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arXiv:2602.04524

A simple means for deriving quantum mechanics

Eric Tesse

quant-phSubmitted Feb 4, 2026• Announced Feb 5, 2026• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

A type of mechanics will be presented that possesses some distinctive properties. On the one hand, its physical description & rules of operation are readily comprehensible & intuitively clear. On the other, it fully satisfies all observable predictions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Within it, particles exist at points in space, follow continuous, piecewise differentiable paths, and their linear momentum is equal to their mass times their velocity along their path. Yet the probabilities for position and momentum, conditioned on the state of the particle's environment, follow the rules of quantum theory. Indeed, all observable consequences of quantum theory are satisfied; particles can be entangled, have intrinsic spin, this spin is not local to the particle, particle identity can effect probabilities, and so forth. All the rules of quantum mechanics are obeyed, and all arise in a straightforward fashion. After this is established, connections will be drawn out between this type of mechanics and other types of quantum worlds; those that obey Bohmian mechanics, stochastic mechanics, the many worlds interpretation, and physical collapse. In the final section, a relativistic version of the mechanics will be presented.

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21 pages

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A type of mechanics will be presented that possesses some distinctive properties. On the one hand, its physical description & rules of operation are readily comprehensible & intuitively clear. On the other, it fully satisfies all observable predictions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Within it, particles exist at points in space, follow continuous, piecewise differentiable paths, and their linear momentum is equal to their mass times their velocity along their path. Yet the probabilities for position and momentum, conditioned on the state of the particle's environment, follow the rules of quantum theory. Indeed, all observable consequences of quantum theory are satisfied; particles can be entangled, have intrinsic spin, this spin is not local to the particle, particle identity can effect probabilities, and so forth. All the rules of quantum mechanics are obeyed, and all arise in a straightforward fashion. After this is established, connections will be drawn out between this type of mechanics and other types of quantum worlds; those that obey Bohmian mechanics, stochastic mechanics, the many worlds interpretation, and physical collapse. In the final section, a relativistic version of the mechanics will be presented.
Certainly there is no unique answer to Frank Wilczek’s question, “What Is Quantum Theory?” (Physics Today, June 2000, page 11). I was not certain that a pragmatic answer, which I proposed for a course in applied quantum mechanics, 1 1. W. A. Harrison, Applied Quantum Mechanics, World Scientific, River Edge, N.J. (2000). would be sustainable for the entire course, but it seems that it was. That answer was the assertion that everything is both a particle and a wave, and that everything else would follow from that one assertion. Planck’s constant arose when the velocity of a wave (the derivative of the frequency with respect to wavenumber) was equated to the velocity of a particle (the derivative of the energy with respect to momentum), so that energy is proportional to frequency and momentum to wavenumber, with the same proportionality constant ħ. When Hamiltonian mechanics was introduced, “everything” became anything that can be described by such mechanics, or anything that satisfies a wave equation. Quantum theory does not say what nature gives, only how to predict the behavior of what is given. If nature serves up particles with half-integral angular momentum, the wavefunction that describes them must go into its negative when they are interchanged, and they therefore obey the Pauli principle.Such principles, which historically arose as independent conjectures, now follow from the one assertion. It is a matter of seeing how this peculiar assertion can turn out to be absolutely true.The relation between quantum theory and the physical world was seen as follows: Quantum theory tells what future scenarios are consistent with some initial information, and what the relative probability of each scenario is. Quantum theory cannot tell more than that, but neither can any other theory.My pragmatic approach may not satisfy everyone’s philosophical needs. But the aim of an applied quantum course is to see how to use the theory and to introduce the many approximations that have made the theory accessible to physicists and engineers. If some basic consequences are difficult to accept, the problem must lie with the initial assertion from which the consequences follow.REFERENCESection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCE <<1. W. A. Harrison, Applied Quantum Mechanics, World Scientific, River Edge, N.J. (2000). Google ScholarCrossref© 2001 American Institute of Physics.
Standard quantum mechanics—the theory that is made use of in practice and is, because of this, taught in university courses— is a theory that is weakly objective only. For this reason it is most conveniently and neatly expressed by means of a set of basic rules of calculation that enable physicists to make predictions concerning what will be observed. Classical and quantum physics both make considerable use of the expressions "physical system" and "state of a physical system." Quantum mechanics is essentially a probabilistic theory. Except in special cases it makes no predictions that bear on individual systems. Rather, it predicts statistical frequencies. In other words, it predicts, as a rule, the number n of times that a given event will be observed when a large number N of physical systems of the same type and satisfying specified conditions are subjected to a measurement process.
A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett's "many-worlds" interpretation. The resulting theory has the advantage of resolving known issues of both theories, as well as those of standard quantum mechanics. It has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Most importantly, the Born rule can be derived by straightforward application of the Laplacian rule, without reliance on a "quantum equilibrium hypothesis" that is crucial for Bohmian mechanics, and without reliance on a "branch weight" that is crucial for Everett-type theories. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett's approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no "splitting of worlds", which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains 1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, 2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, 3) the identification of observables as self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space, and 4) the apparently random "collapse of the wavefunction" caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.
Bohmian mechanics (BM) is a popular interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) in which particles have real positions. The velocity of a point x in configuration space is defined as the standard probability current j ( x ) divided by the probability density P ( x ). However, this 'standard' j is in fact only one of infinitely many that transform correctly and satisfy . In this paper, I show that a particular j is singled out if one requires that j be determined experimentally as a weak value , using a technique that would make sense to a physicist with no knowledge of QM. This 'naively observable' j seems the most natural way to define j operationally. Moreover, I show that this operationally defined j equals the standard j , so, assuming , one obtains the dynamics of BM. It follows that the possible Bohmian paths are naively observable from a large enough ensemble. Furthermore, this justification for the Bohmian law of motion singles out x as the hidden variable, because (for example) the analogously defined momentum current is in general incompatible with the evolution of the momentum distribution. Finally I discuss how, in this setting, the usual quantum probabilities can be motivated from a Bayesian standpoint, via the principle of indifference.
Quantum mechanics (QM) is not just a theory of micro-objects: it is our current fundamental theory of motion. It expresses a deeper understanding of Nature than classical mechanics. Precisely as classical mechanics, the conventional formulation of QM describes evolution of states and observables in time. Precisely as classical mechanics, this is not sufficient to deal with general relativistic systems, because these systems do not describe evolution in time; they describe correlations between observables. Therefore, a formulation of QM slightly more general than the conventional one – or a quantum version of the relativistic classical mechanics discussed in the previous chapter – is needed. In this chapter I discuss the possibility of such a formulation. In the last section I discuss the general physical interpretation of QM.QM can be formulated in a number of more or less equivalent formalisms: canonical (Hilbert spaces and self-adjoint operators), covariant (Feynman's sum-over-histories), algebraic (states as linear functionals over an abstract algebra of observables) and others. Generally, but not always, we are able to translate these formalisms into one another, but often what is easy in one formulation is difficult in another. A generalrelativistic sum-over-histories formalism has been developed by Jim Hartle. Here I focus on the canonical formalism, because the canonical formalism has provided the mathematical completeness and precision needed to explicitly construct the mathematical apparatus of quantum gravity. Later I will consider alternative formalisms.
The three major theoretical principles of quantum mechanics relevant to its interpretation are: (T1), linearity; (T2), invariance under certain groups; and (T3) the orthogonality and isolation of the different branches of the state vector. These three imply the particle-like properties of mass, energy, momentum, spin, charge, and locality are actually properties of the state vector; and this in turn implies there is no evidence for the existence of particles. Experimentally there is no evidence for collapse (E1) and theoretically linearity prohibits collapse. One also has the experimentally verified probability law (E2), which is found to rule out the many-worlds interpretation. The failure of these three major interpretation, particles, collapse, and many-worlds, apparently implies an acceptable interpretation must be based on perception. Rather than being a separate principle, probability follows in this interpretation from a weak assumption on perception plus the combinatorics when an experiment is run many times. This suggests a relatively simple experimental test of the perception interpretation.