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Toward Post-Quantum Secure O-RAN: Testbed Evaluation of PQC-Enabled Transport Layer Security

Sanzida Hoque, Abdullah Aydeger, Engin Zeydan, Madhusanka Liyanage

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Radio access networks are being disaggregated into multi-vendor software components connected over open interfaces, an evolution that Open RAN (O-RAN) standardizes and makes programmable. Every added interface is another link that must be authenticated and encrypted, and the public-key cryptography protecting such links today will not withstand a quantum-capable adversary. Future 5G and 6G deployments must therefore adopt post-quantum cryptography (PQC), whose overhead on operational RAN links remains largely unmeasured. This paper experimentally evaluates PQC-enabled secure session establishment in an operational O-RAN deployment, using TLS 1.3 with explicit algorithm selection as a representative protection mechanism for the O-CU–O-DU link. We benchmark handshake configurations that pair ML-KEM or HQC key establishment with ML-DSA, FN-DSA, or SLH-DSA authentication, each at the lowest NIST security level of its family. The results show that PQC overhead is strongly suite-dependent. Several configurations sustain low-millisecond handshake latency, whereas heavier combinations substantially increase handshake traffic and inflate tail latency. These reproducible testbed measurements complement isolated microbenchmarks and offer practical guidance for designing quantum-resistant connectivity in disaggregated O-RAN infrastructures.

DOI
10.1109/mnet.2026.3738526

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Radio access networks are being disaggregated into multi-vendor software components connected over open interfaces, an evolution that Open RAN (O-RAN) standardizes and makes programmable. Every added interface is another link that must be authenticated and encrypted, and the public-key cryptography protecting such links today will not withstand a quantum-capable adversary. Future 5G and 6G deployments must therefore adopt post-quantum cryptography (PQC), whose overhead on operational RAN links remains largely unmeasured. This paper experimentally evaluates PQC-enabled secure session establishment in an operational O-RAN deployment, using TLS 1.3 with explicit algorithm selection as a representative protection mechanism for the O-CU–O-DU link. We benchmark handshake configurations that pair ML-KEM or HQC key establishment with ML-DSA, FN-DSA, or SLH-DSA authentication, each at the lowest NIST security level of its family. The results show that PQC overhead is strongly suite-dependent. Several configurations sustain low-millisecond handshake latency, whereas heavier combinations substantially increase handshake traffic and inflate tail latency. These reproducible testbed measurements complement isolated microbenchmarks and offer practical guidance for designing quantum-resistant connectivity in disaggregated O-RAN infrastructures.
Disaggregation of Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) offers greater transparency, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness; however, there is a risk of an increase in the exposure of the connecting interfaces – O1, O2, A1, F1, E2, etc. The evolving quantum computing makes the current ciphers employed in these interfaces vulnerable — emphasizing the importance of developing a quantum-resistant mechanism to ensure long-term secure communication. The strategy is to use Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC), which can make communication secure during the quantum era. This work investigates the incorporation of PQC in O-RAN — specifically targeting the Midhaul (F1) interface between Central Unit (CU) and Distributed Unit (DU) — Disaggregated and Control User Plane Separation (CUPS) architectures. NIST-standardized post-quantum algorithms — Module-Lattice-Based-Key-Encapsulation-Mechanism (ML-KEM), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA), along with Classical algorithms AES-256-GCM through Hash-Based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) based Key Derivation Function (HKDF) — provide a strong and robust security to the proposed work, making the communication quantum resistant by safeguarding from classical and quantum attacks. The analysis is performed multi-fold, demonstrating the feasibility of incorporating PQC with the Disaggregated and CUPS O-RAN — considering Latency, Capacity, Reliability, and Resource Efficiency — providing a foundational work for the quantum-safe O-RAN infrastructure that ensures long-term security.
The telecommunications industry faces a dual transformation: the architectural shift toward Open Radio Access Networks (O-RAN) and the emerging threat from quantum computing. O-RAN disaggregated, multi-vendor architecture creates a larger attack surface vulnerable to crypt-analytically relevant quantum computers(CRQCs) that will break current public key cryptography. The Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) attack strategy makes this threat immediate, as adversaries can intercept encrypted data today for future decryption. This paper presents Q-RAN, a comprehensive quantum-resistant security framework for O-RAN networks using NIST-standardized Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). We detail the implementation of ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204), integrated with Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNG) for cryptographic entropy. The solution deploys PQ-IPsec, PQ-DTLS, and PQ-mTLS protocols across all O-RAN interfaces, anchored by a centralized Post-Quantum Certificate Authority (PQ-CA) within the SMO framework. This work provides a complete roadmap for securing disaggregated O-RAN ecosystems against quantum adversaries.
As Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) deployments expand and adversaries adopt “store-now, decrypt-later” strategies, operators need empirical data on the cost of migrating critical control interfaces to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This paper experimentally evaluates the impact of integrating a NIST-aligned Module-Lattice Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) into IKEv2/IPsec, protecting the E2 interface between the 5G Node B (gNB) and the Near-Real-Time RAN Intelligent Controller (Near-RT RIC). Using an open-source testbed built from srsRAN, Open5GS, FlexRIC and strongSwan (with liboqs), we compare three configurations: no IPsec, classical Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH)-based IPsec, and ML-KEM-based IPsec. This study focuses on IPsec tunnel-setup latency and the runtime behaviour of Near-RT RIC xApps under realistic signalling workloads. Results from repeated, automated runs show that ML-KEM integration adds a small overhead to tunnel establishment, which is approximately 2.7~4.7 ms in comparison to classical IPsec, while xApp operation and RIC control loops remain stable in our experiments. These findings, produced from an open, reproducible testbed, indicate that ML-KEM-based IPsec on the E2 interface is practically feasible and inform quantum-safe migration strategies for O-RAN deployments.
Cryptographically relevant quantum computers do not yet exist, but the transition away from classical public-key cryptography is already underway: adversaries can record encrypted traffic today and decrypt it once a sufficiently capable quantum computer becomes available, a threat known as harvest-now, decrypt-later. This paper examines the engineering case for combining post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum key distribution (QKD) as a strategy for securing next-generation communication infrastructure, focusing on 6G core and radio-access networks, Open RAN (O-RAN), and constrained Internet of Things (IoT) deployments. Rather than treating the two mechanisms as symmetric, interchangeable layers, the paper examines what each one actually guarantees, surveys the empirical evidence available for deployment cost, and describes where national security authorities and standards bodies disagree on the value of QKD. The architecture is grounded in the finalized National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standards and its 2025 hybrid key-establishment guidance, drawing on empirical Open RAN latency and energy measurements published during 2025 and 2026, embedded-hardware benchmarks for constrained devices, and the small number of quantum key distribution deployments operating at metropolitan or national backbone scale today. The paper is explicit about which figures are measured results and which remain illustrative proposals, and it closes by naming the specific standardization and field-trial gaps that separate current practice from the architecture it describes. The purpose of the work is to give network architects and policymakers a single, evidence-graded reference for deciding where each mechanism belongs in a real deployment, rather than treating post-quantum and quantum-distributed keying as equivalent options.
The evolving 5G architecture, moving from proprietary monolithic hardware towards the disaggregated and modular Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN), introduces new, critical interfaces requiring robust security. While IPSec is a prevalent solution for securing IP communications, the advent of quantum computing threatens its traditional cryptographic underpinnings; it may be deprecated in the near future. To address this, we propose a quantum-safe Open RAN framework for securing fronthaul (i.e., Radio Unit-Distributed Unit) and backhaul (i.e., Centralized Unit-5G core) interfaces. Our framework employs a hybrid key exchange scheme, combining post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum keys as cryptographic material, designed for seamless integration with TLS, IKEv2/IPSec, and MACSec standards, and compatible with ETSI QKD 004 and 014 APIs. Furthermore, we present a novel key distribution protocol for Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDN). This protocol incorporates encapsulation techniques inspired by onion routing, combined with PQC, to ensure confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and anonymity. It also leverages post-quantum public key encryption to protect shared secrets from intermediate nodes within the QKDN, mitigating intermediary attacks. We have deployed a proof-of-concept of our proposal, experimentally validating both air-based and fiber-based QKD, primarily using ML-KEM and ML-DSA standards for PQC algorithms.
6G networks will require quantum-secure cryptography deployed across core infrastructure, edge nodes, resource-constrained IoT devices. Although post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms have been standardized by NIST, their practical deployability in bandwidth and latency limited wireless systems remains unclear. This paper presents a practical evaluation of NIST selected PQC schemes, including ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and Falcon. Benchmarks conducted with OpenSSL and the OQS provider on heterogeneous platforms show that while computational performance is acceptable, ciphertext and signature size expansion significantly impact handshake reliability and bandwidth efficiency, particularly at the network edge. The results highlight key system-level trade-offs and motivate the need for PQC optimization and deployment-aware design for future quantum-secure 6G networks.