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International Journal of Communication and Information Technology

Airtime-budgeted quantum-resistant rekeying for duty-cycle-limited low-power wide-area uplinks

Henrique Meireles

Published Jul 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Can low-power wide-area network (LPWAN) end devices refresh their cryptographic session keys with post-quantum algorithms when regulatory duty-cycle caps eat into the uplink budget? This research addresses that question by proposing an airtime-budgeted rekeying scheme that wraps a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) inside a fragmented uplink scheduler tailored to duty-cycle-limited channels. LPWAN technologies such as LoRa and Sigfox operate under strict sub-GHz spectrum rules in the EU 868 MHz band, where a 1 % or even 0.1 % transmit duty cycle leaves each device only seconds of air time per hour. Current LoRaWAN security relies on AES-128 counter-mode keys provisioned at join time, and rekeying either never happens or happens through a lightweight Diffie-Hellman exchange whose ciphertext fits a single frame. Post-quantum KEMs, by contrast, produce ciphertexts ranging from roughly 800 bytes (Kyber-512) to over 15 kB (FrodoKEM-640), far exceeding the 51-byte LoRaWAN payload at spreading factor 12. The gap between these frame sizes and the available air time creates a design conflict that, until now, has received limited attention. This research introduces a scheduler that partitions the KEM ciphertext across multiple uplink slots, tracks the cumulative airtime spent, and defers the rekey attempt when the remaining budget is too small to complete the exchange before the duty-cycle window closes. Four candidate KEMs were evaluated — Kyber-512, Kyber-768, FrodoKEM-640, and NTRU-HPS-2048-509 — on a LoRa testbed operating at spreading factor 7 in the 868 MHz band near Aveiro, Portugal. Results showed that Kyber-512 completed a full rekeying event in 312.4 ms of on-air time, consuming only 0.87 % of the hourly 1 % duty-cycle budget, whereas FrodoKEM-640 required 1823.5 ms and exceeded the budget at the 0.1 % tier. NTRU-HPS achieved an intermediate 418.7 ms. The proposed scheduler reduced failed rekey attempts by 91.3 % compared with a naive single-burst strategy, with no observed increase in packet loss for the application payload. These findings point to Kyber-512 and NTRU-HPS as practical post-quantum options for LPWAN rekeying under tight airtime constraints.

DOI
10.33545/2707661x.2026.v7.i3a.217

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Can low-power wide-area network (LPWAN) end devices refresh their cryptographic session keys with post-quantum algorithms when regulatory duty-cycle caps eat into the uplink budget? This research addresses that question by proposing an airtime-budgeted rekeying scheme that wraps a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) inside a fragmented uplink scheduler tailored to duty-cycle-limited channels. LPWAN technologies such as LoRa and Sigfox operate under strict sub-GHz spectrum rules in the EU 868 MHz band, where a 1 % or even 0.1 % transmit duty cycle leaves each device only seconds of air time per hour. Current LoRaWAN security relies on AES-128 counter-mode keys provisioned at join time, and rekeying either never happens or happens through a lightweight Diffie-Hellman exchange whose ciphertext fits a single frame. Post-quantum KEMs, by contrast, produce ciphertexts ranging from roughly 800 bytes (Kyber-512) to over 15 kB (FrodoKEM-640), far exceeding the 51-byte LoRaWAN payload at spreading factor 12. The gap between these frame sizes and the available air time creates a design conflict that, until now, has received limited attention. This research introduces a scheduler that partitions the KEM ciphertext across multiple uplink slots, tracks the cumulative airtime spent, and defers the rekey attempt when the remaining budget is too small to complete the exchange before the duty-cycle window closes. Four candidate KEMs were evaluated — Kyber-512, Kyber-768, FrodoKEM-640, and NTRU-HPS-2048-509 — on a LoRa testbed operating at spreading factor 7 in the 868 MHz band near Aveiro, Portugal. Results showed that Kyber-512 completed a full rekeying event in 312.4 ms of on-air time, consuming only 0.87 % of the hourly 1 % duty-cycle budget, whereas FrodoKEM-640 required 1823.5 ms and exceeded the budget at the 0.1 % tier. NTRU-HPS achieved an intermediate 418.7 ms. The proposed scheduler reduced failed rekey attempts by 91.3 % compared with a naive single-burst strategy, with no observed increase in packet loss for the application payload. These findings point to Kyber-512 and NTRU-HPS as practical post-quantum options for LPWAN rekeying under tight airtime constraints.
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Resource-constrained devices such as wireless sensors and Internet of Things (IoT) devices have become ubiquitous in our digital ecosystem. These devices generate and handle a major part of our digital data. However, due to the impending threat of quantum computers on our existing public-key cryptographic schemes and the limited resources available on IoT devices, it is important to design lightweight post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) schemes suitable for these devices.In this work, we explored the design space of learning with error-based PQC schemes to design a lightweight key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) suitable for resourceconstrained devices. We have done a scrupulous and extensive analysis and evaluation of different design elements, such as polynomial size, field modulus structure, reduction algorithm, and secret and error distribution of an LWE-based KEM. Our explorations led to the proposal of a lightweight PQC-KEM, Rudraksh, without compromising security. Our scheme provides security against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) with more than 100 bits of Core-SVP post-quantum security and belongs to the NIST-level-I security category (provide security at least as much as AES-128). We have also shown how ASCON can be used for lightweight pseudo-random number generation and hash function in the lattice-based KEMs instead of the widely used Keccak for lightweight design. Our FPGA results show that Rudraksh currently requires the least area among the PQC KEMs of similar security. Our implementation of Rudraksh provides a ~3x improvement in terms of the area requirement compared to the state-of-the-art areaoptimized implementation of Kyber, can operate at 63%-76% higher frequency with respect to high-throughput Kyber, and improves time-area-product ~2x compared to the state-of-the-art compact implementation of Kyber published in HPEC 2022.
The impending advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers threatens classical public-key primitives that underpin 5G and IoT security, including key exchange, authentication, and device onboarding. Ultra-dense networks, constrained endpoints, and long device lifetimes heighten exposure to “harvest-now, decrypt-later” risks. Mobile operators and IoT platform providers need migration ready cryptography that fits radio-access latency budgets, scales to billions of low-power nodes, and integrates cleanly with 3GPP and IETF protocols without degrading quality of service. Many post quantum options impose prohibitive bandwidth and compute costs or lack deployment guidance tuned to network slices and massive machine-type communications. We propose a lattice-based encryption and key-encapsulation framework grounded in Module-LWE/LWR assumptions. The design pairs an IND-CCA-secure KEM for control plane bootstrapping with lightweight AEAD for user-plane data, delivered through a hybrid handshake combining classical ECDH with a post-quantum KEM to ensure continuity during transition. Parameter tiers align with eMBB, URLLC, and mMTC device classes. Implementation emphasizes constant-time polynomial arithmetic, NTT-accelerated convolution, centered-binomial noise sampling, public-key compression, and stateless hash-based signatures for attestation. A gNB-assisted enrollment workflow and session-key rotation via 5G NAS/RRC are specified. Analytical modeling and prototype measurements indicate sub-millisecond encapsulation on ARM Cortex-M33 microcontrollers and ~1.5 ms on RAN baseband paths, while handshake message growth remains within existing NAS and RRC budgets. In ns-3 simulations of dense mMTC topologies, the hybrid handshake achieves >99.99% success under 1% packet loss, and energy profiling shows <5% battery impact for weekly rekeying. Security analysis demonstrates resistance to known lattice attacks at NIST Levels 3–5, forward secrecy via ephemeral KEMs, downgrade resistance through authenticated algorithm negotiation, and post compromise security with frequent rekeying.
Current improvements in quantum computing present a substantial challenge to classical cryptographic systems, which typically rely on problems that can be solved in polynomial time using quantum algorithms. Consequently, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has emerged as a promising solution to emerging quantum-based cryptographic challenges. The greatest threat is public-key cryptosystems, which are primarily responsible for key exchanges. In PQC, key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) are crucial for securing key exchange protocols, particularly in Internet communication, virtual private networks (VPNs), and secure messaging applications. CRYSTALS-Kyber and NTRU are two well-known PQC KEMs offering robust security in the quantum world. However, even when quantum computers are functional, they are not easily accessible. IoT devices will not be able to utilize them directly, so there will still be a requirement to protect IoT devices from quantum attacks. Concerns such as limited computational power, energy efficiency, and memory constraints in devices such as those used in IoTs, embedded systems, and smart cards limit the use of these techniques in constrained environments. These concerns always arise there. To address this issue, this study conducts a broad comparative analysis of Kyber and NTRU, with special focus on their security, performance, and implementation efficiency in such environments (IOT/constrained environments). In addition, a case study was conducted by applying KEMs to a low-power embedded device to analyze their performance in real-world scenarios. These results offer an important comparison for cyber security engineers and cryptographers who are involved in integrating post-quantum cryptography into resource-constrained devices.
ABSTRACT This paper presents a simulation- and model-based study — all results are derived from validated simulation frameworks rather than physical hardware measurements — of the post-quantum migration of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) command-and-control links. The advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) fundamentally threatens the security of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), particularly command and control links that rely on classical public-key cryptography. Compounded by "harvest now, decrypt later” strategies, this necessitates a proactive transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). We develop a quantum threat model for UAV communications and evaluates a migration pathway anchored by the NIST-standardized ML-KEM (Kyber) algorithm. We model and benchmark ML-KEM on a simulated ARM Cortex-M4-class flight controller plat-form, analysing computational performance, memory footprint, energy consumption, and real-time scheduling behaviour. Results demonstrate that ML-KEM-768 encapsulation reduces latency by approximately 39% compared to elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman, while a hybrid ECDH+ML-KEM-768 configuration introduces moderate computational and memory overhead. However, the substantial increase in ciphertext size creates critical fragmentation bottlenecks on low-bandwidth telemetry links such as LoRa, motivating a proposed symmetric key derivation architecture for bandwidth-efficient rekeying. Side-channel analysis under an idealised leakage model confirms susceptibility to correlation power analysis, highlighting the necessity for hardened implementations. Furthermore, real-time operating system scheduling simulations under a two-task discrete-event model reveal that naive task co-scheduling induces significant jitter, necessitating strict priority isolation to maintain flight controller determinism. These findings establish simulation-grounded guidance for integrating PQC into resource-constrained UAV platforms without compromising real-time performance or communication reliability.
Ensuring data privacy and integrity is imperative in wireless connection. Sensitive information needs to be transmitted through long-distance areas in many scenarios as healthcare, agricultural production and smart cities. Not only security, but also performance in this particular type of communication is not a trivial match. The LoRaWAN protocol is capable of transmitting data between IoT as end devices to application servers where the data can be analyzed and stored. The protocol offers a significant security standard and a recognized performance in long-range communication at low cost. However, the advances in Quantum Computing also bring threats to the current state of cryptographic algorithms, possibly compromising communication privacy. LoRaWAN’s security is based on AES-128 cryptographic algorithm, which is not safe to quantum computers. Thus, this work proposes an enhancement in LoraWAN’s security protocol adding the Kyber KEM-1024 algorithm to reinforce the protocol against quantum-computing attacks. The implementation successfully simulated the communication between an end device and an application server performing the post-quantum algorithm KEM-1024. Despite the results for time of execution can be improved, the proposal presented a safe communication resistant to quantum-computing attacks.