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IEEE Workshop on Advances in Information, Electronic and Electrical Engineering (AIEEE)

Authentication Overhead in Post-Quantum IoT for Classical, Full-PQC and Hybrid TLS

Simas Krušniauskas, Šarūnas Grigaliūnas, Rasa Brūzgienė

Published May 22, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The transition to post-quantum cryptography is particularly challenging for resource-constrained IoT devices, where improved cryptographic resilience must be balanced against latency, energy, and reliability constraints. This paper presents an empirical evaluation of TLS 1.3 authentication overhead on ESP32 under three key-exchange modes: classical X25519, full post-quantum ML-KEM-768, and hybrid X25519+ML-KEM-768. The study contributes the first direct large-scale comparison of these regimes on Xtensa-class hardware using wolfSSL and introduces IoT-QARS, an extension of the PAREK risk model that incorporates measured deployment overhead. Across 3,000 recorded sessions, including 2,938 successful handshakes, ML-KEM-768 reduced mean handshake latency by 43% and connection energy by 34% relative to X25519, while the hybrid mode increased latency and energy by only 11% and 7%, respectively. However, full PQC exhibited a 3.8% connectionfailure rate, likely caused by larger cryptographic payloads and buffer constraints. Applied to an industrial sensor profile, IoTQARS identifies hybrid deployment as the most practical nearterm migration option and highlights TCP-buffer tuning as a prerequisite for reliable full-PQC adoption. These results provide actionable guidance for post-quantum migration in embedded and industrial IoT environments.

DOI
10.1109/aieee71113.2026.11577039

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The integration of NIST-standardized lattice-based cryptographic algorithms (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) into TLS 1.3 enables post-quantum secure authentication for Industrial IoT (IIoT) environments. This work implements these algorithms within the X.509 certificate infrastructure and evaluates their performance on resource-constrained IIoT hardware (Raspberry Pi 4). Experimental measurements covering key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation, and signature operations were obtained using a liboqs-enabled TLS 1.3 stack. The results show that PQ TLS 1.3 achieves comparable handshake latency to conventional TLS on IIoT-class gateways, with certificate size identified as the dominant overhead. These findings confirm the practicality of post-quantum authentication in IIoT systems while acknowledging limitations related to the hardware scope and simulated networking. Future work will extend validation to field deployments and additional PQC candidates.
The migration of Internet of Things (IoT) systems to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is essential to ensure long-term security against quantum enabled adversaries. However, the large computational, memory, and communication overheads of PQC algorithms pose challenges for resource-constrained IoT environments. In practice, IoT platforms span a wide range of capabilities, from battery-powered sensors to gateway devices, making a one-size-fits-all configuration impractical. This paper presents a new methodology for selecting suitable PQC schemes based on RFC 7228 device classes. We introduce the Efficiency-Adjusted Security for Post-Quantum Cryptography (EAS-PQC) metric that considers security strength, latency, energy consumption, memory footprint, communication overhead, and protocol reliability. Device-class-specific constraints and weighting profiles are incorporated to reflect the operational priorities of Class 0, Class 1, and Class 2 IoT devices. Our evaluation primarily uses performance benchmarks from the PQM4 framework, which are based on ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller profiles, and performance results from several work on similar embedded platforms. Energy consumption is estimated using a constant active power model derived from Cortex-M4 power characteristics. We evaluate multiple PQC candidates, including ML-KEM and ML-DSA, and the results show a quantitative mapping between IoT device classes and PQC schemes. Specifically, Saber-LightSaber is identified as the most suitable option for Class 0 devices, while ML-DSA-87 combined with ML-KEM-768 achieves the highest overall scores for Class 1 and Class 2 devices. Our findings improve feasibility and efficiency by up to 30–40% compared to static baseline configurations. With these findings, we recommend EAS-PQC as a useful tool for the assessment of post-quantum security in industrial IoT systems.
The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices that use the Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol poses significant security challenges in the emerging quantum computing era. Current Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementations rely on classical cryptographic algorithms vulnerable to Shor's algorithm. This paper proposes PQ-MQTT, a hybrid post-quantum secure communication protocol that integrates ML-KEM-768 with X25519 for key encapsulation and a lightweight session-key derivation mechanism optimized for resource-constrained IoT publishers. We present a formal security analysis under the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM), demonstrating resilience against store-now-decryptlater attacks. Experimental evaluation on the Raspberry Pi 4, ESP32, and Arduino Nano 33 platforms shows that PQ-MQTT achieves handshake latencies of127.3 ms,412.7 ms127.3 ~\text{ms}, 412.7 ~\text{ms}127.3 ms,412.7 ms, and1,847.2 ms1,847.2 ~\text{ms}1,847.2 ms, respectively, with 18.2 KB of additional memory overhead. A comparative analysis of pure post-quantum and classical TLS implementations shows energy reductions of23.5%−40.5%23.5 \%-40.5 \%23.5%−40.5%relative to pure PQC, achieved through our hybrid optimization approach, while maintaining 94.2 % throughput efficiency.
Post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms are being developed to guard against quantum-computing attacks, but their behavior in constrained Internet of Things (IoT) environments remains an important topic of discussion. In this work, we study the impact of deploying PQC protocols in IoT networks using the Open Quantum Safe (liboqs) framework. In particular, key encapsulation and digital signature schemes are evaluated in terms of their computational performance, communication costs, and energy consumption. Our results indicate that although PQC operations can be completed in microseconds using general-purpose processors, substantially larger key and ciphertext sizes introduce significant communication overhead. When mapped to common IoT protocols such as Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), IEEE 802.15.4 (Zigbee), and LoRa, these larger payloads must be divided into multiple packets. In low-payload LoRa networks, for example, ML-KEM handshakes can require up to 62 packets. This level of fragmentation increases latency and energy consumption, thus potentially affecting reliability. Furthermore, when packet delivery probabilities approaching 99% are achieved, handshake success rates can drop to values approaching 50%. These results suggest that communication metrics, rather than computational performance, pose key challenges to PQC deployment in constrained IoT settings.
The emergence of quantum computing poses an existential threat to current Internet of Things security infrastructure, which relies predominantly on RSA and elliptic curve cryptography for confidentiality and authentication. Shor's algorithm enables polynomial-time factorization that can break these classical cryptographic primitives, necessitating urgent migration to quantum-resistant alternatives. This paper presents the first comprehensive performance evaluation of six NISTstandardized and candidate post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, NTRU-Prime-hrss, BIKE-L1, HQC-128, Classic-McEliece-348864) integrated into the MQTT protocol across 4,608 experimental configurations spanning diverse real-world network conditions. We systematically evaluate connection establishment latency, message delivery reliability, decryption computational overhead, and throughput stability under systematically varied network latency (10-150 ms representing LAN to satellite links), packet loss rates (0-10% spanning excellent to degraded connectivity), payload sizes (128-1024 bytes covering sensor telemetry to multimedia streams), and message transmission rates (1-10 Hz from periodic monitoring to real-time control). Statistical analysis of 622,080 MQTT messages totaling 384 hours of simulation time reveals that NTRU-Prime-hrss achieves optimal performance-security balance with 98.1% delivery ratio and 26.1 ms median handshake latency across all tested conditions, while Classic-McEliece exhibits 278.3 ms handshake overhead rendering it impractical for resourceconstrained deployments despite offering conservative security margins. We demonstrate through generalized linear modeling that transport-layer effects (TCP retransmissions, TLS record framing overhead) dominate post-quantum cryptographic computational costs, accounting for approximately 70% of endto-end latency in high-loss scenarios. Our novel three-gate decision framework provides quantitative deployment criteria for IoT operators balancing security requirements against operational constraints. Complete implementation, experimental dataset, and analysis scripts available at https://github.com/ vssk18/PQSM-RESEARCH.