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arXiv:quant-ph/0405039 · Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General

Are all particles identical?

Sheldon Goldstein, James Taylor, Roderich Tumulka, Nino Zanghì

Published Feb 3, 2005• 36 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We consider the possibility that all particles in the world are fundamentally identical, i.e., belong to the same species. Different masses, charges, spins, flavours or colours then merely correspond to different quantum states of the same particle, just as spin-up and spin-down do. The implications of this viewpoint can be best appreciated within Bohmian mechanics, a precise formulation of quantum mechanics with particle trajectories. The implementation of this viewpoint in such a theory leads to trajectories different from those of the usual formulation, and thus to a version of Bohmian mechanics that is inequivalent to, though arguably empirically indistinguishable from, the usual one. The mathematical core of this viewpoint is however rather independent of the detailed dynamical scheme Bohmian mechanics provides, and it amounts to the assertion that the configuration space for N particles, even N 'distinguishable particles', is the set of all N -point subsets of physical 3-space.

DOI
10.1088/0305-4470/38/7/012

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The treatment of identical particles in quantum mechanics rests on two (related) principles: the spin‐statistics connection and the Symmetrization Postulate. In light of recent theories (such as q‐deformed commutators) that allow for ‘small’ violations of the spin‐statistics connection and the Symmetrization Postulate, we revisit the issue of how quantum mechanics deals with identical particles and how it supports or fails to support various philosophical stances concerning individuality. As a consequence of the expanded possibilities for quantum statistics, we argue that permutation symmetry is best formulated as a formal property of the state function describing the system of particles rather than as a property of the individual particles.1 Introduction2 Philosophical background2.1 Important terminology2.1.1 Identity2.1.2 Indistinguishability2.1.3 Indiscernibility2.2 When are particles indistinguishable?2.3 The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and quantum mechanics2.4 The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and logic2.5 Particle history2.6 Transcendental individuality3 Some quantum formalism3.1 The Principle of Permutation Invariance and the Symmetrization Postulate3.2 The configuration‐space approach3.3 Commutators and anticommutators, and identical particle statistics3.4 Q‐mutators4 Identical particle statistics: a holistic point of view5 Conclusions

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Sep 1, 2002•20 citations
We consider the possibility that all particles in the world are fundamentally identical, i.e., belong to the same species. Different masses, charges, spins, flavours or colours then merely correspond to different quantum states of the same particle, just as spin-up and spin-down do. The implications of this viewpoint can be best appreciated within Bohmian mechanics, a precise formulation of quantum mechanics with particle trajectories. The implementation of this viewpoint in such a theory leads to trajectories different from those of the usual formulation, and thus to a version of Bohmian mechanics that is inequivalent to, though arguably empirically indistinguishable from, the usual one. The mathematical core of this viewpoint is however rather independent of the detailed dynamical scheme Bohmian mechanics provides, and it amounts to the assertion that the configuration space for N particles, even N 'distinguishable particles', is the set of all N -point subsets of physical 3-space.
The postulates 1 to 6 of quantum mechanics as stated in Sections 3.7 and 7.2 apply to multi-particle systems provided that each of the particles is distinguishable from the others. For example, the nucleus and the electron in a hydrogen-like atom are readily distinguishable by their differing masses and charges. When a system contains two or more identical particles, however, postulates 1 to 6 are not sufficient to predict the properties of the system. These postulates must be augmented by an additional postulate. This chapter introduces this new postulate and discusses its consequences. Permutations of identical particles Particles are identical if they cannot be distinguished one from another by any intrinsic property, such as mass, charge, or spin. There does not exist, in fact and in principle, any experimental procedure which can identify any one of the particles. In classical mechanics, even though all particles in the system may have the same intrinsic properties, each may be identified, at least in principle, by its precise trajectory as governed by Newton's laws of motion. This identification is not possible in quantum theory because each particle does not possess a trajectory; instead, the wave function gives the probability density for finding the particle at each point in space. When a particle is found to be in some small region, there is no way of determining either theoretically or experimentally which particle it is.
A type of mechanics will be presented that possesses some distinctive properties. On the one hand, its physical description & rules of operation are readily comprehensible & intuitively clear. On the other, it fully satisfies all observable predictions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Within it, particles exist at points in space, follow continuous, piecewise differentiable paths, and their linear momentum is equal to their mass times their velocity along their path. Yet the probabilities for position and momentum, conditioned on the state of the particle's environment, follow the rules of quantum theory. Indeed, all observable consequences of quantum theory are satisfied; particles can be entangled, have intrinsic spin, this spin is not local to the particle, particle identity can effect probabilities, and so forth. All the rules of quantum mechanics are obeyed, and all arise in a straightforward fashion. After this is established, connections will be drawn out between this type of mechanics and other types of quantum worlds; those that obey Bohmian mechanics, stochastic mechanics, the many worlds interpretation, and physical collapse. In the final section, a relativistic version of the mechanics will be presented.
Abstract According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. These classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by unique combinations of physical properties. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the received view is that particles of the same kind (“identical particles”) are physically indistinguishable from each other and lack identity. This doctrine rests on the quantum mechanical (anti)symmetrization postulates together with the “factorist” assumption that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space of the tensor product Hilbert space of a many-particle system. Even though standard in theoretical physics and the philosophy of physics, the assumption of factorism and the ensuing indistinguishability of particles are problematic. Particle indistinguishability is irreconcilable with the everyday meaning of “particle”, and also with how this term is used in the practice of physics. Moreover, it is a consequence of the standard view that identical quantum particles remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, which makes a smooth transition to the classical particle concept impossible. Lubberdink (1998; 2009) and Dieks and Lubberdink (2011) have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and avoids these difficulties. We further explain and discuss this alternative framework here. One of its key consequences is that particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but emergent; another that once they have emerged, quantum particles are always physically distinguishable and thus possess a physically grounded identity.
According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. Classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by physical characteristics. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the standard view is that particles of the same kind ("identical particles") are in all circumstances indistinguishable from each other. This indistinguishability doctrine is motivated by the (anti)symmetrization postulates together with the assumption (``factorism'') that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space in the tensor product Hilbert space of a many-particles system. Although the factorist assumption is standard in the literature, it is conceptually problematic. Particle indistinguishability is incompatible with the everyday meaning of ``particle'', and also with how this term is used both in classical physics and in the experimental practice of physics. The standard view requires quantum particles of the same kind to remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, so that a transition to the classical picture of the world seems impossible. Earlier we have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and that avoids these and other problems. We further explain and develop this proposal here. In our view, particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but \emph{emergent}. However, in those situations where the particle concept is applicable, quantum particles---identical or not---are distinguishable in the same way as classical particles.
The symmetrization postulates of quantum mechanics (symmetry for bosons, antisymmetry for fermions) are usually taken to entail that quantum particles of the same kind (e.g., electrons) are all in exactly the same state and therefore indistinguishable in the strongest possible sense. These symmetrization postulates possess a general validity that survives the classical limit, and the conclusion seems therefore unavoidable that even classical particles of the same kind must all be in the same state—in clear conflict with what we know about classical particles. In this article we analyze the origin of this paradox. We shall argue that in the classical limit classical particles emerge , as new entities that do not correspond to the “particle indices” defined in quantum mechanics. Put differently, we show that the quantum mechanical symmetrization postulates do not pertain to particles , as we know them from classical physics, but rather to indices that have a merely formal significance. This conclusion raises the question of whether many discussions in the literature about the status of identical quantum particles have not been misguided.
The treatment of identical particles in quantum mechanics rests on two (related) principles: the spin‐statistics connection and the Symmetrization Postulate. In light of recent theories (such as q‐deformed commutators) that allow for ‘small’ violations of the spin‐statistics connection and the Symmetrization Postulate, we revisit the issue of how quantum mechanics deals with identical particles and how it supports or fails to support various philosophical stances concerning individuality. As a consequence of the expanded possibilities for quantum statistics, we argue that permutation symmetry is best formulated as a formal property of the state function describing the system of particles rather than as a property of the individual particles.1 Introduction2 Philosophical background2.1 Important terminology2.1.1 Identity2.1.2 Indistinguishability2.1.3 Indiscernibility2.2 When are particles indistinguishable?2.3 The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and quantum mechanics2.4 The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and logic2.5 Particle history2.6 Transcendental individuality3 Some quantum formalism3.1 The Principle of Permutation Invariance and the Symmetrization Postulate3.2 The configuration‐space approach3.3 Commutators and anticommutators, and identical particle statistics3.4 Q‐mutators4 Identical particle statistics: a holistic point of view5 Conclusions