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Wave-Function Realism and the Scope of Physical Causal Closure

Alexander Poltorak

Published Aug 9, 2026• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The causal closure of the physical is often formulated as the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. That formulation leaves two parameters tacit: the domain over which closure is asserted, and the completeness relation—causal, dynamical, or explanatory—that closure asserts of it. Both become unstable when the term physical is indexed to competing quantum ontologies. Wave-function realism treats the quantum state as a field on a high-dimensional space, whereas primitive-ontology, spacetime-state, multi-field, and nomological approaches characterize the fundamental ontology differently. I distinguish spatiotemporal-domain closure from fundamental-physical closure and separate causal closure from dynamical and explanatory completeness. Conditional on wave-function realism, spacetime-restricted closure fails if ordinary spacetime is derivative, but theory-relative closure may remain true once the wave function is counted as physical. The apparent conflict therefore does not establish a trans-domain causal breach. It reveals a formulation dilemma for causal arguments for physicalism: a spacetime-restricted closure principle is too narrow to accommodate serious quantum ontologies, while a theory-relative principle requires an independent, non-question-begging criterion of physicality—and an explicit bridge from dynamical to causal completeness—before it can exclude nonphysical mental causes. Quantum ontology thus converts the familiar problem of characterizing the physical from a deferrable objection into a structural requirement on causal arguments for physicalism, without supporting interactionist dualism. It also explains why appeals to Hilbert space, the PBR theorem, the Born rule, or Bohmian guidance cannot by themselves yield the stronger conclusion.

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Abstract: Physicalism's most common implicit defense against consciousness-first frameworks is the appeal to causal closure: if every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, there is no work for consciousness to do. This essay examines whether physics actually delivers that closure. It does not. Classical mechanics provided deterministic closure — given initial conditions and laws, every subsequent state is fixed. Quantum theory replaced this with something structurally different: statistical closure with outcome-level openness. Probability distributions are fixed; which specific outcome actualizes is not determined by the formalism. This is a structural feature of the theory, not a gap in current knowledge. The founders of quantum mechanics recognized immediately that consciousness and measurement could not be cleanly separated. Subsequent interpretations each introduced their own ontological costs and open problems — yet only the consciousness-involving reading was treated as disqualified by its difficulties, driven not by new empirical findings but by the asymmetric methodological restraint this project diagnoses in consciousness studies. The standard formalism does not deliver causal closure; restoring it (as Bohmian mechanics attempts) requires adding unobservable structure to the theory — purchasing closure through metaphysical commitment, not empirical discovery. Keywords: causal closure · quantum mechanics · measurement problem · Born rule · wave function · consciousness · interpretive history · von Neumann · quantum indeterminacy Part of the Return to Consciousness research program — 26 philosophical essays exploring consciousness-first metaphysics. Full project: https://brunoton.github.io/return-to-consciousness/

•Mar 9, 2026•0 citations

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The paper explores a particular line of objection against wave-function realism. This view, advocated by Bell (1987) and presently defended by Albert (1996), North (2013) and Ney (2016), claims that the quantum wave function is a high-dimensional physical field. Normally, wave-function realism has been criticized for its ontological commitments, which are regarded as empirically unsupportable in principle and as violating empirical coherence. In this paper, I investigate whether there are any methodological arguments for endorsing such an ontology and whether they are sound. In particular, I home in on and discuss three arguments that may be used to support wave-function realism: (i) the argument from laws; (ii) the argument from the complete information of the system; (iii) the argument from explanation. My conclusion is that these arguments do not provide any good methodological grounds for inferring the existence of a high-dimensional physical field from quantum theory.

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science•Apr 3, 2021•1 citation

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We present an ontological and dynamic derivation of wave function collapse within the context of General Relativity formulated as a Quantum Theory (GRQT), a formulation that maintains ontological realism and conceptual continuity with General Relativity. Starting exclusively from the discrete geometric structure of spacetime and its fundamental elastic properties, we demonstrate that collapse constitutes neither an additional postulate of quantum mechanics nor an external phenomenological effect, but emerges as a necessary consequence of the requirement for geometric consistency in the temporal update of the causal lattice. We show that quantum superpositions of massive systems imply geometric bifurcations of spacetime, associated with incompatible metrics in the transition between successive simultaneity slices. The energy identified in Objective Reduction theories as gravitational self-interaction energy is reinterpreted, in GRQT, as the elastic deformation energy of the lattice, governed by the fundamental geometric impedance $\alpha$. We derive a quantitative criterion for the viability of temporal evolution and a closed-form expression for the characteristic collapse time, without introducing free parameters. Wave function collapse thus arises as the physical process by which spacetime eliminates geometric ambiguities incompatible with the unique definition of the subsequent slice, preserving the topological continuity of the causal manifold. The boundary between quantum and classical regimes becomes quantitative and derived, resolving the measurement problem in strictly geometric terms. The formulation maintains ontological realism, conceptual continuity with General Relativity, and provides explicit experimental predictions in mesoscopic regimes.

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Primitive ontology is a program which seeks to make explicit the ontological commitments of physical theories in terms of a distribution of matter in ordinary space-time. This program targets wave-function realism, which interprets the high-dimensional configuration space on which wave-functions are defined as our fundamental physical space. Wave-function realism allegedly fails to account for a correspondence between the ontology it postulates and the ‘manifest image’ of the world in which experimental tests of the theory are performed, and therefore the wave-function must be completed with an additional structure which describes what fundamentally exists in ordinary space-time: the ‘primitive ontol- ogy’. However primitive ontologies face some difficulties, in particular concerning the ontological status of the wave-function. In this paper, I defend a realist inter- pretation of the wave-function as describing objects in ordinary space-time, which does not require supplementing the theory with additional structure. The main dif- ference between this proposal and other primitive ontology proposals is that the fundamental constituents of reality are not conceived of as localised objects, but as primitive relations. This interpretation purports to share the advantages of both wave-function realism and primitive ontologies without facing the same difficulties. I argue that the need for an additional structure stems from a commitment to the locality of the fundamental constituents of reality, and that such commitment is unnecessary for recovering the manifest image of the world.

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What ontology does realism about the quantum state suggest? The main extant view in contemporary philosophy of physics is wave-function realism. We elaborate the sense in which wave-function realism does provide an ontological picture, and defend it from certain objections that have been raised against it. However, there are good reasons to be dissatisfied with wave-function realism, as we go on to elaborate. This motivates the development of an opposing picture: what we call spacetime state realism, a view which takes the states associated to spacetime regions as fundamental. This approach enjoys a number of beneficial features, although, unlike wave-function realism, it involves non-separability at the level of fundamental ontology. We investigate the pros and cons of this non-separability, arguing that it is a quite acceptable feature, even one which proves fruitful in the context of relativistic covariance. A companion paper discusses the prospects for combining a spacetime-based ontology with separability, along lines suggested by Deutsch and Hayden. 1 Introduction2 Prolegomena3 Wave-function Realism4 Problems with Wave-function Realism5 Spacetime State Realism6 Locality7 Non-unitary Dynamics on the Spacetime Ontology8 Relativity and Poincaré Covariance9 Finding the Appearances10 Conclusion

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The Argument from Entanglement

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Abstract In quantum mechanics, entangled states are not exotic or rare. Rather, entanglement is the norm and so the metaphysical consequences of entanglement are a central issue for anyone wishing to provide an ontological interpretation of the various formulations of quantum mechanics. This chapter presents the argument for wave function realism from quantum entanglement, which says that wave function realism is necessary if one wants an ontological interpretation that does not conflate distinct quantum states. It explains quantum entanglement and how postulating a wave function in higher dimensions can help to metaphysically ground the phenomenon. The chapter ultimately concludes that the argument from quantum entanglement fails as there are several rival positions that can also explain quantum entanglement and recover the distinctions between different entangled states. These include the primitive ontology approach, various other holisms, ontic structural realism, spacetime state realism, and the multi-field approach.

Oxford University Press eBooks•May 19, 2021•0 citations
The causal closure of the physical is often formulated as the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. That formulation leaves two parameters tacit: the domain over which closure is asserted, and the completeness relation—causal, dynamical, or explanatory—that closure asserts of it. Both become unstable when the term physical is indexed to competing quantum ontologies. Wave-function realism treats the quantum state as a field on a high-dimensional space, whereas primitive-ontology, spacetime-state, multi-field, and nomological approaches characterize the fundamental ontology differently. I distinguish spatiotemporal-domain closure from fundamental-physical closure and separate causal closure from dynamical and explanatory completeness. Conditional on wave-function realism, spacetime-restricted closure fails if ordinary spacetime is derivative, but theory-relative closure may remain true once the wave function is counted as physical. The apparent conflict therefore does not establish a trans-domain causal breach. It reveals a formulation dilemma for causal arguments for physicalism: a spacetime-restricted closure principle is too narrow to accommodate serious quantum ontologies, while a theory-relative principle requires an independent, non-question-begging criterion of physicality—and an explicit bridge from dynamical to causal completeness—before it can exclude nonphysical mental causes. Quantum ontology thus converts the familiar problem of characterizing the physical from a deferrable objection into a structural requirement on causal arguments for physicalism, without supporting interactionist dualism. It also explains why appeals to Hilbert space, the PBR theorem, the Born rule, or Bohmian guidance cannot by themselves yield the stronger conclusion.
Abstract: Physicalism's most common implicit defense against consciousness-first frameworks is the appeal to causal closure: if every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, there is no work for consciousness to do. This essay examines whether physics actually delivers that closure. It does not. Classical mechanics provided deterministic closure — given initial conditions and laws, every subsequent state is fixed. Quantum theory replaced this with something structurally different: statistical closure with outcome-level openness. Probability distributions are fixed; which specific outcome actualizes is not determined by the formalism. This is a structural feature of the theory, not a gap in current knowledge. The founders of quantum mechanics recognized immediately that consciousness and measurement could not be cleanly separated. Subsequent interpretations each introduced their own ontological costs and open problems — yet only the consciousness-involving reading was treated as disqualified by its difficulties, driven not by new empirical findings but by the asymmetric methodological restraint this project diagnoses in consciousness studies. The standard formalism does not deliver causal closure; restoring it (as Bohmian mechanics attempts) requires adding unobservable structure to the theory — purchasing closure through metaphysical commitment, not empirical discovery. Keywords: causal closure · quantum mechanics · measurement problem · Born rule · wave function · consciousness · interpretive history · von Neumann · quantum indeterminacy Part of the Return to Consciousness research program — 26 philosophical essays exploring consciousness-first metaphysics. Full project: https://brunoton.github.io/return-to-consciousness/
The paper explores a particular line of objection against wave-function realism. This view, advocated by Bell (1987) and presently defended by Albert (1996), North (2013) and Ney (2016), claims that the quantum wave function is a high-dimensional physical field. Normally, wave-function realism has been criticized for its ontological commitments, which are regarded as empirically unsupportable in principle and as violating empirical coherence. In this paper, I investigate whether there are any methodological arguments for endorsing such an ontology and whether they are sound. In particular, I home in on and discuss three arguments that may be used to support wave-function realism: (i) the argument from laws; (ii) the argument from the complete information of the system; (iii) the argument from explanation. My conclusion is that these arguments do not provide any good methodological grounds for inferring the existence of a high-dimensional physical field from quantum theory.
We present an ontological and dynamic derivation of wave function collapse within the context of General Relativity formulated as a Quantum Theory (GRQT), a formulation that maintains ontological realism and conceptual continuity with General Relativity. Starting exclusively from the discrete geometric structure of spacetime and its fundamental elastic properties, we demonstrate that collapse constitutes neither an additional postulate of quantum mechanics nor an external phenomenological effect, but emerges as a necessary consequence of the requirement for geometric consistency in the temporal update of the causal lattice. We show that quantum superpositions of massive systems imply geometric bifurcations of spacetime, associated with incompatible metrics in the transition between successive simultaneity slices. The energy identified in Objective Reduction theories as gravitational self-interaction energy is reinterpreted, in GRQT, as the elastic deformation energy of the lattice, governed by the fundamental geometric impedance α\alphaα. We derive a quantitative criterion for the viability of temporal evolution and a closed-form expression for the characteristic collapse time, without introducing free parameters. Wave function collapse thus arises as the physical process by which spacetime eliminates geometric ambiguities incompatible with the unique definition of the subsequent slice, preserving the topological continuity of the causal manifold. The boundary between quantum and classical regimes becomes quantitative and derived, resolving the measurement problem in strictly geometric terms. The formulation maintains ontological realism, conceptual continuity with General Relativity, and provides explicit experimental predictions in mesoscopic regimes.
Primitive ontology is a program which seeks to make explicit the ontological commitments of physical theories in terms of a distribution of matter in ordinary space-time. This program targets wave-function realism, which interprets the high-dimensional configuration space on which wave-functions are defined as our fundamental physical space. Wave-function realism allegedly fails to account for a correspondence between the ontology it postulates and the ‘manifest image’ of the world in which experimental tests of the theory are performed, and therefore the wave-function must be completed with an additional structure which describes what fundamentally exists in ordinary space-time: the ‘primitive ontol- ogy’. However primitive ontologies face some difficulties, in particular concerning the ontological status of the wave-function. In this paper, I defend a realist inter- pretation of the wave-function as describing objects in ordinary space-time, which does not require supplementing the theory with additional structure. The main dif- ference between this proposal and other primitive ontology proposals is that the fundamental constituents of reality are not conceived of as localised objects, but as primitive relations. This interpretation purports to share the advantages of both wave-function realism and primitive ontologies without facing the same difficulties. I argue that the need for an additional structure stems from a commitment to the locality of the fundamental constituents of reality, and that such commitment is unnecessary for recovering the manifest image of the world.
What ontology does realism about the quantum state suggest? The main extant view in contemporary philosophy of physics is wave-function realism. We elaborate the sense in which wave-function realism does provide an ontological picture, and defend it from certain objections that have been raised against it. However, there are good reasons to be dissatisfied with wave-function realism, as we go on to elaborate. This motivates the development of an opposing picture: what we call spacetime state realism, a view which takes the states associated to spacetime regions as fundamental. This approach enjoys a number of beneficial features, although, unlike wave-function realism, it involves non-separability at the level of fundamental ontology. We investigate the pros and cons of this non-separability, arguing that it is a quite acceptable feature, even one which proves fruitful in the context of relativistic covariance. A companion paper discusses the prospects for combining a spacetime-based ontology with separability, along lines suggested by Deutsch and Hayden. 1 Introduction2 Prolegomena3 Wave-function Realism4 Problems with Wave-function Realism5 Spacetime State Realism6 Locality7 Non-unitary Dynamics on the Spacetime Ontology8 Relativity and Poincaré Covariance9 Finding the Appearances10 Conclusion
Abstract In quantum mechanics, entangled states are not exotic or rare. Rather, entanglement is the norm and so the metaphysical consequences of entanglement are a central issue for anyone wishing to provide an ontological interpretation of the various formulations of quantum mechanics. This chapter presents the argument for wave function realism from quantum entanglement, which says that wave function realism is necessary if one wants an ontological interpretation that does not conflate distinct quantum states. It explains quantum entanglement and how postulating a wave function in higher dimensions can help to metaphysically ground the phenomenon. The chapter ultimately concludes that the argument from quantum entanglement fails as there are several rival positions that can also explain quantum entanglement and recover the distinctions between different entangled states. These include the primitive ontology approach, various other holisms, ontic structural realism, spacetime state realism, and the multi-field approach.