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arXiv:1812.05549

QBism and the Ithaca Desiderata

Blake C. Stacey

Published Dec 13, 2018• 3 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In 1996, N. David Mermin proposed a set of desiderata for an understanding of quantum mechanics, the "Ithaca Interpretation". In 2012, Mermin became a public advocate of QBism, an interpretation due to Christopher Fuchs and Ruediger Schack. Here, we evaluate QBism with respect to the Ithaca Interpretation's six desiderata, in the process also evaluating those desiderata themselves. This analysis reveals a genuine distinction between QBism and the IIQM, but also a natural progression from one to the other.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1812.05549

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In 1996, N. David Mermin proposed a set of desiderata for an understanding of quantum mechanics, the "Ithaca Interpretation". In 2012, Mermin became a public advocate of QBism, an interpretation due to Christopher Fuchs and Ruediger Schack. Here, we evaluate QBism with respect to the Ithaca Interpretation's six desiderata, in the process also evaluating those desiderata themselves. This analysis reveals a genuine distinction between QBism and the IIQM, but also a natural progression from one to the other.
Fast forward to the beginning of the current century, when a new version of the quantum-states-are-states-of-knowledge interpretation was launched by Carlton Caves, Chris Fuchs, and Ruediger Schack (2002). At first it was called Quantum Bayesianism, having been conceived as an extension of a personalist Bayesian theory of probability, but since then it has re-branded itself as QBism, the term preferred by Mermin (2017) because “QBism is as big a break with 20th century ways of thinking about science as Cubism was with 19th century ways of thinking about art.”
Recently I posted a paper entitled "External observer reflections on QBism". As any external observer, I was not able to reflect all features of QBism properly. The comments I received from one of QBism's creators, C. A. Fuchs, were very valuable to me in better understanding the views of QBists. Some of QBism's features are very delicate and extracting them from articles of QBists is not a simple task. Therefore, I hope that the second portion of my reflections on QBism (or, strictly speaking, my reflections on Fuchs reflections on my earlier reflections) might be interesting and useful for other experts in quantum foundations and quantum information theory (especially, taking into account my previous aggressively anti-QBism position). In the present paper I correct some of my earlier posted critical comments on QBism. At the same time, other critical comments gained new validation through my recent deeper understanding of QBists views on a number of problems.
Two decades after its creation, the interpretation of quantum mechanics called QBism is entering a new phase. Since it shares a personalist, subjective worldview with phenomenology, the philosophical study of human experience, there is a growing interest in the relationship between the two subjects. I call attention to the little-known philosopher Samuel Todes, whose phenomenology focused on the essential role of the human body in our understanding of the world. After reviewing this radical proposal, and illustrating it with some examples, I recommend it as an interesting mediator between the communities of physicists and phenomenologists. In addition, I argue that it may prove useful for promoting the public understanding of QBism.