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Foundations of Physics

Perspectivism, Concrete and Abstract

Quentin Ruyant

Published Jul 31, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Perspectivist positions have been proposed in physics, notably in order to address the interpretive difficulties of quantum mechanics. Recently, some versions of perspectivism have also been proposed in general philosophy of science to account for the plurality of scientific practice. Both kinds of views share the rejection of what they metaphorically call the “view from nowhere”. However, beyond this superficial similarity, they are very different: while quantum perspectivism entertains a concrete notion of perspective associated with individual agents or systems or concrete contexts, perspectival realism adopts a more abstract notion associated with explanatory aims or conceptual schemes. The aim of this paper is to clarify what is at stake with perspectivism in general. The general notion of a perspective, as well as the various attitudes one can entertained towards them, are characterised using the concepts of harmless contradiction and cross-perspectival accessibility. A taxonomy of positions ranging from absolutism to relativism is proposed on this basis. Then the framework is applied to quantum perspectivism and perspectival realism to show its fruitfulness. Finally, I argue that abstract versions of perspectivism are bound to be metaphysically weaker than concrete versions.

DOI
10.1007/s10701-025-00878-7

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Abstract Perspectivist positions have been proposed in physics, notably in order to address the interpretive difficulties of quantum mechanics. Recently, some versions of perspectivism have also been proposed in general philosophy of science to account for the plurality of scientific practice. Both kinds of views share the rejection of what they metaphorically call the “view from nowhere”. However, beyond this superficial similarity, they are very different: while quantum perspectivism entertains a concrete notion of perspective associated with individual agents or systems or concrete contexts, perspectival realism adopts a more abstract notion associated with explanatory aims or conceptual schemes. The aim of this paper is to clarify what is at stake with perspectivism in general. The general notion of a perspective, as well as the various attitudes one can entertained towards them, are characterised using the concepts of harmless contradiction and cross-perspectival accessibility. A taxonomy of positions ranging from absolutism to relativism is proposed on this basis. Then the framework is applied to quantum perspectivism and perspectival realism to show its fruitfulness. Finally, I argue that abstract versions of perspectivism are bound to be metaphysically weaker than concrete versions.
Abstract The theories of pre-quantum physics are standardly seen as representing physical systems and their properties. Quantum mechanics in its standard form is a more problematic case: here, interpretational problems have led to doubts about the tenability of realist views. Thus, QBists and Quantum Pragmatists maintain that quantum mechanics should not be thought of as representing physical systems, but rather as an agent-centered tool for updating beliefs about such systems. It is part and parcel of such views that different agents may have different beliefs and may assign different quantum states. What results is a collection of agent-centered perspectives rather than a unique representation of the physical world. In this paper we argue that the problems identified by QBism and Quantum Pragmatism do not necessitate abandoning the ideal of representing the physical world. We can avail ourselves of the same puzzle-solving strategies as employed by QBists and pragmatists by adopting a perspectival quantum realism. According to this perspectivalism (close to the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics) objects may possess different, but equally objective properties with respect to different physically defined perspectives. We discuss two options for such a perspectivalism, a local and a nonlocal one, and apply them to Wigner’s friend and EPR scenarios. Finally, we connect quantum perspectivalism to the recently proposed philosophical position of fragmentalism.
This paper offers a conceptual and formal analysis of non-absoluteness in perspectival interpretations of quantum mechanics. Extended Wigner-type experiments reveal a fundamental tension between the universality of quantum mechanics, the absoluteness of observed events, and the possibility of intersubjective agreement. I argue that denying observer-independent events cannot remain a mere interpretive slogan: it requires a precise account of how perspectival statements, tracking assumptions, meta-level descriptions, and intersubjective communication are to be formulated. Many existing approaches either implicitly reintroduce observer-independent structure or leave key notions underdetermined. Within this framework, Convivial Solipsism provides a coherent account of non-absolute events, preserving the universality of quantum mechanics while rejecting the need for a global viewpoint. To make this claim precise, the paper introduces the basic elements of a formal perspectival logic designed to distinguish well-formed perspectival statements from illegitimate unindexed or absolutizing statements. The paper concludes that scientific objectivity need not rest on observer-independent facts, but can instead be grounded in the internal coherence of perspectival structures.
The present study investigates the tension between objectivism and perspectivism in light of the conceptual and philosophical implications of quantum theory. The guiding dictum of objectivism posits that science reveals the underlying structure of reality independently of human cognitive activity, that is, in terms of mind-independent, discourse-independent properties and relations occurring at any spatiotemporal location. It is shown that objectivism’s stance fits with the applicability of the bivalence principle as the semantic foundation of scientific discourse. It becomes then apparent that the non-Boolean logical structure of quantum theory systematically disrupts the objectivist framework. Along this vein, we provide succinct argumentation demonstrating quantum theory’s affinity to perspectivist reasoning. It is contended that the ubiquitous phenomenon of quantum contextuality, as established by Kochen-Specker’s celebrated theorem, strongly suggests that measurement values of quantum observables can, in general, be regarded as pertaining to an object under investigation only within a local probing frame or perspective from which the object-system is considered. The last remark is reinforced when considered within the endo-theoretic perspectivist framework of quantum mechanics. The essential philosophical meaning of the latter implies the view that the quantum world can be consistently comprehended through a multilevel structure of overlapping Boolean probing frames, realized as locally variable perspectives on a quantum system, being capable of forming jointly a coherent picture of the whole in a nontrivial way. Finally, in the appendix, the endo-theoretic perspectivist framework of quantum theory is critically compared to the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, particularly in its recent development involving the postulate of “cross-perspective links”, revealing thereby the profoundly different picture of the quantum world’s architecture between the two proposals.
Abstract It has been claimed that Massimi’s recent perspectival approach to science sits in tension with a realist stance. I shall argue that this tension can be defused in the quantum context by recasting Massimi’s perspectivalism within a phenomenological framework. I shall begin by indicating how the different but complementary forms of the former are manifested in the distinction between certain so-called ‘-epistemic’ and ‘-ontic’ understandings of quantum mechanics, namely QBism and Relational Quantum Mechanics, respectively. A brief consideration of Dieks’ perspectivism will then lead to a consideration of the much-maligned and typically dismissed role of the observer in the measurement process. This opens the door to London and Bauer’s presentation of a form of ‘phenomenological quantum perspectivalism’ that brings together Massimi’s two forms and explicitly eschews the ‘naïve’ realism that creates the above tension. I shall conclude with some reflections on how intersubjectivity can still be established within this framework, focusing in particular on how Massimi’s idea of ‘interlacing’ scientific perspectives can be accommodated, using the example of a ‘new cosmopolitanism’ that gave rise to Bose-Einstein statistics.
Abstract This paper examines the role of perspectivism in Relational Quantum Mechanics, situating it within the broader landscape of quantum interpretations and the scientific realism debate. We argue that, while interpretations such as QBism embrace strong forms of perspectivism, Relational Quantum Mechanics adopts a “soft” perspectivism, limiting the observer’s role to selecting experimental contexts without compromising its realist framework. We also explore the historical roots of Relational Quantum Mechanics, showing that relational ideas in the works of Bohr and other pioneers similarly avoided strong perspectivist commitments. By analyzing both contemporary and historical perspectives, we argue that Relational Quantum Mechanics offers a minimalist yet robust relational interpretation, distinct from more subjectivist approaches.
I take a pragmatist perspective on quantum theory. This is not a view of the world described by quantum theory. In this view quantum theory itself does not describe the physical world, nor our observatons, experiences or opinions of it. Instead, the theory offers reliable advice on when to expect an event of one kind or another, and on how strongly to expect each possible outcome of that event. The actual outcome is a perspectival fact: a fact relative to a physical context of assessment. Measurement outcomes and quantum states are both perspectival. By noticing that each must be relativized to an appropriate physical context one can resolve the measurement problem and the problem of nonlocal action. But if the outcome of a quantum measurement is not an absolute fact, then why shoud the statistics of such outcomes give us any objective reason to accept quantum theory? One can describe extensions of the scenario of Wigner's friend in which a statement expressing the outcome of a quantum measurement would be true relative to one such context but not relative to another. However, physical conditions in our world prevent us from realizing such scenarios. Since the outcome of every actual quantum measurement is certified at what is essentially a single context of assessment, the outcome relative to that context is an objective fact in the only sense that matters for science. We should accept quantum theory because the statistics these outcomes display are just those it leads us to expect.