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arXiv:quant-ph/0604060

Fake-signal-and-cheating attack on quantum secret sharing

Fu‐Guo Deng, Xihan Li, Chen Pan, Chunyan Li, Hong-Yu Zhou

Published Apr 10, 2006• 6 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We present a fake-signal-and-cheating attack strategy for the dishonest agent in quantum secret sharing (QSS) to steal the information of the other agents' fully and freely. It is found that almost all the QSS protocols existing, such as the two famous QSS protocols, the Hillery-Bu$\check{z}$ek-Berthiaume [Phys. Rev. A \textbf{59}, 1829 (1999)] and the Karlsson-Koashi-Imoto [Phys. Rev. A \textbf{59}, 162 (1999)], can be eavesdropped freely if the process for the eavesdropping check is accomplished with the cooperation of the dishonest agent. He can sends a fake signal to the other agents after intercepting the original photons and storing them. His action can be hidden with entanglement swapping and cheating when the photons are chosen as the samples for checking eavesdropping. Finally, we present a possible improvement of these QSS protocols' security with decoy photons.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0604060

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We present a fake-signal-and-cheating attack strategy for the dishonest agent in quantum secret sharing (QSS) to steal the information of the other agents' fully and freely. It is found that almost all the QSS protocols existing, such as the two famous QSS protocols, the Hillery-Buzˇ\check{z}zˇek-Berthiaume [Phys. Rev. A \textbf{59}, 1829 (1999)] and the Karlsson-Koashi-Imoto [Phys. Rev. A \textbf{59}, 162 (1999)], can be eavesdropped freely if the process for the eavesdropping check is accomplished with the cooperation of the dishonest agent. He can sends a fake signal to the other agents after intercepting the original photons and storing them. His action can be hidden with entanglement swapping and cheating when the photons are chosen as the samples for checking eavesdropping. Finally, we present a possible improvement of these QSS protocols' security with decoy photons.
Security of the one-way quantum secret sharing (QSS) schemes based on entanglement and a collective eavesdropping check is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel losses. An opaque cheat attack scheme is presented for the dishonest agent, which reveals that these QSS schemes are completely insecure for transmission efficiencies lower than 50%. That is, the dishonest agent can eavesdrop fully and freely in almost all the one-way QSS schemes based on entanglement if the quantum channel induces 50% losses, including the two pioneer works, the Hillery-Bu\v{z}ek-Berthiaume scheme and the Karlsson-Koashi-Imoto scheme. Finally, we present two ways for possible improvement of these schemes.
Security of the three-party quantum secret sharing (QSS) schemes based on entanglement and a collective eavesdropping check is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel losses. An opaque attack scheme is presented for the dishonest agent to eavesdrop the message obtained by the other agent freely, which reveals that these QSS schemes are insecure for transmission efficiencies lower than 50%, especially when they are used to share an unknown quantum state. Finally, we present a general way to improve the security of QSS schemes for sharing not only a private key but also an unknown quantum state.
Quantum secret sharing (QSS) allows a dealer to split a secret among several players so that only authorized coalitions can recover it, while any eavesdropping is revealed by quantum disturbance. Since the first proposals in 1999 [3–5], a long series of cryptanalyses has shown that many QSS protocols fail not because of outside eavesdroppers but because of their own players. In this paper, we review the flaws in and attacks on QSS from 1999 to 2026. We classify the attacks into three layers: protocol-level attacks (intercept-resend, entangle-measure, Trojan horse and fake-signal); insider attacks by dishonest or colluding participants, which are especially powerful because insiders control part of the security check; and implementation-level (side-channel) attacks, which exploit imperfect sources, detectors and local oscillators. For each class, we describe the attack mechanism, representative protocols that were broken, and the countermeasures that followed, such as decoy states, one-way transmission with wavelength filtering, measurement-device-independent (MDI) and device-independent (DI) QSS, and composable finite-key proofs that treat dishonest players as adversaries. We conclude that the field is converging on a single lesson: a QSS protocol is only as secure as the participant model behind its proof, so security proofs must treat every player as a potential adversary with full access to their own devices. We end with open problems for QSS in quantum networks.
It is generally believed that nonorthogonal operations which can realize the state transformation between two nonorthogonal bases may ensure the security of many quantum communication protocols. However, in this paper, we present a powerful attack against quantum secret sharing protocols of these kinds. Applying entangled photons as fake signals, Eve can successfully steal the exact information without being revealed. We also give our effective modification to improve it. Under the suggested checking strategy, even to Eve's most general attack, it is robust and secure.