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arXiv:1409.2454

Why QBism is not the Copenhagen interpretation and what John Bell might have thought of it

N. David Mermin

Published Sep 8, 2014• 33 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Christopher Fuchs and Rüdiger Schack have developed a way of understanding science, which, among other things, resolves many of the conceptual puzzles of quantum mechanics that have vexed people for the past nine decades. They call it QBism. I speculate on how John Bell might have reacted to QBism, and I explain the many ways in which QBism differs importantly from the orthodox ways of thinking about quantum mechanics associated with the term "Copenhagen interpretation."

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1409.2454

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Fast forward to the beginning of the current century, when a new version of the quantum-states-are-states-of-knowledge interpretation was launched by Carlton Caves, Chris Fuchs, and Ruediger Schack (2002). At first it was called Quantum Bayesianism, having been conceived as an extension of a personalist Bayesian theory of probability, but since then it has re-branded itself as QBism, the term preferred by Mermin (2017) because “QBism is as big a break with 20th century ways of thinking about science as Cubism was with 19th century ways of thinking about art.”

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The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.

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The purpose of this book is to explain Quantum Bayesianism ('QBism') to "people without easy access to mathematical formulas and equations" (4-5). Qbism is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that "doesn't meddle with the technical aspects of the theory [but instead] reinterprets the fundamental terms of the theory and gives them new meaning" (3). The most important motivation for QBism, enthusiastically stated on the book's cover, is that QBism provides "a way past quantum theory's paradoxes and puzzles" such that much of the weirdness associated with quantum theory "dissolves under the lens of QBism". Could a non-technical book that almost fits in your pocket really succeed in resolving the notorious paradoxes of quantum theory? I believe the answer is: not in this case. There are three primary reasons. Firstly, the argument that QBism solves quantum paradoxes is not convincing. Secondly, it proves difficult to pin down exactly what QBism says. Thirdly, as a scientific theory QBism seems explanatorily inert, which is maybe why the topic of scientific explanation is not broached. Sections 2-4 below discuss each of these problems in turn. However, there is still a wealth of insights that make this book a worthwhile read, and I shall begin with those.

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We give an introduction to the QBist interpretation of quantum mechanics, which removes the paradoxes, conundra, and pseudo-problems that have plagued quantum foundations for the past nine decades. As an example, we show in detail how this interpretation eliminates “quantum nonlocality.”

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Christopher Fuchs and Rüdiger Schack have developed a way of understanding science, which, among other things, resolves many of the conceptual puzzles of quantum mechanics that have vexed people for the past nine decades. They call it QBism. I speculate on how John Bell might have reacted to QBism, and I explain the many ways in which QBism differs importantly from the orthodox ways of thinking about quantum mechanics associated with the term "Copenhagen interpretation."
Fast forward to the beginning of the current century, when a new version of the quantum-states-are-states-of-knowledge interpretation was launched by Carlton Caves, Chris Fuchs, and Ruediger Schack (2002). At first it was called Quantum Bayesianism, having been conceived as an extension of a personalist Bayesian theory of probability, but since then it has re-branded itself as QBism, the term preferred by Mermin (2017) because “QBism is as big a break with 20th century ways of thinking about science as Cubism was with 19th century ways of thinking about art.”
The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.
The purpose of this book is to explain Quantum Bayesianism ('QBism') to "people without easy access to mathematical formulas and equations" (4-5). Qbism is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that "doesn't meddle with the technical aspects of the theory [but instead] reinterprets the fundamental terms of the theory and gives them new meaning" (3). The most important motivation for QBism, enthusiastically stated on the book's cover, is that QBism provides "a way past quantum theory's paradoxes and puzzles" such that much of the weirdness associated with quantum theory "dissolves under the lens of QBism". Could a non-technical book that almost fits in your pocket really succeed in resolving the notorious paradoxes of quantum theory? I believe the answer is: not in this case. There are three primary reasons. Firstly, the argument that QBism solves quantum paradoxes is not convincing. Secondly, it proves difficult to pin down exactly what QBism says. Thirdly, as a scientific theory QBism seems explanatorily inert, which is maybe why the topic of scientific explanation is not broached. Sections 2-4 below discuss each of these problems in turn. However, there is still a wealth of insights that make this book a worthwhile read, and I shall begin with those.