MAN AND THE INDETERMINACIES* JOHN R. PLATTf Understanding the external world is the objective of science, and accurate prediction is the test ofit. Ifwe really understand genetics, we can breed better hybrid corn. Ifwe really understand geology, we can locate minerals and oil. If we really understand the motion of the atmosphere and its water vapor, we can predict the weather. But some ofthe most thought-provoking problems ofscience are those involving "indeterminacy," where accurate prediction for some reason becomes impossible. It is as though a sign said, "Nonsense!—Your prying or your prediction at this point interferes with itself, so your supposed observations orpredictions can no longer be made objectively or meaningfully ." Many ofthese problems are a little bit like my answer to your question whether I will wear my red tie tomorrow morning. I may tell you that I will, but this is an intention, not an objective prediction like predicting rain—and you will immediately show that you know this by laughing at me ifI try to bet with you on it. It is obvious that my knowledge ofthe prediction and the bet would change my performance, and I am likely to wear the red tie or not, as the case may be,just so I will win—or to do the converse to prove my unpredictability. Everyone knows, really, that predictions of one's own conscious decisions are not objective predictions in any scientific sense. The most famous case ofindeterminacy, where getting data for a prediction interacts with the outcome in somewhat the same way, is that of the Heisenberg "uncertainty principle" in atomic physics, which upset the whole philosophical world forty years ago. But indeterminacy and * A chapter from the book The Step to Man, published byJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.,June, 1966; reprinted by permission. t Acting Director, Mental Health Research Institute, University ofMichigan, Ann Arbor. 67 related questions of prediction also touch many other problems, for example , in areas such as biology and psychology. It is interesting to look at some ofthese problems to seejust what goes wrong with deterministic predictions, and why. This gives us a much clearer view ofwhat questions objective science can meaningfully ask and what it cannot, and what parts oflife must be left out ofthe scientific equation. It appears that several of the non-classical conclusions may be ofcentral importance in understanding the relations between manandman and between man and the universe. The Areas ofDeterminism The concept ofdeterminismis closely bound up with the concept ofthe "isolated system." An isolated system, in astronomy or physics or chemistry , is a body or collection ofbodies—for example, the sun and planets, or the chemicals in a flask—which are supposed to interact in some respect only with each other. It is a system which an observer can either start off or can observe accurately at some initial time, and which can then continue to be observed indefinitely without any appreciable disturbance to its motions or behavior from interactions with the observer himself or with the rest ofthe universe. These conditions are evidently essential in order for determinism to hold, that is, in order for our specification of the initial state ofthe system to suffice for determining its final state accurately at any later time. Ofcourse, isolation from the surroundings is never perfect. The chemicals in the flask boil offinto the air. The earth's tides slow down the moon by amounts that can be measured. Nevertheless, the "isolated system" is a useful and accurate approximation for most ofthe problems we know how to solve in physics and chemistry and engineering; and in fact, that is why we know how to solve them. Ifwe correct for the small disturbances , Newton's laws will predict eclipses and the motions ofplanets or man-made satellites for years or centuries ahead. The planets are heavy bodies, not much affected by the dust in their paths or the sunbeams by which we observe them. Few other predictions in science are as certain as those of the planets, but in most cases the uncertainties are not believed to be due to any breakdown of determinism. Forecasting the weather, for example, is difficult apparently because of the great complexity of...
MAN AND THE INDETERMINACIES* JOHN R. PLATTf Understanding the external world is the objective of science, and accurate prediction is the test ofit. Ifwe really understand genetics, we can breed better hybrid corn. Ifwe really understand geology, we can locate minerals and oil. If we really understand the motion of the atmosphere and its water vapor, we can predict the weather. But some ofthe most thought-provoking problems ofscience are those involving "indeterminacy," where accurate prediction for some reason becomes impossible. It is as though a sign said, "Nonsense!—Your prying or your prediction at this point interferes with itself, so your supposed observations orpredictions can no longer be made objectively or meaningfully ." Many ofthese problems are a little bit like my answer to your question whether I will wear my red tie tomorrow morning. I may tell you that I will, but this is an intention, not an objective prediction like predicting rain—and you will immediately show that you know this by laughing at me ifI try to bet with you on it. It is obvious that my knowledge ofthe prediction and the bet would change my performance, and I am likely to wear the red tie or not, as the case may be,just so I will win—or to do the converse to prove my unpredictability. Everyone knows, really, that predictions of one's own conscious decisions are not objective predictions in any scientific sense. The most famous case ofindeterminacy, where getting data for a prediction interacts with the outcome in somewhat the same way, is that of the Heisenberg "uncertainty principle" in atomic physics, which upset the whole philosophical world forty years ago. But indeterminacy and * A chapter from the book The Step to Man, published byJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.,June, 1966; reprinted by permission. t Acting Director, Mental Health Research Institute, University ofMichigan, Ann Arbor. 67 related questions of prediction also touch many other problems, for example , in areas such as biology and psychology. It is interesting to look at some ofthese problems to seejust what goes wrong with deterministic predictions, and why. This gives us a much clearer view ofwhat questions objective science can meaningfully ask and what it cannot, and what parts oflife must be left out ofthe scientific equation. It appears that several of the non-classical conclusions may be ofcentral importance in understanding the relations between manandman and between man and the universe. The Areas ofDeterminism The concept ofdeterminismis closely bound up with the concept ofthe "isolated system." An isolated system, in astronomy or physics or chemistry , is a body or collection ofbodies—for example, the sun and planets, or the chemicals in a flask—which are supposed to interact in some respect only with each other. It is a system which an observer can either start off or can observe accurately at some initial time, and which can then continue to be observed indefinitely without any appreciable disturbance to its motions or behavior from interactions with the observer himself or with the rest ofthe universe. These conditions are evidently essential in order for determinism to hold, that is, in order for our specification of the initial state ofthe system to suffice for determining its final state accurately at any later time. Ofcourse, isolation from the surroundings is never perfect. The chemicals in the flask boil offinto the air. The earth's tides slow down the moon by amounts that can be measured. Nevertheless, the "isolated system" is a useful and accurate approximation for most ofthe problems we know how to solve in physics and chemistry and engineering; and in fact, that is why we know how to solve them. Ifwe correct for the small disturbances , Newton's laws will predict eclipses and the motions ofplanets or man-made satellites for years or centuries ahead. The planets are heavy bodies, not much affected by the dust in their paths or the sunbeams by which we observe them. Few other predictions in science are as certain as those of the planets, but in most cases the uncertainties are not believed to be due to any breakdown of determinism. Forecasting the weather, for example, is difficult apparently because of the great complexity of...
In a recent number of Blackfriars (July, 1949) Dr A. W. Gledhill has discussed very competently some aspects of the statistical method as used in modern physics. He has tried to show there ‘that modern physical theory does not contradict the principle of causality’. Having made a study of this subject over quite a number of years, the writer, while agreeing with some of Dr Gledhill’s conclusions, feels nevertheless that there are a few points which have not been covered as adequately as the importance of the subject for modern philosophy seems to warrant. In order to understand the controversy about the validity or non-validity of the principle of causality, which has been initiated by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, it is necessary to realise, first of all, that when a physicist speaks about causality, he usually does not mean the same thing as a scholastic philosopher. In scholastic philosophy one distinguishes different kinds of causes, such as the material, the efficient, the final, as well as the formal and exemplary causes. The classical physicist, on the other hand, since the time of Galileo, admits only efficient causes. Let us therefore give a brief sketch of the development of this concept of scientific causality and show the reasons for this limitation. The purpose of a scientific theory is the prediction of events among the natural objects which form the field of enquiry of the particular science concerned. Evidently, the more certain the prediction, the better the theory on which it is based.
In discussing the fundamental sources of unpredictability, I shall concentrate on those indeterminacies that are definitely required by theory. Let me therefore begin \nby eliminating from consideration supposed indeterminacies stemming from doubts that some people may entertain about basic principles or from certain kinds of ignorance that I believe to be temporary and likely to be remedied in the relatively near future. I assume the following: \n1. Quantum mechanics is correct. The formulation and interpretation of quantum mechanics are still undergoing some necessary evolution, especially in order to accommodate quantum cosmology in a comfortable way, but the basic character of quantum mechanics has always been the same and we may suppose it will remain unchanged. \n2. The elementary particles and their interactions obey a definite dynamical law, discoverable by inquiring complex adaptive systems such as the human scientific enterprise. Although the process of discovery involves a sequence of \napproximate schemata, there is an endpoint to the process after a finite amount of research. (Of course, it can never be possible to prove that the resulting unified theory is perfect; one can only verify it in the usual way by comparing predictions to available observations.) Humans may already have found this unified quantum field theory in the form of superstring theory, which has, to begin with, no arbitrary parameters. (Of course, spontaneous symmetry \nbreaking may give rise to some parameters and even to a choice of solutions, with probabilities for the various alternatives. I will deal with that possibility further on.) This second assumption is equivalent to stating that there is no necessary fundamental unpredictability stemming from ignorance of the universal dynamical law. \n3. The density matrix (in the Schrödinger picture) of the universe near the beginning of its expansion is also knowable. It must in any case be comparatively simple and very far from equilibrium. The second law of thermodynamics and the other associated arrows of time are explained by these properties of the initial density matrix along with the fact that the universe is still very young—the interval of ten billion years is extremely short compared with the relaxation time from the special initial condition.
Most of the physicians that I know are chary of Physics, especially the theory of elementary particles. Even if in Isaac Newton's mathematically precise universe, everything follows clear-cut laws and predictions are easy given appropriate starting conditions. Perhaps, however, physicians coping with this uncertainty will perhaps feel more in tune with Heisenberg's uncertainty law. Heisenberg (1901–76) described a theory of quantum mechanics, published in 1925, when he was only 23 years old. The uncertainty principle describes an imprecision in nature resulting in a limit to what we can know about the behaviour of quantum particles and, hence the smallest scales of nature. Heisenberg was awarded the Nobel Prize for Physics for 1932 for this theory and its application that resulted amongst other things the discovery of allotropic forms of hydrogen. His theory stated that we cannot always give an electron a position in space at a given time, nor follow it in its orbit, so that we cannot assume that the planetary orbits proposed by Niels Bohr exist. Mechanical quantities, such as position and velocity, should be represented, not by ordinary numbers, but by abstract mathematical structures called ‘matrices’ and he formulated his new theory in terms of matrix equations. The principle of uncertainty, says that the determination of the position and momentum of a mobile particle necessarily contains errors the product of which cannot be less than the quantum constant h and that, although these errors are negligible on the human scale, they cannot be ignored in studies. We cannot measure the position (x) and the momentum (p) of a particle with absolute precision. The more accurately we know one of these values, the less accurately we know the other. There are many ways of looking at this and in medicine we need to take account of uncertainty. Uncertainty in medicine can be resolved in many ways and can include Occam's razor. In medicine, all presenting symptoms in a patient may be explained by a few possible causes. In medicine, all presenting symptoms in a patient may be due to several disease and social processes at the same time. How can this be relevant to a working physician? The whole of medical practice has parallels with the certainties of Newton and Bohr. The object of a clinical consultation is to give a sign or complaint a diagnostic named description to be followed by a treatment regime which resolves the problem. Yet every physician knows and automatically models his understanding of a clinical problem perhaps unknowingly on a model based on Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. A core process, which is complicated by factors understood or not. The same principles are relevant to so many other features of life. There are certain fixed points in the diagnostic and clinical process. Gender, race, age, weight to height ratio, privileged and social life and intelligence. Some people age at different rates to their age cohort? Similarly, obesity does not always matter. The patient′s family history is another variable, complicated occasionally when the putative father with a family health trait may not be the actual father. The social story is a minefield, with the possibility of every phase of a person’s life being of relevance. A further element is how well the physician and the patient and their caring team relate. The clinical examination then gives a further array of data. From all of this comes a diagnosis which gives a pathway to a treatment schedule the ability of the patient to manage their treatment regime becomes important. There is a tendency that as soon as the diagnosis is made then the other elements fade away from the care plan, though of course it persists in the person's life. We are all consciously or unconsciously aware of the complex fabric of clinical care. It is intriguing to appreciate that other disciplines have been presented with the same multifactorial uncertainties. The era in Physics when Heisenberg introduced his view of nuclear physics was one when a precise physical model was being completed and gave certainty to a complex problem. His principle while obviously reintroducing uncertainty gave freedom of thinking and allowed further fruitful progress. We physicians do not enjoy uncertainty, and to have it formalized is uncomfortable. So we instinctively identify the major problem and treat that. By and large this is a useful process. It is however important to see this as a convenience. A convenience that may not always suit the patient. Applying the Heisenberg principles gives a broader view of a patient's concerns and problems and better care.
is all about, and not bothering to familiarize themselves in specific detail with the vast accumulation of behavioral data upon which the conclusions ofpsychoanalysis are based. Though specialists in scientific method, they refuse to look through Galileo's telescope [p. 349]. Hospers examines with skill and calmness many of die totally illogical arguments used in this conference, permitting one to end the volume with a faintly restored faith that one day there will be "a free, critical interchange ofviews on die scientific status of psychoanalysis" between philosophers ofscience and psychoanalysts. Ifthere is any lesson to be drawn from this kind ofexhibition, it is that diere is no substitute for firsthand knowledge ofthe method and data ofa discipline as a prerequisite for any critical discussion ofits merit and validity. This may seem like an utterly banal dictum, yet the facts are that it is too often casually disregarded when it comes to the sciences ofhuman behavior. Any taxicab driver will freely volunteer opinions about reasons forjuvenile delinquency, sexual perversions, drug addiction, or dreams—but rarely about astral physics, genetics, or C14 dating. There is a good reason for this; all such matters touch one personally to varying degrees. But the philosopher (and, even more importandy, the physician) must be cautious not to confuse this personal interest and ¦ involvement with the scientific knowledge and detachment necessary for critical judgment . The latter come about only through long experience and diligent study. George L. Engel University ofRochester The Physicist's Conception ofNature. ByWerner Heisenberg.Translated from the German by ArnoldJ. Pomerans. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1958. Pp. 192. $3.75. This book, written by a famous German scientist, the founder ofquantum mechanics, die discoverer of die uncertainty relations, and die Nobel prize winner in physics for 1933, does not do much credit to die author. The first 67 pages comprise three chapters which apparendy represent an attempt to amalgamate the three speechesdelivered or three articles written on three different occasions at diree different times. It is difficult to date die first two chapters, but die diird one must have been written in 1948, since in it the author refers to a conversation which he had had "some diirty years ago" during die Communist revolt in Munich (1918). The first chapter of the book presents die idea of the three stages of die evolution ofhuman diought about the surrounding world. According to die author, during olden times (ofKepler, etc.) scientists saw die world as die work ofGod. During the nineteendi century die world was existing all for itself, independent ofman. Since the discovery of the uncertainty relations, die man looking at the surrounding world sees his own image in it. The second chapter represents a discussion ofuncertainty relations and contains several interesting ideas (for example, about past and future difference in die case ofvery short time intervals) which may be ofgreat interest to a person trained in die modern quantum theory but will pass unnoticed by a general reader. 158 Book Reviews Perspectives in Biology and Medicine · Autumn 1939 The third chapter discusses die relative advantages ofclassical (i.e., Greek grammar, etc.) and scientific education and presents arguments in favor ofdie former: "Thus, we may say in favour ofclassical education diat it is always a good diing to know the roots, even ifthey may not always be of practical use" (p. 52). However, by die end of the chapter (p. 67) die audior comes to die conclusion: "It does not matter whedier we prefer a classical or a scientific education. What alone matters is our unshakable faidi in the West." The remaining 115 pages ofthe text contain a masterful selection ofquotations from Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Oswald, De Broglie, and others which are supposed to illustrate die ideas ofdie author expressed in die first 67 pages. G. GAMOW University ofColorado The Autobiography of Charles Darwin, 1809-1882. Edited, with Appendix and notes, by his granddaughter Nora Barlow. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959. Pp. 253. $4.50. Darwin's autobiography was written mainly in 1876, six years before his death, with additional material inserted during his last yean. When first published in 1887, as part ofthe Life and Letters ofCharles Darwin, edited by his son Francis, it...
This much I can say with definiteness -namely, that there is no scientific basis for the denial of religion -nor is there in my judgement any excuse for a conflict between science and religion, for their fields are entirely different.Men who know very little of science and men who know very little of religion do indeed get to quarrelling, and the onlookers imagine that there is a conflict between science and religion, whereas the conflict is only between two different species of ignorance.The first important quarrel of this sort arose over the advancing by Copernicus of his theory that the earth, instead of being a flat plane and the center of the universe, was actually only one of a number of little planets, rotating once a day upon its axis and circling once a year about the sun.Copernicus was a priest -the canon of a cathedraland he was primarily a religious rather than a scientific man.He knew that the foundations of real religion are not laid where scientific discoveries of any kind can disturb them.He was persecuted, not because he went against the teachings of religion but because under his theory man was not the center of the universe and this was most displeasing news to a number of egoists."
Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.