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arXiv:1604.07766 · Foundations of Science

Towards Better Understanding QBism

Andrei Yu. Khrennikov

Published Feb 21, 2017• 17 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Recently I posted a paper entitled "External observer reflections on QBism". As any external observer, I was not able to reflect all features of QBism properly. The comments I received from one of QBism's creators, C. A. Fuchs, were very valuable to me in better understanding the views of QBists. Some of QBism's features are very delicate and extracting them from articles of QBists is not a simple task. Therefore, I hope that the second portion of my reflections on QBism (or, strictly speaking, my reflections on Fuchs reflections on my earlier reflections) might be interesting and useful for other experts in quantum foundations and quantum information theory (especially, taking into account my previous aggressively anti-QBism position). In the present paper I correct some of my earlier posted critical comments on QBism. At the same time, other critical comments gained new validation through my recent deeper understanding of QBists views on a number of problems.

DOI
10.1007/s10699-017-9524-0

Related papers

QBism AND LOCALITY IN QUANTUM MECHANICS

Michael Nauenberg

A critique to the article by C.A. Fuchs, N.D. Mermin, and R.Schack, "An introduction to QBism with and application to the locality of quantum mechanics" that appeared in Am. J. Phys. 82 (8), 749-754 (2014)

arXiv:1502.00123•American Journal of Physics•Feb 23, 2015•4 citations

Classical and quantum framing of the Now

N. David Mermin

Mermin replies: Understanding the Now was not the main purpose of my March 2014 commentary. My primary point was that a new way of resolving the puzzles and paradoxes of quantum mechanics, called QBism by Christopher Fuchs and Rüdiger Schack, was also able to settle that longstanding problem in classical physics. After my earlier commentary on QBism (Physics Today, July 2012, page 8), I was concerned that many of the letters about it (December 2012, page 8) had sounded the same theme: that the letter writer’s own way of looking at quantum mechanics was already perfectly satisfactory. I hoped that by applying QBist thinking to a strictly classical problem, I could disengage those readers from their favorite interpretation of quantum mechanics and help them think about QBism on its own merits. I recently emphasized in Nature11. N. D. Mermin, Nature 507, 421 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1038/507421a that QBism sheds light on classical physics, too, but there I discussed quantum applications of QBism as well as classical applications (“CBism”).The letters here all address only the problem of the Now but not the fact that I deal with it through a classical application of QBism. While I’m disappointed that they say nothing about QBism or CBism, I’m pleased that they all agree that the problem of the Now is indeed a problem. Not everybody does.Berge Tatian and B. K. Ridley both criticize me for taking the Now to be a point. But I don’t. I call the Now an event “whose duration and location are restricted enough that it can usefully be represented as a point in space and time.” I say that “the events we experience are complex, extended entities” and that “to represent our actual experiences as a collection of mathematical points … is a brilliant strategic simplification, but we ought not to confuse a cartoon … with the experience itself.”Ridley’s comment “Nor could one person’s Now be exactly the same as another’s” suggests that I say it could be. What I do say is “The commonality of my Now and your Now whenever we are together requires that our Nows must coincide at each of two consecutive meetings.” “Commonality” or “coincide” mean only that our two private Now experiences happen at a common place and time, not that they are identical. Indeed, the personal experiences of different people are incomparable, except through the imperfect medium of language.I agree with James Hartle on much in the paper he cites, but we have important differences. He takes spacetime to be objective and fundamental; I take it to be an abstract tool used by an agent to organize her experience. He uses the notion of a point in spacetime uncritically; I regard it as an approximate representation of an agent’s spatially and temporally extended experience. He takes an agent’s experience to be an objective property of the agent, like the contents of a register. I take an agent’s experience to be private and self-evident to that agent and to be the fundamental basis for her inference of an external world; the experience of each agent plays a special role for that—and only that—agent, analogous to the special role played by “the classical domain” in the quantum mechanics of Lev Landau and Evgeny Lifshitz.Rudolf Peierls wrote to John Bell in 1980, “In my view, a description of the laws of physics consists in giving us a set of correlations between successive observations. By observations I mean … what our senses can experience. That we have senses and can experience such sensations is an empirical fact, which has not been deduced (and in my opinion cannot be deduced) from current physics.”22. S. Lee, ed., Sir Rudolf Peierls: Selected Private and Scientific Correspondence, vol. 2, World Scientific, River Edge, NJ (2009), p. 807. If “us” is expanded to “each of us,” then nobody has ever put QBism and CBism more concisely than that.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<CITING ARTICLES1. N. D. Mermin, Nature 507, 421 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1038/507421a, Google ScholarCrossref, ISI2. S. Lee, ed., Sir Rudolf Peierls: Selected Private and Scientific Correspondence, vol. 2, World Scientific, River Edge, NJ (2009), p. 807. Google ScholarCrossref© 2014 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Sep 1, 2014•2 citations

Measured responses to quantum Bayesianism

N. David Mermin

Mermin replies: Robert Griffiths takes my joke about an undergraduate collapsing a wavepacket to be an attempt to solve the measurement problem. The actual QBist solution—versions of which predate QBism (see, for example, reference 11. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096)—is that a quantum state is not an objective property of the world but a compendium of probabilities constructed by an agent. When an agent updates her state assignment, nothing changes in her external world. The only change is in the agent’s expectations for her subsequent experience of that world, and therefore there is no measurement problem. Consistent historians agree that collapse is not a physical process, but for entirely different reasons.QBism takes the “mysterious whatever-it-is” that Griffiths criticizes in quantum orthodoxy to be the experience induced in an agent by the world. That, and the fact that different agents may have different experiences, drains the swamp, slays the dragon, and quiets the maddening paradoxes.QBists hold that any agent can indeed apply quantum mechanics to her own external world, from quarks to quasars. Only an agent’s personal, directly perceived experience is boxed off from the domain of applicability. That exclusion disagrees with most versions of the many-worlds interpretation, but it does not limit the scope of science: Alice can apply quantum mechanics to the experience of another agent, Bob, as represented through his words, writings, or drawings, all of which do belong to her external world.The way in which Bob’s experience impinges on Alice resonates with Niels Bohr’s emphasis on the need to state results of experiments in ordinary language. It also addresses Ching Hung Woo’s question of how different agents can come to agreement on their state assignments.Griffiths correctly notes that QBism violates the first desideratum he quotes from my 15-year-old “Ithaca interpretation.” Like Barack Obama’s view of marriage, my thinking about quantum foundations has evolved. But Griffiths wrongly claims that QBism rejects the other desideratum he quotes: locality. Actually, QBism insists on it. The absurdity of quantum nonlocality provides an independent argument that quantum states cannot be objective internal properties of the systems they describe, whether or not one regards probabilities as subjective. Griffiths is probably right, however, that John Bell would not have been pleased with how QBists fix his shifty split.I would not call QBism an “antiquated approach.” It is younger than Griffiths’ consistent histories and, as I have remarked upon elsewhere,22. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. taking reality itself to be relative to what he calls a framework, is vastly more radical than taking quantum state assignments to be relative to an agent.But foreshadowings of QBism can indeed be found in antiquity. Since writing my commentary, I came across another striking anticipation in a 1931 letter from Erwin Schrödinger to Arnold Sommerfeld:33. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. “Quantum mechanics forbids statements about what really exists—statements about the object. It deals only with the object–subject relation. Although this holds, after all, for any description of nature, it appears to hold in a much more radical and far-reaching sense in quantum mechanics” (translated by N. D. Mermin and Ruediger Schack).When Bell and Michael Nauenberg wrote their delightful article in 1966, there was indeed much less interest in quantum foundations than there is today. Most textbooks have wisely steered clear of the many contemporary interpretive positions, since none of them are held by more than a fraction of those physicists with an interest in such issues.QBists do not reject the Born rule for calculating probabilities, but they do reject the objective frequentist interpretation of those probabilities presented by Nauenberg and held by most physicists. The frequentist view is notoriously circular. It defines probability using such notions as “equally probable,” “unlikely,” or (with Nauenberg) “identically prepared,” none of which make sense without a prior definition of probability. “Identically prepared” might seem safe from circularity, but two different preparations cannot be strictly identical. It would be more accurate to say they must differ in unimportant ways. Unimportant for what? For the probabilities of the outcomes.When I started to learn about subjective probability, I was surprised to discover that most of the books were not in Cornell University’s physics or mathematics libraries but in the business school library. In our recent election, Americans have been told that business experience is necessary for being president; I would suggest that it may be even more helpful for understanding quantum mechanics.I cannot tell from Nauenberg’s remarks about the Liouville equation whether he agrees with the view of QBists (and many others) that the collapse of the wavefunction is no more than the updating of a collection of probability distributions.Nauenberg’s example of the Rydberg atom does not contradict the QBist resolution of Bell’s shifty split. The Rydberg atom is part of the world external to the agent, and therefore on the quantum side of her split. There are indeed circumstances under which fully quantum mechanical behavior can look very classical.Art Hobson repeats the common view that only mixed states can be associated with subjective probabilities. QBism takes that to be the very mistake that got us lost for so long in the quantum swamp. Hobson also believes that wavefunctions were collapsing before there were physicists. Does he believe that probabilities were updating before there were statisticians?Hobson wrongly claims that Chris Fuchs “might dispute the notion that some kind of physical reality actually exists.” What he and other QBists do deny is that there are properties of the external world—“elements of reality”—that underlie quantum state assignments. (The argument of Matthew Pusey and coauthors that Hobson cites, implying that quantum states are physically real, relies on such hidden variables.) An agent’s state assignment rests entirely on her experience of the external world. It is neither solipsistic nor superstitious to maintain that any agent’s experience comes fully into being only at the moment it is experienced.Hobson’s treatment of Eugene Wigner and his friend relies on decoherence producing an objective mixed state, which both of them must agree on. But since quantum mechanics holds all the way out to infinity (as Griffiths puts it), even from an objective view of quantum states, that switch from superposition to either/or is at best a FAPP solution, to use Bell’s wonderfully sardonic abbreviation of “for all practical purposes.”QBism does not, as Hobson concludes, give up on a realist interpretation of nature. But it does warn us not to confuse nature with the abstractions we have ingeniously constructed to help any agent deal with the very real impact of nature on his or her own internal experience (see my Reference Frame, Physics Today, May 2009, page 8).I’m glad that Blake Stacey has called attention to some of the more applied spinoffs of QBism. I’m also pleased that he mentions Bruno de Finetti, one of the great 20th-century pioneers of subjective probability. Indeed, since there are objective as well as subjective Bayesians, if I had my way, the B in QBism would stand not for Thomas Bayes, but for Bruno de Finetti, who put the crucial point like this: “The abandonment of superstitious beliefs about the existence of Phlogiston, the Cosmic Ether, Absolute Space and Time … , or Fairies and Witches, was an essential step along the road to scientific thinking. Probability, too, if regarded as something endowed with some kind of objective existence, is no less a misleading misconception, an illusory attempt to exteriorize or materialize our [actual (vero)] probabilistic beliefs.”44. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096, Google ScholarCrossref2. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. Google ScholarCrossref3. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. Google ScholarCrossref4. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface. Google Scholar© 2012 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 30, 2012•6 citations

Comment on "An Introduction to Qbism with an Application to the Locality of Quantum Mechanics" Arxiv: 1311.5253v1

Jiří Souček

•Feb 1, 2015•3 citations

QBism's account of quantum dynamics and decoherence

John B. DeBrota, Christopher A. Fuchs, Rüdiger Schack

QBism has long recognized quantum states, positive-operator-valued measure elements, Kraus operators, and even unitary operations to be of the same type: they express aspects of an agent's belief system concerning the consequences (for her) of actions she might take upon her external world. Such action-consequence pairs have conventionally been called ``quantum measurements.'' The calculus of quantum theory is then viewed as an empirically motivated addition to Bayesian decision theory when brought to this notion of measurement. This radical approach has allowed QBism to eliminate conceptual problems that plague other interpretations of quantum mechanics. However, one issue has remained elusive: If a QBist does not believe in the existence of an ontic (agent-independent) dynamical variable evolving over time, why would there be any constraints on her quantum-state assignment in the absence of performing a measurement? Why would she introduce unitary or open-system quantum dynamics at all? Here, we present a representation theorem based on van Fraassen's reflection principle to answer these questions. Simply put, an agent's assignment of quantum dynamics represents her belief that a measurement action she is contemplating would not change her current odds for future gambles. A corollary to this approach is that one can make sense of ``open-system dynamics'' without the need to introduce an ``environment with a measurement record,'' as is common in decoherence accounts of quantum measurement. QBism's understanding instead rests more fundamentally on an agent's beliefs about the system of interest (not system plus environment) and her judgments about measurements she might perform on that system. More broadly, this result establishes QBism's contention that measurement itself is the central concept of quantum theory and thus the framework upon which any future QBist ontology must hang.

arXiv:2312.14112•Physical Review A•Nov 6, 2024•10 citations

A Critical, But Hopefully Cordial, QBist Reply to Ballentine

Blake C. Stacey

L. E. Ballentine's remarks in Physics Today about the QBist interpretation of quantum mechanics are generally wide of the mark.

arXiv:2311.06904•Nov 12, 2023•1 citation
Recently I posted a paper entitled "External observer reflections on QBism". As any external observer, I was not able to reflect all features of QBism properly. The comments I received from one of QBism's creators, C. A. Fuchs, were very valuable to me in better understanding the views of QBists. Some of QBism's features are very delicate and extracting them from articles of QBists is not a simple task. Therefore, I hope that the second portion of my reflections on QBism (or, strictly speaking, my reflections on Fuchs reflections on my earlier reflections) might be interesting and useful for other experts in quantum foundations and quantum information theory (especially, taking into account my previous aggressively anti-QBism position). In the present paper I correct some of my earlier posted critical comments on QBism. At the same time, other critical comments gained new validation through my recent deeper understanding of QBists views on a number of problems.
Mermin replies: Understanding the Now was not the main purpose of my March 2014 commentary. My primary point was that a new way of resolving the puzzles and paradoxes of quantum mechanics, called QBism by Christopher Fuchs and Rüdiger Schack, was also able to settle that longstanding problem in classical physics. After my earlier commentary on QBism (Physics Today, July 2012, page 8), I was concerned that many of the letters about it (December 2012, page 8) had sounded the same theme: that the letter writer’s own way of looking at quantum mechanics was already perfectly satisfactory. I hoped that by applying QBist thinking to a strictly classical problem, I could disengage those readers from their favorite interpretation of quantum mechanics and help them think about QBism on its own merits. I recently emphasized in Nature11. N. D. Mermin, Nature 507, 421 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1038/507421a that QBism sheds light on classical physics, too, but there I discussed quantum applications of QBism as well as classical applications (“CBism”).The letters here all address only the problem of the Now but not the fact that I deal with it through a classical application of QBism. While I’m disappointed that they say nothing about QBism or CBism, I’m pleased that they all agree that the problem of the Now is indeed a problem. Not everybody does.Berge Tatian and B. K. Ridley both criticize me for taking the Now to be a point. But I don’t. I call the Now an event “whose duration and location are restricted enough that it can usefully be represented as a point in space and time.” I say that “the events we experience are complex, extended entities” and that “to represent our actual experiences as a collection of mathematical points … is a brilliant strategic simplification, but we ought not to confuse a cartoon … with the experience itself.”Ridley’s comment “Nor could one person’s Now be exactly the same as another’s” suggests that I say it could be. What I do say is “The commonality of my Now and your Now whenever we are together requires that our Nows must coincide at each of two consecutive meetings.” “Commonality” or “coincide” mean only that our two private Now experiences happen at a common place and time, not that they are identical. Indeed, the personal experiences of different people are incomparable, except through the imperfect medium of language.I agree with James Hartle on much in the paper he cites, but we have important differences. He takes spacetime to be objective and fundamental; I take it to be an abstract tool used by an agent to organize her experience. He uses the notion of a point in spacetime uncritically; I regard it as an approximate representation of an agent’s spatially and temporally extended experience. He takes an agent’s experience to be an objective property of the agent, like the contents of a register. I take an agent’s experience to be private and self-evident to that agent and to be the fundamental basis for her inference of an external world; the experience of each agent plays a special role for that—and only that—agent, analogous to the special role played by “the classical domain” in the quantum mechanics of Lev Landau and Evgeny Lifshitz.Rudolf Peierls wrote to John Bell in 1980, “In my view, a description of the laws of physics consists in giving us a set of correlations between successive observations. By observations I mean … what our senses can experience. That we have senses and can experience such sensations is an empirical fact, which has not been deduced (and in my opinion cannot be deduced) from current physics.”22. S. Lee, ed., Sir Rudolf Peierls: Selected Private and Scientific Correspondence, vol. 2, World Scientific, River Edge, NJ (2009), p. 807. If “us” is expanded to “each of us,” then nobody has ever put QBism and CBism more concisely than that.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<CITING ARTICLES1. N. D. Mermin, Nature 507, 421 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1038/507421a, Google ScholarCrossref, ISI2. S. Lee, ed., Sir Rudolf Peierls: Selected Private and Scientific Correspondence, vol. 2, World Scientific, River Edge, NJ (2009), p. 807. Google ScholarCrossref© 2014 American Institute of Physics.
Mermin replies: Robert Griffiths takes my joke about an undergraduate collapsing a wavepacket to be an attempt to solve the measurement problem. The actual QBist solution—versions of which predate QBism (see, for example, reference 11. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096)—is that a quantum state is not an objective property of the world but a compendium of probabilities constructed by an agent. When an agent updates her state assignment, nothing changes in her external world. The only change is in the agent’s expectations for her subsequent experience of that world, and therefore there is no measurement problem. Consistent historians agree that collapse is not a physical process, but for entirely different reasons.QBism takes the “mysterious whatever-it-is” that Griffiths criticizes in quantum orthodoxy to be the experience induced in an agent by the world. That, and the fact that different agents may have different experiences, drains the swamp, slays the dragon, and quiets the maddening paradoxes.QBists hold that any agent can indeed apply quantum mechanics to her own external world, from quarks to quasars. Only an agent’s personal, directly perceived experience is boxed off from the domain of applicability. That exclusion disagrees with most versions of the many-worlds interpretation, but it does not limit the scope of science: Alice can apply quantum mechanics to the experience of another agent, Bob, as represented through his words, writings, or drawings, all of which do belong to her external world.The way in which Bob’s experience impinges on Alice resonates with Niels Bohr’s emphasis on the need to state results of experiments in ordinary language. It also addresses Ching Hung Woo’s question of how different agents can come to agreement on their state assignments.Griffiths correctly notes that QBism violates the first desideratum he quotes from my 15-year-old “Ithaca interpretation.” Like Barack Obama’s view of marriage, my thinking about quantum foundations has evolved. But Griffiths wrongly claims that QBism rejects the other desideratum he quotes: locality. Actually, QBism insists on it. The absurdity of quantum nonlocality provides an independent argument that quantum states cannot be objective internal properties of the systems they describe, whether or not one regards probabilities as subjective. Griffiths is probably right, however, that John Bell would not have been pleased with how QBists fix his shifty split.I would not call QBism an “antiquated approach.” It is younger than Griffiths’ consistent histories and, as I have remarked upon elsewhere,22. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. taking reality itself to be relative to what he calls a framework, is vastly more radical than taking quantum state assignments to be relative to an agent.But foreshadowings of QBism can indeed be found in antiquity. Since writing my commentary, I came across another striking anticipation in a 1931 letter from Erwin Schrödinger to Arnold Sommerfeld:33. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. “Quantum mechanics forbids statements about what really exists—statements about the object. It deals only with the object–subject relation. Although this holds, after all, for any description of nature, it appears to hold in a much more radical and far-reaching sense in quantum mechanics” (translated by N. D. Mermin and Ruediger Schack).When Bell and Michael Nauenberg wrote their delightful article in 1966, there was indeed much less interest in quantum foundations than there is today. Most textbooks have wisely steered clear of the many contemporary interpretive positions, since none of them are held by more than a fraction of those physicists with an interest in such issues.QBists do not reject the Born rule for calculating probabilities, but they do reject the objective frequentist interpretation of those probabilities presented by Nauenberg and held by most physicists. The frequentist view is notoriously circular. It defines probability using such notions as “equally probable,” “unlikely,” or (with Nauenberg) “identically prepared,” none of which make sense without a prior definition of probability. “Identically prepared” might seem safe from circularity, but two different preparations cannot be strictly identical. It would be more accurate to say they must differ in unimportant ways. Unimportant for what? For the probabilities of the outcomes.When I started to learn about subjective probability, I was surprised to discover that most of the books were not in Cornell University’s physics or mathematics libraries but in the business school library. In our recent election, Americans have been told that business experience is necessary for being president; I would suggest that it may be even more helpful for understanding quantum mechanics.I cannot tell from Nauenberg’s remarks about the Liouville equation whether he agrees with the view of QBists (and many others) that the collapse of the wavefunction is no more than the updating of a collection of probability distributions.Nauenberg’s example of the Rydberg atom does not contradict the QBist resolution of Bell’s shifty split. The Rydberg atom is part of the world external to the agent, and therefore on the quantum side of her split. There are indeed circumstances under which fully quantum mechanical behavior can look very classical.Art Hobson repeats the common view that only mixed states can be associated with subjective probabilities. QBism takes that to be the very mistake that got us lost for so long in the quantum swamp. Hobson also believes that wavefunctions were collapsing before there were physicists. Does he believe that probabilities were updating before there were statisticians?Hobson wrongly claims that Chris Fuchs “might dispute the notion that some kind of physical reality actually exists.” What he and other QBists do deny is that there are properties of the external world—“elements of reality”—that underlie quantum state assignments. (The argument of Matthew Pusey and coauthors that Hobson cites, implying that quantum states are physically real, relies on such hidden variables.) An agent’s state assignment rests entirely on her experience of the external world. It is neither solipsistic nor superstitious to maintain that any agent’s experience comes fully into being only at the moment it is experienced.Hobson’s treatment of Eugene Wigner and his friend relies on decoherence producing an objective mixed state, which both of them must agree on. But since quantum mechanics holds all the way out to infinity (as Griffiths puts it), even from an objective view of quantum states, that switch from superposition to either/or is at best a FAPP solution, to use Bell’s wonderfully sardonic abbreviation of “for all practical purposes.”QBism does not, as Hobson concludes, give up on a realist interpretation of nature. But it does warn us not to confuse nature with the abstractions we have ingeniously constructed to help any agent deal with the very real impact of nature on his or her own internal experience (see my Reference Frame, Physics Today, May 2009, page 8).I’m glad that Blake Stacey has called attention to some of the more applied spinoffs of QBism. I’m also pleased that he mentions Bruno de Finetti, one of the great 20th-century pioneers of subjective probability. Indeed, since there are objective as well as subjective Bayesians, if I had my way, the B in QBism would stand not for Thomas Bayes, but for Bruno de Finetti, who put the crucial point like this: “The abandonment of superstitious beliefs about the existence of Phlogiston, the Cosmic Ether, Absolute Space and Time … , or Fairies and Witches, was an essential step along the road to scientific thinking. Probability, too, if regarded as something endowed with some kind of objective existence, is no less a misleading misconception, an illusory attempt to exteriorize or materialize our [actual (vero)] probabilistic beliefs.”44. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096, Google ScholarCrossref2. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. Google ScholarCrossref3. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. Google ScholarCrossref4. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface. Google Scholar© 2012 American Institute of Physics.
QBism has long recognized quantum states, positive-operator-valued measure elements, Kraus operators, and even unitary operations to be of the same type: they express aspects of an agent's belief system concerning the consequences (for her) of actions she might take upon her external world. Such action-consequence pairs have conventionally been called ``quantum measurements.'' The calculus of quantum theory is then viewed as an empirically motivated addition to Bayesian decision theory when brought to this notion of measurement. This radical approach has allowed QBism to eliminate conceptual problems that plague other interpretations of quantum mechanics. However, one issue has remained elusive: If a QBist does not believe in the existence of an ontic (agent-independent) dynamical variable evolving over time, why would there be any constraints on her quantum-state assignment in the absence of performing a measurement? Why would she introduce unitary or open-system quantum dynamics at all? Here, we present a representation theorem based on van Fraassen's reflection principle to answer these questions. Simply put, an agent's assignment of quantum dynamics represents her belief that a measurement action she is contemplating would not change her current odds for future gambles. A corollary to this approach is that one can make sense of ``open-system dynamics'' without the need to introduce an ``environment with a measurement record,'' as is common in decoherence accounts of quantum measurement. QBism's understanding instead rests more fundamentally on an agent's beliefs about the system of interest (not system plus environment) and her judgments about measurements she might perform on that system. More broadly, this result establishes QBism's contention that measurement itself is the central concept of quantum theory and thus the framework upon which any future QBist ontology must hang.