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SPIE Quantum Technologies for Defence and Security

QURSA: architecture for quantum-safe 5G

Ana Fernández Vilas, Florina Almenárez, Manuel Fernández‐Veiga, Daniel Díaz-Sánchez, Javier Blanco-Romero, Celeste Campo, Rebeca P. Díaz Redondo, Carlos García-Rubio, Pedro Otero-García, Pedro Blanco-Casal

Published Oct 29, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The evolving 5G architecture, moving from proprietary monolithic hardware towards the disaggregated and modular Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN), introduces new, critical interfaces requiring robust security. While IPSec is a prevalent solution for securing IP communications, the advent of quantum computing threatens its traditional cryptographic underpinnings; it may be deprecated in the near future. To address this, we propose a quantum-safe Open RAN framework for securing fronthaul (i.e., Radio Unit-Distributed Unit) and backhaul (i.e., Centralized Unit-5G core) interfaces. Our framework employs a hybrid key exchange scheme, combining post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum keys as cryptographic material, designed for seamless integration with TLS, IKEv2/IPSec, and MACSec standards, and compatible with ETSI QKD 004 and 014 APIs. Furthermore, we present a novel key distribution protocol for Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDN). This protocol incorporates encapsulation techniques inspired by onion routing, combined with PQC, to ensure confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and anonymity. It also leverages post-quantum public key encryption to protect shared secrets from intermediate nodes within the QKDN, mitigating intermediary attacks. We have deployed a proof-of-concept of our proposal, experimentally validating both air-based and fiber-based QKD, primarily using ML-KEM and ML-DSA standards for PQC algorithms.

DOI
10.1117/12.3071778

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The evolving 5G architecture, moving from proprietary monolithic hardware towards the disaggregated and modular Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN), introduces new, critical interfaces requiring robust security. While IPSec is a prevalent solution for securing IP communications, the advent of quantum computing threatens its traditional cryptographic underpinnings; it may be deprecated in the near future. To address this, we propose a quantum-safe Open RAN framework for securing fronthaul (i.e., Radio Unit-Distributed Unit) and backhaul (i.e., Centralized Unit-5G core) interfaces. Our framework employs a hybrid key exchange scheme, combining post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum keys as cryptographic material, designed for seamless integration with TLS, IKEv2/IPSec, and MACSec standards, and compatible with ETSI QKD 004 and 014 APIs. Furthermore, we present a novel key distribution protocol for Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDN). This protocol incorporates encapsulation techniques inspired by onion routing, combined with PQC, to ensure confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and anonymity. It also leverages post-quantum public key encryption to protect shared secrets from intermediate nodes within the QKDN, mitigating intermediary attacks. We have deployed a proof-of-concept of our proposal, experimentally validating both air-based and fiber-based QKD, primarily using ML-KEM and ML-DSA standards for PQC algorithms.
Nowadays, 5G architecture is characterized by the use of monolithic hardware, where the configuration of its elements is completely proprietary for each manufacturer. In recent years, as an alternative to this centralized architecture, a new model has emerged: the Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN). One of its main features has been the split of the Base Band Unit (BBU) into new simpler hardware with more specific functions approaching to a more modular model. As a consequence of this split, new interfaces appeared to connect these components that need to be protected. With the developments in the field of quantum computing, traditional protection mechanisms for this kind of interfaces may be deprecated in the near future. This security issue motivates this paper, which aims to study how to integrate post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanisms to current security standards, such as IPsec and MACsec. In addition, the proposal is also put into practice to compare the performance of traditional mechanisms with PQC implementations. This research shows that the new implementation does not reduce the performance of the aforementioned standards, while the security is reinforced against quantum attacks.
Disaggregation of Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) offers greater transparency, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness; however, there is a risk of an increase in the exposure of the connecting interfaces – O1, O2, A1, F1, E2, etc. The evolving quantum computing makes the current ciphers employed in these interfaces vulnerable — emphasizing the importance of developing a quantum-resistant mechanism to ensure long-term secure communication. The strategy is to use Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC), which can make communication secure during the quantum era. This work investigates the incorporation of PQC in O-RAN — specifically targeting the Midhaul (F1) interface between Central Unit (CU) and Distributed Unit (DU) — Disaggregated and Control User Plane Separation (CUPS) architectures. NIST-standardized post-quantum algorithms — Module-Lattice-Based-Key-Encapsulation-Mechanism (ML-KEM), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA), along with Classical algorithms AES-256-GCM through Hash-Based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) based Key Derivation Function (HKDF) — provide a strong and robust security to the proposed work, making the communication quantum resistant by safeguarding from classical and quantum attacks. The analysis is performed multi-fold, demonstrating the feasibility of incorporating PQC with the Disaggregated and CUPS O-RAN — considering Latency, Capacity, Reliability, and Resource Efficiency — providing a foundational work for the quantum-safe O-RAN infrastructure that ensures long-term security.
The telecommunications industry faces a dual transformation: the architectural shift toward Open Radio Access Networks (O-RAN) and the emerging threat from quantum computing. O-RAN disaggregated, multi-vendor architecture creates a larger attack surface vulnerable to crypt-analytically relevant quantum computers(CRQCs) that will break current public key cryptography. The Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) attack strategy makes this threat immediate, as adversaries can intercept encrypted data today for future decryption. This paper presents Q-RAN, a comprehensive quantum-resistant security framework for O-RAN networks using NIST-standardized Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). We detail the implementation of ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204), integrated with Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNG) for cryptographic entropy. The solution deploys PQ-IPsec, PQ-DTLS, and PQ-mTLS protocols across all O-RAN interfaces, anchored by a centralized Post-Quantum Certificate Authority (PQ-CA) within the SMO framework. This work provides a complete roadmap for securing disaggregated O-RAN ecosystems against quantum adversaries.
Radio access networks are being disaggregated into multi-vendor software components connected over open interfaces, an evolution that Open RAN (O-RAN) standardizes and makes programmable. Every added interface is another link that must be authenticated and encrypted, and the public-key cryptography protecting such links today will not withstand a quantum-capable adversary. Future 5G and 6G deployments must therefore adopt post-quantum cryptography (PQC), whose overhead on operational RAN links remains largely unmeasured. This paper experimentally evaluates PQC-enabled secure session establishment in an operational O-RAN deployment, using TLS 1.3 with explicit algorithm selection as a representative protection mechanism for the O-CU–O-DU link. We benchmark handshake configurations that pair ML-KEM or HQC key establishment with ML-DSA, FN-DSA, or SLH-DSA authentication, each at the lowest NIST security level of its family. The results show that PQC overhead is strongly suite-dependent. Several configurations sustain low-millisecond handshake latency, whereas heavier combinations substantially increase handshake traffic and inflate tail latency. These reproducible testbed measurements complement isolated microbenchmarks and offer practical guidance for designing quantum-resistant connectivity in disaggregated O-RAN infrastructures.
With its disaggregated and open interfaces, the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) architecture promises flexibility, innovation, and cost-effectiveness for future wireless networks. However, the increased reliance on software and open interfaces also introduces new security challenges. As the threat of quantum computing looms, the traditional cryptographic algorithms used in O-RAN will become vulnerable to potential attacks. This paper proposes the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) into O-RAN to enhance its security against post-quantum adversaries. We discuss the specific vulnerabilities of current O-RAN security mechanisms to quantum attacks and identify key areas where PQC can be applied, such as key exchange, authentication, and data protection. We present a framework for evaluating the suitability of different PQC algorithms for O-RAN and outline potential challenges and implementation considerations. By proactively integrating PQC into O-RAN, we aim to ensure the long-term security and resilience of this emerging network architecture in the era of quantum computing.
The advent of quantum computing will pose great challenges to the current communication systems, requiring essential changes in the establishment of security associations in traditional architectures. In this context, the multi-technological and heterogeneous nature of 5G networks makes it a challenging scenario for the introduction of quantum communications. Specifically, 5G networks support the unification of non-3GPP access technologies (i.e. Wi-Fi), which are secured through the IPsec protocol suite and the Non-3GPP Interworking Function (N3IWF) entity. These mechanisms leverage traditional public key cryptography and Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanisms, which should be updated to quantum-safe standards. Therefore, in this paper we present the design and development of a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) based non-3GPP access mechanism for 5G networks, integrating QKD keys with IPsec tunnel establishment. Besides, we also demonstrate the feasibility of the system by experimental validation in a testbed with commercial QKD equipment and an open-source 5G core implementation. Results show that the time required to complete the authentication and IPsec security association establishment is 4.62% faster than traditional cryptography PSK-based systems and 5.17% faster than the certificate-based system, while ensuring Information-Theoretic Security (ITS) of the QKD systems.