arXiv:2610.10176
Collusion-Secure Semi-Quantum Secret Sharing Scheme using a Quantum Third Party
Santanu Majhi, Nirupam Basak
Abstract
The security of a secret sharing protocol is compromised if one or more dishonest participants can reconstruct the secret by deviating from the prescribed protocol, particularly when such malicious behavior remains undetected. Semi-Quantum Secret Sharing (SQSS) is a variant of secret sharing in which the participants possess only classical capabilities, such as preparing and measuring qubits in the computational ($Z$) basis, while a quantum-capable third party assists the dealer in generating and distributing quantum shares of a classical secret. The limited quantum capabilities of the participants in SQSS protocols may introduce vulnerabilities to collusion attacks, enabling an assisting quantum third party, in collaboration with a dishonest classical participant, to jointly recover the secret even without detection. In this work, we propose a novel SQSS protocol that eliminates this vulnerability and achieves information-theoretic security against collusion attacks. We further prove that the proposed protocol is secure against a broad class of external and internal attacks. Finally, a comparative analysis demonstrates that our construction advances existing SQSS protocols by simultaneously optimizing qubit efficiency, involves a classical dealer, and resilience against DCNA attacks using basic Bell states.
AI Summary
The paper studies whether semi-quantum secret sharing can protect a classical secret when a quantum assisting server colludes with one recipient. It analyzes a two-recipient protocol in which a semi-quantum dealer distributes secret shares using two quantum servers. A colluding recipient–server coalition can measure the other recipient’s entire stream in the $Z$ basis, falsify server-controlled decoy checks, and recover the missing key after its positions are announced. A replacement protocol uses one quantum server, Bell-state encoding, dealer-inserted $Z$-basis key qubits and BB84 decoys, and secret permutations pre-shared between the dealer and each recipient. Recipients permute the decoys and randomly measure or reflect them. The server reports measurement outcomes before recipients disclose their operation choices; the dealer evaluates the checks. The paper claims information-theoretic security against recipient–server collusion. Its argument combines one-time-pad secrecy, conditional on the other recipient’s key remaining private, with disturbance calculations for interception, double-CNOT, entangle–measure, and decoy-substitution attacks. For interception of the entire stream, it gives an escape probability $(3/4)^{m/2}$ for $m$ decoys, assuming equally likely reflection and measurement and approximately half diagonal-basis decoys. The stated qubit efficiency is $n/(4n+2m)$ for an $n$-bit secret. The construction addresses two recipients and requires pre-shared secret permutations. Generalization to larger networks, heterogeneous participant capabilities, and practical resource optimization are identified as future directions.
Central claim may not hold: A Bob–Trent coalition can use one shared CNOT probe to cancel all returned decoy contributions independently of their permutation and learn the secret's parity without changing any decoy-test statistics, contradicting information-theoretic secrecy. The Entangle-Measure analysis mistakes perfect probe distinguishability for the requirement to obtain any information and provides no secrecy guarantee for partial-information attacks accepted below a nonzero QBER threshold. The Double CNOT analysis incorrectly claims that a second CNOT restores coherence destroyed by SIFT measurement and gives an escape probability incompatible with its own mode probabilities. The efficiency calculation matches the corrected predecessor's efficiency but supplies no bound establishing the claimed resource optimality.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.