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arXiv:2201.04734 · Routledge eBooks

On the Consilience between QBism and Phenomenology

Hans Christian von Baeyer

Published Nov 20, 2023• 15 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Two decades after its creation, the interpretation of quantum mechanics called QBism is entering a new phase. Since it shares a personalist, subjective worldview with phenomenology, the philosophical study of human experience, there is a growing interest in the relationship between the two subjects. I call attention to the little-known philosopher Samuel Todes, whose phenomenology focused on the essential role of the human body in our understanding of the world. After reviewing this radical proposal, and illustrating it with some examples, I recommend it as an interesting mediator between the communities of physicists and phenomenologists. In addition, I argue that it may prove useful for promoting the public understanding of QBism.

DOI
10.4324/9781003259008-8

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This is the first volume that focuses specifically on phenomenological approaches to quantum mechanics. It is also the first volume focusing on the philosophical implications of QBism. This coincidence is not accidental. Phenomenology's rich potential for our understanding of quantum mechanics has long been overlooked by analytic philosophers and phenomenologists alike. The experience-first approach of phenomenology, its descriptive methodology, and Husserl's critique of mathematization do not sit well with “mainstream” analytic philosophy of physics. But as this volume will demonstrate, it sits nicely with the basic tenets of QBism. Conversely, QBism constitutes the most consistent and best-developed interpretation of quantum mechanics that fully embraces the Bohrian idea that a proper understanding of science must be based on the concept of experience. However, since its inception in the early 2000s, QBism has struggled to connect with the philosophical community. Not only are the underlying intuitions shaping and dominating contemporary philosophy of quantum mechanics—namely, that a scientific theory must be purged of all subjective and operational notions such as “experience” or “measurement” and that, consequently, a successful approach to quantum mechanics must be formulated as a “quantum theory without observers”—at odds with QBism. It seems that sometimes the incommensurability already starts at the level of the basic conceptual framework which, in the case of mainstream analytic philosophy, is not very well suited to express some of QBism's main tenets. Considering this situation, the main hypothesis of this volume is that phenomenology and QBism are natural bedfellows, and that both can profit from mutual exchange. In order to make this exchange as profitable as possible, the aim of this introductory chapter is to identify, clarify, and motivate some of the cornerstones of phenomenological approaches to quantum mechanics, to shed light on the main ideas and virtues of QBism, and to discuss points of contact and points of possible conflict between these two projects.

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Routledge eBooks•Nov 20, 2023•5 citations
Two decades after its creation, the interpretation of quantum mechanics called QBism is entering a new phase. Since it shares a personalist, subjective worldview with phenomenology, the philosophical study of human experience, there is a growing interest in the relationship between the two subjects. I call attention to the little-known philosopher Samuel Todes, whose phenomenology focused on the essential role of the human body in our understanding of the world. After reviewing this radical proposal, and illustrating it with some examples, I recommend it as an interesting mediator between the communities of physicists and phenomenologists. In addition, I argue that it may prove useful for promoting the public understanding of QBism.
This is the first volume that focuses specifically on phenomenological approaches to quantum mechanics. It is also the first volume focusing on the philosophical implications of QBism. This coincidence is not accidental. Phenomenology's rich potential for our understanding of quantum mechanics has long been overlooked by analytic philosophers and phenomenologists alike. The experience-first approach of phenomenology, its descriptive methodology, and Husserl's critique of mathematization do not sit well with “mainstream” analytic philosophy of physics. But as this volume will demonstrate, it sits nicely with the basic tenets of QBism. Conversely, QBism constitutes the most consistent and best-developed interpretation of quantum mechanics that fully embraces the Bohrian idea that a proper understanding of science must be based on the concept of experience. However, since its inception in the early 2000s, QBism has struggled to connect with the philosophical community. Not only are the underlying intuitions shaping and dominating contemporary philosophy of quantum mechanics—namely, that a scientific theory must be purged of all subjective and operational notions such as “experience” or “measurement” and that, consequently, a successful approach to quantum mechanics must be formulated as a “quantum theory without observers”—at odds with QBism. It seems that sometimes the incommensurability already starts at the level of the basic conceptual framework which, in the case of mainstream analytic philosophy, is not very well suited to express some of QBism's main tenets. Considering this situation, the main hypothesis of this volume is that phenomenology and QBism are natural bedfellows, and that both can profit from mutual exchange. In order to make this exchange as profitable as possible, the aim of this introductory chapter is to identify, clarify, and motivate some of the cornerstones of phenomenological approaches to quantum mechanics, to shed light on the main ideas and virtues of QBism, and to discuss points of contact and points of possible conflict between these two projects.
Abstract Phenomenology has also been brought to bear on QM in the context of recent discussions over the approach known as ‘QBism’. This takes the theoretical formalism to be simply a device for predicting an agent’s future experiences, rather than as representing the world. Such a first-person perspective has been widely taken to mesh with the phenomenological stance, as usually understood. However, although advocates of QBism maintain that any slide into solipsism can be resisted, they struggle to accommodate what has been called the ‘kicks from the world’. Here it is argued that in order do so while remaining within a phenomenological framework, the correlationist feature identified by London and Bauer should be incorporated. Interestingly, one of the phenomenologist philosophers who is often cited in this specific context, Merleau-Ponty, took classes with Gurwitsch and drew on London and Bauer’s ‘little book’ in his own analysis of quantum physics.
The interpretation of quantum theory known as QBism argues that many elements of the formalism have a subjective interpretation. At the same time, QBism claims to be a broadly realist programme. This implies that reality in QBism must be somehow founded upon an agent's subjective experiences (measurement outcomes). To make this idea more precise, we propose to interpret QBism's “experiences” as synonymous with the concept of “perceived phenomena” in phenomenology. This suggests an approach to ontology in which objects can only be physically real if they are in principle observable. But what does “observable” mean? Are atoms, electromagnetic fields, quantum states, or probabilities observable? Here we discuss the different answers to this question given by QBists and phenomenologists, and attempt to reconcile them.
The interpretation of quantum mechanics known as QBism developed out of efforts to understand the probabilities arising in quantum physics as Bayesian in character. But this development was neither easy nor without casualties. Many ideas voiced, and even committed to print, during earlier stages of Quantum Bayesianism turn out to be quite fallacious when seen from the vantage point of QBism. I trace the history of what we might call “proto-QBism” becoming QBism proper, showing that the process was one of becoming consistently Jamesian. But William James and phenomenology are evolutionary cousins, and so guided by QBism's history, I will sketch ways in which phenomenological turns may be inspirational for future developments in the QBist project. The prize, I will argue, would be if phenomenology can evoke a new technical development in the reconstruction of quantum theory or the understanding of the classical limit.
QBism is currently one of the most widely discussed 'subjective' interpretations of quantum mechanics. Its key move is to say that quantum probabilities are personalist Bayesian probabilities and that the quantum state represents subjective degrees of belief. Even probability-one predictions are considered subjective assignments expressing the agent's highest possible degree of certainty about what they will experience next. For most philosophers and physicists this means that QBism is simply too subjective. Even those who agree with QBism that the wave function should not be reified and that we should look for alternatives to standard Psi-ontic interpretations often argue that QBism must be abandoned because it detaches science from objectivity. The problem is that from the QBist perspective it is hard to see how objectivity could enter science. In this paper, I introduce and motivate an interpretation of quantum mechanics that takes QBism as a starting point, is consistent with all its virtues, but allows objectivity to enter from the get-go. This is the view that quantum probabilities should be understood as objective degrees of epistemic justification.
A discrepancy between the instrumentalist and realist inclinations of QBism, or between its experiential and interactional concepts of measurement, has been repeatedly noticed. Here, we show that this discrepancy can be resolved by adopting a phenomenological approach throughout. In other terms, the difficulty can be overcome by unambiguously choosing the first-person standpoint as a radical origin of knowledge, and by ascending from the situated lived experience of a knowing and acting subject, to the structure and use of the quantum formalism. To reconstruct some crucial features of the objectivity promised by science, and to accommodate the soundest aspect of the realist intuitions of QBist authors, a phenomenological reinterpretation of what is commonly called “the world” is proposed. This reinterpretation is based on Bruce Bégout's “Eco-Phenomenology”, that replaces the concept of a somehow extrinsic relation between subject and world, with the immersive experience of a subject partaking of the world.