual quantum measurement is certified at what is essentially a single context of assessment, the outcome relative to that context is an objective fact in the only sense that matters for science. We should accept quantum theory because the statistics these outcomes display are just those it leads us to expect.
This paper examines the metaphysical foundations of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM), with special attention to its compatibility with scientific realism. We argue that RQM faces a dilemma. In its original formulation, RQM secures a sparse ontology of relative quantum events, but lacks the world-building structure needed to explain how these events jointly constitute a single, coherent reality of the kind presupposed by scientific realism. Recent discussions have already emphasized the difficulties that RQM faces concerning intersubjective agreement, communication, and the emergence of stable facts. Our contribution is to diagnose these difficulties as symptoms of a deeper metaphysical problem: RQM provides relative facts, but no clear account of what makes them facts of one world. We then assess the revised formulation proposed by Adlam and Rovelli, centered on the Cross-Perspective Links (CPL) principle. While CPL aims to restore intersubjective agreement by guaranteeing consistency across perspectives, we argue that it does so at a significant cost. It introduces observer-independent facts, persistent information-bearing structures, and global consistency constraints that sit uneasily with the relational spirit of the original interpretation. Thus, RQM either remains thoroughly relational but metaphysically too weak to support robust scientific realism, or it repairs this weakness by compromising its own relational foundations.
In this paper we investigate the history of relationalism and its present use in some interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the first part of this article we will provide a conceptual analysis of the relation between substantivalism, relationalism and relativism in the history of both physics and philosophy. In the second part, we will address some relational interpretations of quantum mechanics, namely, Bohr's relational approach, the modal interpretation by Kochen, the perspectival modal version by Bene and Dieks and the relational interpretation by Rovelli. We will argue that all these interpretations ground their understanding of relations in epistemological terms. By taking into account the analysis on the first part of our work, we intend to highlight the fact that there is a different possibility for understanding quantum mechanics in relational terms which has not been yet considered within the foundational literature. This possibility is to consider relations in (non-relativist) ontological terms. We will argue that such an understanding might be capable of providing a novel approach to the problem of representing what quantum mechanics is really talking about.
Quantum mechanics has transformed our understanding of reality, yet deep philosophical puzzles remain unresolved. Is there a consistent way to describe quantum measurement, the emergence of space and time, and the role of observers within one coherent ontology? This paper introduces Relational Quantum Dynamics (RQD), an interpretation that places relationships and information, not isolated objects, at the foundation of physics. Unlike traditional views, such as the Copenhagen interpretation, Everett's many-worlds theory, or hidden-variable approaches, RQD denies a single observer-independent reality, instead proposing that facts only become definite within specific observational contexts. It explicitly addresses foundational no-go results, including Bell's theorem, the Kochen-Specker theorem, and the Frauchiger-Renner paradox, by replacing absolute facts with relational, context-dependent truths. RQD rests on five interlocking principles: (1) quantum states are contextual and observer-relative, (2) time emerges from quantum interactions rather than existing as an external parameter, (3) space is constructed from patterns of quantum entanglement, (4) observers emerge as systems with highly integrated information, and (5) classical reality appears through quantum decoherence without special wavefunction collapse. Philosophically, RQD aligns with ontic structural realism, proposing that the fundamental ontology of the universe consists entirely of informational relations. It avoids collapsing into relativism or solipsism by ensuring intersubjective agreement through physical interactions. Ultimately, RQD may offer a unified picture in which quantum mechanics, spacetime, and observers are no longer separate domains but aspects of one interconnected informational web.