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International Journal of Applied Smart Interdisciplinary Technologies

Hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptography and Quantum Key Distribution Co-Design for Quantum-Safe 6G, O-RAN, and IoT Infrastructure

Aagnik Chakraborty

Published Sep 10, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Cryptographically relevant quantum computers do not yet exist, but the transition away from classical public-key cryptography is already underway: adversaries can record encrypted traffic today and decrypt it once a sufficiently capable quantum computer becomes available, a threat known as harvest-now, decrypt-later. This paper examines the engineering case for combining post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum key distribution (QKD) as a strategy for securing next-generation communication infrastructure, focusing on 6G core and radio-access networks, Open RAN (O-RAN), and constrained Internet of Things (IoT) deployments. Rather than treating the two mechanisms as symmetric, interchangeable layers, the paper examines what each one actually guarantees, surveys the empirical evidence available for deployment cost, and describes where national security authorities and standards bodies disagree on the value of QKD. The architecture is grounded in the finalized National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standards and its 2025 hybrid key-establishment guidance, drawing on empirical Open RAN latency and energy measurements published during 2025 and 2026, embedded-hardware benchmarks for constrained devices, and the small number of quantum key distribution deployments operating at metropolitan or national backbone scale today. The paper is explicit about which figures are measured results and which remain illustrative proposals, and it closes by naming the specific standardization and field-trial gaps that separate current practice from the architecture it describes. The purpose of the work is to give network architects and policymakers a single, evidence-graded reference for deciding where each mechanism belongs in a real deployment, rather than treating post-quantum and quantum-distributed keying as equivalent options.

DOI
10.68104/ijasit.v1.i3.26

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Cryptographically relevant quantum computers do not yet exist, but the transition away from classical public-key cryptography is already underway: adversaries can record encrypted traffic today and decrypt it once a sufficiently capable quantum computer becomes available, a threat known as harvest-now, decrypt-later. This paper examines the engineering case for combining post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum key distribution (QKD) as a strategy for securing next-generation communication infrastructure, focusing on 6G core and radio-access networks, Open RAN (O-RAN), and constrained Internet of Things (IoT) deployments. Rather than treating the two mechanisms as symmetric, interchangeable layers, the paper examines what each one actually guarantees, surveys the empirical evidence available for deployment cost, and describes where national security authorities and standards bodies disagree on the value of QKD. The architecture is grounded in the finalized National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standards and its 2025 hybrid key-establishment guidance, drawing on empirical Open RAN latency and energy measurements published during 2025 and 2026, embedded-hardware benchmarks for constrained devices, and the small number of quantum key distribution deployments operating at metropolitan or national backbone scale today. The paper is explicit about which figures are measured results and which remain illustrative proposals, and it closes by naming the specific standardization and field-trial gaps that separate current practice from the architecture it describes. The purpose of the work is to give network architects and policymakers a single, evidence-graded reference for deciding where each mechanism belongs in a real deployment, rather than treating post-quantum and quantum-distributed keying as equivalent options.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and quantum key distribution (QKD) address the quantum threat from opposite directions: PQC replaces vulnerable public-key algorithms with schemes believed to resist quantum cryptanalysis, while QKD derives keys whose secrecy rests on physical assumptions rather than computational ones. Because each approach has a distinct failure mode, a growing body of work combines them so that a session key remains secure if either component holds. We first establish the deployed baseline, hybrid classical-plus-PQC key exchange, against which QKD-augmented designs must be judged. We then propose a taxonomy of hybrid PQC-QKD designs along eight dimensions (integration layer, combiner construction, authentication scope and source, QKD topology, trusted entities, key-delivery interface, classical component, and evidence type), and use it to compare published protocols, including Muckle and its successors, MACsec and TLS integrations, and IKEv2 mechanisms standardised in RFCs 8784, 9370, and 9867. We examine key-combiner constructions in light of the KEM-combiner literature and of NIST, ETSI, and ITU-T guidance, and map the security arguments for hybrid PQC-QKD protocols onto a common grid of security model, assumptions, permitted compromise, established guarantee, and limitations. We synthesise deployment evidence from metropolitan and national QKD networks, distinguishing the few testbeds that have run PQC in the key path from pure-QKD deployments, and summarise the standards and policy landscape, including the positions of national security agencies that recommend against relying on QKD alone. We close with open problems: authentication of the QKD classical channel, shared-infrastructure threat models, device certification versus formal proofs, formal verification of hybrid handshakes, and the lack of peer-reviewed deployment economics.
Radio access networks are being disaggregated into multi-vendor software components connected over open interfaces, an evolution that Open RAN (O-RAN) standardizes and makes programmable. Every added interface is another link that must be authenticated and encrypted, and the public-key cryptography protecting such links today will not withstand a quantum-capable adversary. Future 5G and 6G deployments must therefore adopt post-quantum cryptography (PQC), whose overhead on operational RAN links remains largely unmeasured. This paper experimentally evaluates PQC-enabled secure session establishment in an operational O-RAN deployment, using TLS 1.3 with explicit algorithm selection as a representative protection mechanism for the O-CU–O-DU link. We benchmark handshake configurations that pair ML-KEM or HQC key establishment with ML-DSA, FN-DSA, or SLH-DSA authentication, each at the lowest NIST security level of its family. The results show that PQC overhead is strongly suite-dependent. Several configurations sustain low-millisecond handshake latency, whereas heavier combinations substantially increase handshake traffic and inflate tail latency. These reproducible testbed measurements complement isolated microbenchmarks and offer practical guidance for designing quantum-resistant connectivity in disaggregated O-RAN infrastructures.
The convergence of quantum computing threats and resource-constrained Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems presents a fundamental security challenge for emerging 6G networks. Post-Quantum cryptography (PQC) has been designated as a key research priority by several leading institutions seeking advances in encryption techniques that will drive a paradigm shift. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) can resist quantum attacks, but direct deployment on constrained IoT hardware often incurs high computation, memory, and energy costs. This paper presents QSAFE, a lightweight hybrid cryptographic framework that combines established classical primitives with NIST-recommended PQC algorithms to provide defense-in-depth without compromising operational feasibility on varied IoT platforms. QSAFE is positioned as a systems and engineering framework for quantum-resilient 6G IoT rather than a new cryptographic primitive. Comparative experiments show that QSAFE achieves higher performance than selected pure PQC baselines while incurring only 6–8% overhead relative to classical-only protocols under our evaluated configuration. Security analysis demonstrates that QSAFE complies with NIST Security Level 1 (SL1) through an AND-composition defense-in-depth architecture. Future work includes hardware acceleration, adaptive platform security mechanisms, and standardization in collaboration with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
With the rapid advancement of quantum computing, existing cryptographic schemes in 4G LTE and 5G networks confront serious security threats. Traditional reliance on protocols like IPsec and Transport Layer Security leaves infrastructure vulnerable to future quantum attacks, particularly “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” attacks, where adversaries store current encrypted traffic for future decryption. To counter these threats, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) have become potential solutions. As future 6G networks aim to realize ultra-reliable and ubiquitous secure connectivity, it is essential to incorporate both PQC and QKD solutions to ensure long-term robustness. Therefore, the synergy of these security solutions and 5G draws the attention of researchers and practitioners worldwide. This study systematically reviews the literature in this specific field. We analyzed evidence from reviewed literature to address three research questions, resulting in a novel taxonomy to categorize publications in this area and a vision for a quantum-safe 6G network. Moreover, we discussed several open challenges in 5G, PQC, and QKD, along with future work.
Quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical asymmetric cryptography, which is essential for ensuring confidentiality, authentication, and key exchange in contemporary digital infrastructures. Although post-quantum cryptography (PQC) provides mechanisms that resist quantum attacks, its implementation in Internet of Things (IoT) systems is challenged by constrained resources, including limitations in computation, memory, energy, latency, and bandwidth, and the heterogeneity of devices. This paper offers a comprehensive narrative review of PQC approaches applicable to IoT, systematically organizing 30 peer-reviewed studies published between 2022 and 2026 across four layers: device, communication, distributed trust, and application. Additionally, the review examines two cross-cutting dimensions, privacy and side-channel resistance. The analysis indicates a significant prevalence of lattice-based schemes, hybrid strategies, and integrations with blockchain technology, zero-knowledge proofs, federated learning, homomorphic encryption, AI, and Zero Trust architectures. Notably, key gaps remain in side-channel evaluation, migration pathways, deployment costs, and real-world validation—issues that are particularly critical given the long lifecycles of IoT devices and the ongoing threat of “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks.
The future security of digital communications will increasingly rely on the integration of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), indicating a necessary convergence rather than a competitive relationship between these two technologies. Following the publication of NIST FIPS 203, 204 and 205, the industry now possesses standardised algorithmic tools for migrating away from RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC). At the same time, for critical infrastructure facing “harvest-now, decrypt-later” adversaries, purely software-based measures provide only computational, not information-theoretic, security. We argue that the optimal solution is a hybrid architecture, in which PQC provides authentication and cryptographic agility across heterogeneous endpoints, while QKD supplies an additional physical-layer shield for high-value links. The central engineering challenge is brownfield coexistence: deploying QKD over existing lit telecom fibers that carry high-power classical traffic. We review three spectral coexistence strategies to mitigate Spontaneous Raman Scattering (SpRS) – O-band separation, dense C-band DWDM integration with guard bands, and an “inverted” spectrum approach where data uses the O-band and QKD uses the C-band – and we discuss emerging physical media such as hollow-core and multi-core fibers. At the protocol layer, we discuss hybrid key encapsulation and the role of crypto-agile gateways in combining keys from classical, PQC and QKD sources [1]. Finally, we survey industrial pilots (e.g., SK Telecom, EuroQCI / OPENQKD) and outline open challenges in cost, standardisation and operations. The goal is to provide practitioners with a realistic, engineering-oriented overview of how PQC and QKD can be combined in brownfield optical networks.