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IEEE Networking Letters

Beyond Idealized Fragmentation: Duty-Cycle-Limited Completion Time of Post-Quantum Handshakes over LoRaWAN

Dipul Poudel

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration for the Internet of Things is under way, but prior LoRaWAN evaluations estimate PQC handshake time from payload size alone, ignoring LoRaWAN’s mandatory duty cycle. We show that under EU868’s 1% duty cycle, the wall-clock time to send the combined ML-KEM handshake volume uplink exceeds the idealized estimate of prior work by three to five orders of magnitude: minutes at SF7, hours at SF12. A closed-form airtime model reproduces our ns-3 results to within rounding and separates rate-mismatch, airtime-overhead, and duty-cycle factors; duty cycle dominates at SF7 but not at SF12. Handshake duration, not only packet loss, is thus a key obstacle to practical LPWAN PQC deployment.

DOI
10.1109/lnet.2026.3745920

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Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration for the Internet of Things is under way, but prior LoRaWAN evaluations estimate PQC handshake time from payload size alone, ignoring LoRaWAN’s mandatory duty cycle. We show that under EU868’s 1% duty cycle, the wall-clock time to send the combined ML-KEM handshake volume uplink exceeds the idealized estimate of prior work by three to five orders of magnitude: minutes at SF7, hours at SF12. A closed-form airtime model reproduces our ns-3 results to within rounding and separates rate-mismatch, airtime-overhead, and duty-cycle factors; duty cycle dominates at SF7 but not at SF12. Handshake duration, not only packet loss, is thus a key obstacle to practical LPWAN PQC deployment.
Post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms are being developed to guard against quantum-computing attacks, but their behavior in constrained Internet of Things (IoT) environments remains an important topic of discussion. In this work, we study the impact of deploying PQC protocols in IoT networks using the Open Quantum Safe (liboqs) framework. In particular, key encapsulation and digital signature schemes are evaluated in terms of their computational performance, communication costs, and energy consumption. Our results indicate that although PQC operations can be completed in microseconds using general-purpose processors, substantially larger key and ciphertext sizes introduce significant communication overhead. When mapped to common IoT protocols such as Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), IEEE 802.15.4 (Zigbee), and LoRa, these larger payloads must be divided into multiple packets. In low-payload LoRa networks, for example, ML-KEM handshakes can require up to 62 packets. This level of fragmentation increases latency and energy consumption, thus potentially affecting reliability. Furthermore, when packet delivery probabilities approaching 99% are achieved, handshake success rates can drop to values approaching 50%. These results suggest that communication metrics, rather than computational performance, pose key challenges to PQC deployment in constrained IoT settings.
Can low-power wide-area network (LPWAN) end devices refresh their cryptographic session keys with post-quantum algorithms when regulatory duty-cycle caps eat into the uplink budget? This research addresses that question by proposing an airtime-budgeted rekeying scheme that wraps a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) inside a fragmented uplink scheduler tailored to duty-cycle-limited channels. LPWAN technologies such as LoRa and Sigfox operate under strict sub-GHz spectrum rules in the EU 868 MHz band, where a 1 % or even 0.1 % transmit duty cycle leaves each device only seconds of air time per hour. Current LoRaWAN security relies on AES-128 counter-mode keys provisioned at join time, and rekeying either never happens or happens through a lightweight Diffie-Hellman exchange whose ciphertext fits a single frame. Post-quantum KEMs, by contrast, produce ciphertexts ranging from roughly 800 bytes (Kyber-512) to over 15 kB (FrodoKEM-640), far exceeding the 51-byte LoRaWAN payload at spreading factor 12. The gap between these frame sizes and the available air time creates a design conflict that, until now, has received limited attention. This research introduces a scheduler that partitions the KEM ciphertext across multiple uplink slots, tracks the cumulative airtime spent, and defers the rekey attempt when the remaining budget is too small to complete the exchange before the duty-cycle window closes. Four candidate KEMs were evaluated — Kyber-512, Kyber-768, FrodoKEM-640, and NTRU-HPS-2048-509 — on a LoRa testbed operating at spreading factor 7 in the 868 MHz band near Aveiro, Portugal. Results showed that Kyber-512 completed a full rekeying event in 312.4 ms of on-air time, consuming only 0.87 % of the hourly 1 % duty-cycle budget, whereas FrodoKEM-640 required 1823.5 ms and exceeded the budget at the 0.1 % tier. NTRU-HPS achieved an intermediate 418.7 ms. The proposed scheduler reduced failed rekey attempts by 91.3 % compared with a naive single-burst strategy, with no observed increase in packet loss for the application payload. These findings point to Kyber-512 and NTRU-HPS as practical post-quantum options for LPWAN rekeying under tight airtime constraints.
The transition to post-quantum cryptography is particularly challenging for resource-constrained IoT devices, where improved cryptographic resilience must be balanced against latency, energy, and reliability constraints. This paper presents an empirical evaluation of TLS 1.3 authentication overhead on ESP32 under three key-exchange modes: classical X25519, full post-quantum ML-KEM-768, and hybrid X25519+ML-KEM-768. The study contributes the first direct large-scale comparison of these regimes on Xtensa-class hardware using wolfSSL and introduces IoT-QARS, an extension of the PAREK risk model that incorporates measured deployment overhead. Across 3,000 recorded sessions, including 2,938 successful handshakes, ML-KEM-768 reduced mean handshake latency by 43% and connection energy by 34% relative to X25519, while the hybrid mode increased latency and energy by only 11% and 7%, respectively. However, full PQC exhibited a 3.8% connectionfailure rate, likely caused by larger cryptographic payloads and buffer constraints. Applied to an industrial sensor profile, IoTQARS identifies hybrid deployment as the most practical nearterm migration option and highlights TCP-buffer tuning as a prerequisite for reliable full-PQC adoption. These results provide actionable guidance for post-quantum migration in embedded and industrial IoT environments.
The emergence of quantum computing poses an existential threat to current Internet of Things security infrastructure, which relies predominantly on RSA and elliptic curve cryptography for confidentiality and authentication. Shor's algorithm enables polynomial-time factorization that can break these classical cryptographic primitives, necessitating urgent migration to quantum-resistant alternatives. This paper presents the first comprehensive performance evaluation of six NISTstandardized and candidate post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, NTRU-Prime-hrss, BIKE-L1, HQC-128, Classic-McEliece-348864) integrated into the MQTT protocol across 4,608 experimental configurations spanning diverse real-world network conditions. We systematically evaluate connection establishment latency, message delivery reliability, decryption computational overhead, and throughput stability under systematically varied network latency (10-150 ms representing LAN to satellite links), packet loss rates (0-10% spanning excellent to degraded connectivity), payload sizes (128-1024 bytes covering sensor telemetry to multimedia streams), and message transmission rates (1-10 Hz from periodic monitoring to real-time control). Statistical analysis of 622,080 MQTT messages totaling 384 hours of simulation time reveals that NTRU-Prime-hrss achieves optimal performance-security balance with 98.1% delivery ratio and 26.1 ms median handshake latency across all tested conditions, while Classic-McEliece exhibits 278.3 ms handshake overhead rendering it impractical for resourceconstrained deployments despite offering conservative security margins. We demonstrate through generalized linear modeling that transport-layer effects (TCP retransmissions, TLS record framing overhead) dominate post-quantum cryptographic computational costs, accounting for approximately 70% of endto-end latency in high-loss scenarios. Our novel three-gate decision framework provides quantitative deployment criteria for IoT operators balancing security requirements against operational constraints. Complete implementation, experimental dataset, and analysis scripts available at https://github.com/ vssk18/PQSM-RESEARCH.
The convergence of quantum computing and the scale of Internet of Things (IoT) deployments creates a compounded security problem: classical public-key cryptography securing today’s IoT traffic is vulnerable to harvest-now, decrypt-later attacks, while the constrained hardware typical of IoT devices limits the security mechanisms can be deployed. Prior work has largely evaluated post-quantum cryptography (PQC), federated learning (FL)-based anomaly detection, and quantum-resilient storage separately or in partial combinations, leaving open whether these mechanisms remain practical when composed on constrained hardware under a shared operational budget. This paper answers that question with a three-layer architecture — a hybrid PQC pipeline (Kyber-based key encapsulation, ML-DSA signatures, AES-GCM encryption, and PQC-TLS transport), a federated anomaly-detection layer, and a quantum-resilient storage and audit layer (DeSSE and MuReQua) — executed end-to-end on a Raspberry Pi 5 edge node under AWS IoT Greengrass Core, with nine concurrent virtual IoT nodes processing real attack traffic from the N-BaIoT and TON_IoT datasets. Benchmarking across 27 cryptographic algorithm combinations (810 pipeline executions) shows that all 27 configurations completed in under 2.1 ms, with the deployed Kyber768/ML-DSA-65/AES-256-GCM tier adding 4,521 bytes of per-message overhead, which remained compatible with the evaluated 20 ms inter-row transmission budget. Live federated deployment across the nine virtual IoT nodes on N-BaIoT achieves F1-scores above 0.998 on eight of nine devices, processing at approximately 900 rows/second with zero signature verification failures; a centralized baseline evaluation further confirms 99.46% attack recall on unseen TON_IoT threats withheld from training. The quantum-resilient storage layer maintains 100% chain integrity and complete signature coverage across 4,471 audit records, with independent tamper simulations reliably detected. PQC-TLS introduces a one-time handshake overhead of 13.7 ms (288.5% relative increase) over classical TLS, which remains small relative to the multi-minute FL round intervals measured in the evaluated deployment. Together, these results demonstrate that quantum-resilient cryptography, federated intelligence, and auditable storage can be jointly executed on constrained IoT edge hardware as a single experimentally demonstrated pipeline within the operational conditions evaluated in this study.
The Google Quantum AI whitepaper [1] established that the secp256k1 elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP-256) the signature primitive securing the majority of public blockchain networks can be broken with fewer than 500,000 physical qubits in approximately nine minutes on a fast-clock cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC), a roughly 20-fold reduction from prior estimates. That analysis addresses cryptocurrency nodes and does not model the structurally distinct risk profile of IoT/WSN nodes participating in blockchain networks. This paper closes that gap. We demonstrate that gateway-mediated transaction submission, combined with the duty-cycle wakeup latency endemic to IEEE 802.15.4-class sensor nodes, can extend the on-spend attack window beyond Bitcoin’s ten-minute block time making constrained WSN nodes more vulnerable to on-spend attacks than standard cryptocurrency clients for certain deployment configurations. We introduce a formal HNDL Risk Score (HRS) that jointly quantifies harvest-now/decrypt-later exposure, on-spend vulnerability, and migration feasibility as a function of node hardware class and deployment lifespan. We benchmark all four NIST-standardised post-quantum cryptography algorithms (ML-KEM-512, ML-DSA-44, FN-DSA/FALCON-512, SLH-DSA-128s) on representative WSN hardware (Raspberry Pi Pico RP2040 and ESP32) and identify FN-DSA/FALCON-512 as the superior candidate for WSN-blockchain transaction authentication, offering 666-byte signatures at 71.6 ms mean signing time on Cortex-M0+ hardware. A concrete, tiered migration roadmap is proposed for healthcare WSN, industrial IIoT, and smart city sensor deployments.