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Appendix 03: Chance and Spontaneity

DougMcManaman

Published Nov 8, 2010• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Many people in the world of science will often employ terms like 'indeterminacy', 'chance', 'probability', etc., and using knowledge from the world of science they will often attempt to draw philosophical conclusions about the nature of reality as a whole.Claims typically made center around the idea that everything happens by chance, or everything is a result of probability, or that reality is fundamentally indeterminate, etc. But at the root of these claims is a vague and imprecise understanding of what these terms really mean.

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Many people in the world of science will often employ terms like 'indeterminacy', 'chance', 'probability', etc., and using knowledge from the world of science they will often attempt to draw philosophical conclusions about the nature of reality as a whole.Claims typically made center around the idea that everything happens by chance, or everything is a result of probability, or that reality is fundamentally indeterminate, etc. But at the root of these claims is a vague and imprecise understanding of what these terms really mean.
Abstract Many theories and models from physics are probabilistic. This observation raises several philosophical questions: What are probabilities in physics? Do they reflect objective chances which exist independently of the human mind? Or do they only express subjective credences and thus capture our own uncertainty about the world? Finally, which metaphysical lessons, if at all, can one draw from the largely probabilistic character of physics? The chapters collected in this volume address these questions and provide a detailed philosophical appraisal of the status of probabilities in all of physics. Particular emphasis is laid upon statistical physics and quantum mechanics. Many chapters reflect a desire to understand probabilities from physics as objective chances. These chances are characterized, e.g., as time-averages, as probabilities from a best system in the terms of David Lewis, or using the Boltzmannian typicality approach. Other chapters are sympathetic to a Bayesian view of probabilities in physics. The chapters about quantum mechanics elucidate the peculiar characteristics of quantum correlations and discuss strategies to justify the Born Rule. Finally, the chapters of this volume demonstrate how closely interpretive issues about probabilities are entangled with other foundational problems of physics such as the Reversibility Paradox, the ontology of the quantum world and the question whether the world is deterministic.
Abstract Uses a historical approach to explore the extent to which quantum theory mandates indeterminism. Drawing on important examples in the history of physics, it discusses explicitly the crucial distinction – often overlooked in the philosophical literature – between indeterminacy of physical quantities and causal indeterminism. It pursues at a more sophisticated level, issues raised in Ch. 2 concerning determinism and indeterminism in modern science. It concludes that quantum indeterminacy is an objective feature of the world, but that the jury is still out regarding quantum indeterminism.
There are several links between information theory — between »information as such« whatever that might mean — and the foundations of nature, i e, basic physics. Well, since physics a science still evolving (despite propositions that »the end of science« now in sight), some of the links between information and physics are hypothetical. One linkage fairly obvious — thermodynamics depends upon entropy or some measure of order or disorder, and that clearly has something to do with information. The other possible relationship might be between the uncertainty that a key characteristic of quantum mechanics. We can never know everything on the quantum scale; the Heisenberg uncertainty principle tells that the more information we gain in one direction the less we know in another. If we, on that scale, obtain certainty as to one factor, then another will stay entirely undecided — try to affix a position to a quantum particle, and the momentum will be out of bounds entirely. (This the established dogma currently, though there are some deviating ideas.1) Then the question arises: who does the actual measuring, with what — what particles, at what level, are involved in this act of, as it pronounced, forcing the wave function to collapse? This wave function is the indeterminate particle: the various statistics describing the probabilities that the particle (which simultaneously takes on aspects of a wave) may be in one state or another. We will now attempt to discuss these different — or are they really different? — interdependencies, starting with black holes.
MAN AND THE INDETERMINACIES* JOHN R. PLATTf Understanding the external world is the objective of science, and accurate prediction is the test ofit. Ifwe really understand genetics, we can breed better hybrid corn. Ifwe really understand geology, we can locate minerals and oil. If we really understand the motion of the atmosphere and its water vapor, we can predict the weather. But some ofthe most thought-provoking problems ofscience are those involving "indeterminacy," where accurate prediction for some reason becomes impossible. It is as though a sign said, "Nonsense!—Your prying or your prediction at this point interferes with itself, so your supposed observations orpredictions can no longer be made objectively or meaningfully ." Many ofthese problems are a little bit like my answer to your question whether I will wear my red tie tomorrow morning. I may tell you that I will, but this is an intention, not an objective prediction like predicting rain—and you will immediately show that you know this by laughing at me ifI try to bet with you on it. It is obvious that my knowledge ofthe prediction and the bet would change my performance, and I am likely to wear the red tie or not, as the case may be,just so I will win—or to do the converse to prove my unpredictability. Everyone knows, really, that predictions of one's own conscious decisions are not objective predictions in any scientific sense. The most famous case ofindeterminacy, where getting data for a prediction interacts with the outcome in somewhat the same way, is that of the Heisenberg "uncertainty principle" in atomic physics, which upset the whole philosophical world forty years ago. But indeterminacy and * A chapter from the book The Step to Man, published byJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.,June, 1966; reprinted by permission. t Acting Director, Mental Health Research Institute, University ofMichigan, Ann Arbor. 67 related questions of prediction also touch many other problems, for example , in areas such as biology and psychology. It is interesting to look at some ofthese problems to seejust what goes wrong with deterministic predictions, and why. This gives us a much clearer view ofwhat questions objective science can meaningfully ask and what it cannot, and what parts oflife must be left out ofthe scientific equation. It appears that several of the non-classical conclusions may be ofcentral importance in understanding the relations between manandman and between man and the universe. The Areas ofDeterminism The concept ofdeterminismis closely bound up with the concept ofthe "isolated system." An isolated system, in astronomy or physics or chemistry , is a body or collection ofbodies—for example, the sun and planets, or the chemicals in a flask—which are supposed to interact in some respect only with each other. It is a system which an observer can either start off or can observe accurately at some initial time, and which can then continue to be observed indefinitely without any appreciable disturbance to its motions or behavior from interactions with the observer himself or with the rest ofthe universe. These conditions are evidently essential in order for determinism to hold, that is, in order for our specification of the initial state ofthe system to suffice for determining its final state accurately at any later time. Ofcourse, isolation from the surroundings is never perfect. The chemicals in the flask boil offinto the air. The earth's tides slow down the moon by amounts that can be measured. Nevertheless, the "isolated system" is a useful and accurate approximation for most ofthe problems we know how to solve in physics and chemistry and engineering; and in fact, that is why we know how to solve them. Ifwe correct for the small disturbances , Newton's laws will predict eclipses and the motions ofplanets or man-made satellites for years or centuries ahead. The planets are heavy bodies, not much affected by the dust in their paths or the sunbeams by which we observe them. Few other predictions in science are as certain as those of the planets, but in most cases the uncertainties are not believed to be due to any breakdown of determinism. Forecasting the weather, for example, is difficult apparently because of the great complexity of...
In our search for the ultimate law, P, that allows us to encode the whole of reality we have come across a very fundamental obstacle. As Deutsch argued, P cannot be all-encompassing, simply because it cannot explain its own origins. We need a law more fundamental than P, from which P can be derived. But then this more fundamental law also needs to come from somewhere. This is like the metaphor of the painter in the lunatic asylum, who is trying to paint a picture of the garden he is sitting in. He can never find a way to completely include himself in the picture and gets caught in an infinite regression. Does this mean we can never understand the whole of reality? Maybe so, given that any postulate that we start from needs its own explanation. Any law that underlies reality ultimately needs an a priori law. This puts us in a bit of a ‘Catch 22’ situation. So, are we resigned to failure or is there a way out? Is there some fundamental level at which events have no a priori causes and we can break the infinite regression? What does it mean for an event to have no a priori cause? This means that, even with all prior knowledge, we cannot infer that this event will take place. Furthermore, if there were genuinely acausal events in this Universe, this would imply a fundamentally random element of reality that cannot be reduced to anything deterministic. This is a hugely controversial area, with various proponents of religion, science, and philosophy all having a quite contrasting set of views on this. Often people get very emotional over this question, as it has profound implications for us as human beings. Could it be that some events just don’t have first causes? The British philosopher Bertrand Russell thought so. In Russell’s famous debate with Reverend Copleston on the origin of the world, Copleston thought everything must have a cause, and therefore the world has a cause – and this cause is ultimately God himself.