There are several links between information theory — between »information as such« whatever that might mean — and the foundations of nature, i e, basic physics. Well, since physics a science still evolving (despite propositions that »the end of science« now in sight), some of the links between information and physics are hypothetical. One linkage fairly obvious — thermodynamics depends upon entropy or some measure of order or disorder, and that clearly has something to do with information. The other possible relationship might be between the uncertainty that a key characteristic of quantum mechanics. We can never know everything on the quantum scale; the Heisenberg uncertainty principle tells that the more information we gain in one direction the less we know in another. If we, on that scale, obtain certainty as to one factor, then another will stay entirely undecided — try to affix a position to a quantum particle, and the momentum will be out of bounds entirely. (This the established dogma currently, though there are some deviating ideas.1) Then the question arises: who does the actual measuring, with what — what particles, at what level, are involved in this act of, as it pronounced, forcing the wave function to collapse? This wave function is the indeterminate particle: the various statistics describing the probabilities that the particle (which simultaneously takes on aspects of a wave) may be in one state or another. We will now attempt to discuss these different — or are they really different? — interdependencies, starting with black holes.
There are several links between information theory — between »information as such« whatever that might mean — and the foundations of nature, i e, basic physics. Well, since physics a science still evolving (despite propositions that »the end of science« now in sight), some of the links between information and physics are hypothetical. One linkage fairly obvious — thermodynamics depends upon entropy or some measure of order or disorder, and that clearly has something to do with information. The other possible relationship might be between the uncertainty that a key characteristic of quantum mechanics. We can never know everything on the quantum scale; the Heisenberg uncertainty principle tells that the more information we gain in one direction the less we know in another. If we, on that scale, obtain certainty as to one factor, then another will stay entirely undecided — try to affix a position to a quantum particle, and the momentum will be out of bounds entirely. (This the established dogma currently, though there are some deviating ideas.1) Then the question arises: who does the actual measuring, with what — what particles, at what level, are involved in this act of, as it pronounced, forcing the wave function to collapse? This wave function is the indeterminate particle: the various statistics describing the probabilities that the particle (which simultaneously takes on aspects of a wave) may be in one state or another. We will now attempt to discuss these different — or are they really different? — interdependencies, starting with black holes.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
What is information? A short answer could be: Anything that changes our minds and states of thinking! Information is virtual. It can be carried by speech, an image, scratches on a stone, patterns in a photon field, the connections of neurons in our brains or even by the wavefunction of an electron. Information does not depend on the actual means of transmission nor does its identity change when changing the carrier. Information is physical. It needs to be sustained by a physical substrate and rearranging that substrate to contain the wanted information requires to spend energy or work. Without a physical world, information can not be stored, processed, or transmitted. Our world is permeated with different representations of information. Actually Information about the physical laws governing our Universe can be found everywhere and in everything. Could it then be that the real fundamental elements of this world are tiny bits of information? Could we get it from bit?1 A number of researcher investigate this possibility, and several of their attempts to recover physical laws from the principles governing information are reported about in this special issue on physics of information. The articles by Gregg Jaeger,2 by Ariel Caticha,3 and by John Skilling and Kevin Knuth4 address the reconstruction of quantum mechanics from information theory. Furthermore, Kevin Knuth and James Walsh5 show how to recover space-time from particles sending each others signals in an initially geometry-free setting. A central element of most works on information is the concept of a probability. Probabilities can be defined via various routes. Most familiar might be their definitions by the frequentists school as relative frequencies of events (in the limit of infinite amounts of such). A more general definition of probabilities is the Bayesians' one, which regards probabilities as quantifiers of statements, expressing how much those should be expected to be true. Although this definition looks subjective on the first glance, it rests on a solid mathematical theorem by Richard Cox6 that any extension of binary logic to a continuum of single valued truthfulness quantifier that respects a minimum of requirements must be isomorphic to probability theory. And this definition turns out to embrace the frequentists' definition in case that infinite numbers of comparable events are actually available and can be counted. The majority of authors of this special issues seem to favor the Bayesian perspective, which is probably a result of our own, the guest editors', preference and not necessarily a reflection of the prevailing position of contemporary scientists. The different views on probabilities of frequentists and Bayesians are addressed by the article of Allen Caldwell.7 He builds a bridge between these antagonistic camps by explaining frequentists' constructions in a Bayesian language. In particular, his argumentation why the omnipresent p-value in statistical and experimental literature might often capture a relevant signal of model misfit is reassuring, given that a large fraction of our medical system is based on decisions backed up by p-values. A Bayesian might add that it would be even more reassuring, if a system rigorously build on logic and its continuous extension would be used for decisions affecting live-or-death questions. The laws governing probabilities themselves seem to reflect that of more elementary mathematical structures. Kevin Knuth shows how these emerge from lattice theory, which deals with relations in partially ordered sets like that of collections of possibilities.8 The sum rule of probability theory is a direct consequence of the underlying lattice structure. Interestingly, a number of other theories are resting also on such lattices and therefore exhibit their own versions of sum rules: measures of sets, mutual information, the Euler characteristics of topological spaces, as well as quantum mechanical interactions that are quantified by pairs of numbers, the real and imaginary parts of complex probability amplitudes (see also4). The theory of information has very practical application in physics and elsewhere. Manfred Opper discusses how the solutions of stochastic differential equations can be inferred via variational methods, which have their origin in thermodynamics.9 Torsten Enßlin introduces information field theory (IFT), the information theory for fields, as a means to infer the configuration of a physical field from incomplete and noisy data.10 The mathematical apparatus for this is that of quantum field theory (QFT), just with ordinary probabilities instead of complex probability amplitudes as in the latter. Could it be that the difference between IFT and QFT is just be the same as between classical information theory and quantum mechanics, the transition from real valued to complex valued quantifier for statements? Anyhow, any practical inference machinery, be it for dynamical systems or for fields, requires sophisticated numerical methods. Michael Betancourt reviews Markov Chain Monte Carlo Methods to calculate expectation values over high dimensional probabilities.11 Theo Steininger and coworkers present the NIFTy3 software package for numerical information field theory calculations, which can handle very high dimensional field inference problems.12 Finally, in an article focused on the subtleties of the Monty Hall problem and mostly aiming at information theoretical entertainment, Torsten Enßlin and Margret Westercamp investigate the possibility that human intuition might be more rational than contemporary psychology thinks.13 A number of possible topics for an issue on physics of information are not addressed here. We would have loved to have articles on Landauer's principle, which states that erasing information has to cost energy, on QBism, a Bayesian version of quantum mechanics, on artificial and biological neural networks, as well as any other aspect of the information-soaked biological world. What has a reader of this special issue to be equipped with in order to follow the lines of thoughts? In addition to the usual physicist's education, the minimal additional equipment are the basics of probability theory and the concept of entropy. Most of the other concepts used in the articles rest on those and are introduced there. Let A, B, and C be propositions (or possibilities). The probability P ( A | B ) of A being true assuming that B is true is a number between 0 and 1, with P ( A | B ) = 1 expressing certainty of A under B ( B ⇒ A ) and P ( A | B ) = 0 expressing certainty of not A being the case under B ( B ⇒ ¬ A ).
“Anyone who is not shocked by quantum theory has not understood it.” Since Niels Bohr said this many years ago, quantum mechanics has only been getting more shocking. We now realize that it’s not really telling us that “weird” things happen out of sight, on the tiniest level, in the atomic world. Rather, we can now see that everything is quantum: our everyday world is simply what quantum becomes at the human scale. But if quantum mechanics is right, what seems obvious and right in our everyday world is built on foundations that don’t seems obvious or right—or even possible. An exhilarating tour of the contemporary quantum landscape, Beyond Weird is a book about what quantum physics really means—and what it doesn’t. Science writer Philip Ball offers an up-to-date, accessible account of the quest to come to grips with the most fundamental theory of physical reality, and to explain how its counterintuitive principles underpin the world we experience. Over the past decade it has become clear that quantum physics is less a theory about particles and waves, uncertainty and fuzziness, than a theory about information and knowledge—about what can be known, and how we know it. Discoveries and experiments over the past few decades have called into question the meanings and limits of space and time, cause and effect, and, ultimately, of knowledge itself. The quantum world Ball shows us isn’t a different world. It is our world, and if anything deserves to be called “weird,” it’s us.
Along with weaving together observations, experiments, and theoretical constructs into a coherent mesh of understanding of the world around us, physics over its past five centuries has continuously refined the base concepts on which the whole framework is built. In quantum physics, first in non-relativistic mechanics and later in quantum field theories, even familiar concepts of position, momentum, wave or particle, are derived constructs from the classical limit in which we live but not intrinsic to the underlying physics. Most crucially, the very idea of the individual, whether an object or an event, distinguished only in a mere label of identity from others identical to it in all the physics, exists only as an approximation, not an element of underlying reality. Failure to recognize this and seeking alternative explanations in many worlds or multiverses leads only to incoherent logic and incorrect physics. As an example, in a physical system such as an atom in a particular state, physics deals with the universal system of all such atoms but makes no meaningful prediction of the position of an electron or the time of decay of any specific atom. Those are incidental, entirely random among all possible positions and times, even while physics makes very precise predictions for the distribution of the outcomes in measurements on atoms in that state. Physics deals with the universal, not the individual.
What happens to the entropy increase principle as the Universe evolve to form the big-crunch singularity? What happens to the uncertainity relations along the process of gravitational collapses? What is the quantum mechanical description of a Radon atom in a rigid box when the distance of consecutive nodes and antinodes of ψ is equal to or less than the diameter of the atom? What is the position-space wave function of two finite volume massive bosons if we take contact interaction into account? How a photon produce electron-positron pair with finite volume concentrate rest masses? What are the charges of the electron-positron pairs forming loops in the vacuum? How two particles with three-momentums k1,k2(k1=k2) produced to form a loop at a space-time point always arrive at another spacial point simultaneously? What is the microscopic explanation in terms of particle exchanges of the force in the Casimir effect? What is the mechanism of the collapse of the momentum-space wave function of a particle knocking out an elctron from an atom? What is meant by ∣Ψ>=c1(t)∣ΨU238>+c2(t)∣ΨTh234>? Quantum mechanically the region between the rigid walls (which is equiprobable in classical mechanics) is non-homogeneous for a particle in a rigid box ! The large scale structure of the Universe is homogeneous.
T HE FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE BEHIND MODERN INformation technology, the most visible side of science which permeates almost every aspect of our daily lives, rests on two pillars: information science and quantum mechanics. Knowing how to efficiently communicate and process information and understanding the physical phenomena and material properties that are essential to building functional devices have provided us with unprecedented convenience and mastery over nature, possibly with the price of becoming the slaves of our computers and gadgets. Nevertheless, information science and quantum mechanics enter the backbone of current technologies as distinct and independent fields. Therefore, one is naturally tempted to ask several questions. Is there land between these two realms? If yes, what can grow out of that land? In particular, can information theory tell us something relevant about the foundations of quantum mechanics? On the other hand, can one formulate a quantum information science and in what sense would this be different from the classical version? In this chapter we introduce several basic concepts that will allow us to better understand the implications of these questions and grasp the essential ideas behind the answers formulated so far. Discussing these fundamental concepts will also shed light on the role of topological quantum matter in the economy of quantum computation. Here we focus on the key ideas that were launched into the arena by classical information theory and classical computation science. The metamorphosis of these ideas after the encounter with quantum mechanics will be discussed in the final three chapters of this book.