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International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research

Vulnerabilities and Attacks on Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) Schemes: A Review

Ajay Kumar, Mukesh Sharma

Published Nov 8, 2026• 0 citations
PDF (CC BY-SA)Publisher

Abstract

Quantum secret sharing (QSS) allows a dealer to split a secret among several players so that only authorized coalitions can recover it, while any eavesdropping is revealed by quantum disturbance. Since the first proposals in 1999 [3–5], a long series of cryptanalyses has shown that many QSS protocols fail not because of outside eavesdroppers but because of their own players. In this paper, we review the flaws in and attacks on QSS from 1999 to 2026. We classify the attacks into three layers: protocol-level attacks (intercept-resend, entangle-measure, Trojan horse and fake-signal); insider attacks by dishonest or colluding participants, which are especially powerful because insiders control part of the security check; and implementation-level (side-channel) attacks, which exploit imperfect sources, detectors and local oscillators. For each class, we describe the attack mechanism, representative protocols that were broken, and the countermeasures that followed, such as decoy states, one-way transmission with wavelength filtering, measurement-device-independent (MDI) and device-independent (DI) QSS, and composable finite-key proofs that treat dishonest players as adversaries. We conclude that the field is converging on a single lesson: a QSS protocol is only as secure as the participant model behind its proof, so security proofs must treat every player as a potential adversary with full access to their own devices. We end with open problems for QSS in quantum networks.

DOI
10.36948/ijfmr.2026.v08i06.91653

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Quantum secret sharing (QSS) allows a dealer to split a secret among several players so that only authorized coalitions can recover it, while any eavesdropping is revealed by quantum disturbance. Since the first proposals in 1999 [3–5], a long series of cryptanalyses has shown that many QSS protocols fail not because of outside eavesdroppers but because of their own players. In this paper, we review the flaws in and attacks on QSS from 1999 to 2026. We classify the attacks into three layers: protocol-level attacks (intercept-resend, entangle-measure, Trojan horse and fake-signal); insider attacks by dishonest or colluding participants, which are especially powerful because insiders control part of the security check; and implementation-level (side-channel) attacks, which exploit imperfect sources, detectors and local oscillators. For each class, we describe the attack mechanism, representative protocols that were broken, and the countermeasures that followed, such as decoy states, one-way transmission with wavelength filtering, measurement-device-independent (MDI) and device-independent (DI) QSS, and composable finite-key proofs that treat dishonest players as adversaries. We conclude that the field is converging on a single lesson: a QSS protocol is only as secure as the participant model behind its proof, so security proofs must treat every player as a potential adversary with full access to their own devices. We end with open problems for QSS in quantum networks.
We present a fake-signal-and-cheating attack strategy for the dishonest agent in quantum secret sharing (QSS) to steal the information of the other agents' fully and freely. It is found that almost all the QSS protocols existing, such as the two famous QSS protocols, the Hillery-Buzˇ\check{z}zˇek-Berthiaume [Phys. Rev. A \textbf{59}, 1829 (1999)] and the Karlsson-Koashi-Imoto [Phys. Rev. A \textbf{59}, 162 (1999)], can be eavesdropped freely if the process for the eavesdropping check is accomplished with the cooperation of the dishonest agent. He can sends a fake signal to the other agents after intercepting the original photons and storing them. His action can be hidden with entanglement swapping and cheating when the photons are chosen as the samples for checking eavesdropping. Finally, we present a possible improvement of these QSS protocols' security with decoy photons.
Security of the three-party quantum secret sharing (QSS) schemes based on entanglement and a collective eavesdropping check is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel losses. An opaque attack scheme is presented for the dishonest agent to eavesdrop the message obtained by the other agent freely, which reveals that these QSS schemes are insecure for transmission efficiencies lower than 50%, especially when they are used to share an unknown quantum state. Finally, we present a general way to improve the security of QSS schemes for sharing not only a private key but also an unknown quantum state.
The security of a secret sharing protocol is compromised if one or more dishonest participants can reconstruct the secret by deviating from the prescribed protocol, particularly when such malicious behavior remains undetected. Semi-Quantum Secret Sharing (SQSS) is a variant of secret sharing in which the participants possess only classical capabilities, such as preparing and measuring qubits in the computational (ZZZ) basis, while a quantum-capable third party assists the dealer in generating and distributing quantum shares of a classical secret. The limited quantum capabilities of the participants in SQSS protocols may introduce vulnerabilities to collusion attacks, enabling an assisting quantum third party, in collaboration with a dishonest classical participant, to jointly recover the secret even without detection. In this work, we propose a novel SQSS protocol that eliminates this vulnerability and achieves information-theoretic security against collusion attacks. We further prove that the proposed protocol is secure against a broad class of external and internal attacks. Finally, a comparative analysis demonstrates that our construction advances existing SQSS protocols by simultaneously optimizing qubit efficiency, involves a classical dealer, and resilience against DCNA attacks using basic Bell states.
Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is a cryptographic protocol that leverages quantum mechanics to distribute a secret among multiple parties. With respect to the classical counterpart, in QSS, the secret is encoded into quantum states and shared by a dealer such that only an authorized subsets of participants, i.e., the players, can reconstruct it. Several state-of-the-art studies aim to transpose classical secret sharing into the quantum realm, while maintaining their reliance on traditional network topologies (e.g., star, ring, and fully connected), and require that all thennnplayers calculate the secret. These studies exploit the Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger state, which is a type of maximally entangled quantum state involving three or more qubits. However, none of these works account for redundancy, enhanced security/privacy features, or authentication mechanisms able to fingerprint players. To address these gaps, in this article, we introduce a new concept of QSS, which leans on a generic distributed quantum network, based on a threshold scheme, where all the players collaborate also to the routing of quantum information among them. The dealer, by exploiting a custom flexible weighting system, takes advantage of a newly defined quantum Dijkstra algorithm to select the most suitable subset oftttplayers, out of the entire set onnnnplayers, to involve in the computation. To fingerprint and authenticate users, CRYSTAL-Kyber primitives are adopted, while also protecting each player’s privacy by hiding their identities. We show the effectiveness and performance of the proposed protocol by testing it against the main classical and quantum attacks, thereby improving the state-of-the-art security measures.
Measurement-device-independent entanglement witness (MDI-EW) plays an important role for detecting entanglement with untrusted measurement device. We present a double blinding-attack on a quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocol based on GHZ state. Using the MDI-EW method, we propose a QSS protocol against all detector side-channels. We allow source flaws in practical QSS system, so that Charlie can securely distribute a key between the two agents Alice and Bob over long distances. Our protocol provides condition on the extracted key rate for the secret against both external eavesdropper and arbitrary dishonest participants. A tight bound for collective attacks can provide good bounds on the practical QSS with source flaws. Then we show through numerical simulations that using single-photon source a secure QSS over 136 km can be achieved.
Secret sharing allows a trusted party (the dealer) to distribute a secret to a group of players, who can only access the secret cooperatively. Quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocols could provide unconditional security based on fundamental laws in physics. While the general security proof has been established recently in an entanglement-based QSS protocol, the tolerable channel loss is unfortunately rather small. Here we propose a continuous variable QSS protocol using conventional laser sources and homodyne detectors. In this protocol, a Gaussian-modulated coherent state (GMCS) prepared by one player passes through the secure stations of the other players sequentially, and each of the other players injects a locally prepared, independent GMCS into the circulating optical mode. Finally, the dealer measures both the amplitude and the phase quadratures of the receiving optical mode using double homodyne detectors. Collectively, the players can use their encoded random numbers to estimate the measurement results of the dealer and further generate a shared key. We prove the unconditional security of the proposed protocol against both eavesdroppers and dishonest players in the presence of high channel loss, and discuss various practical issues.