Wave-Function Realism and the Scope of Physical Causal Closure
Alexander Poltorak
Abstract
The causal closure of the physical is often formulated as the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. That formulation leaves two parameters tacit: the domain over which closure is asserted, and the completeness relation—causal, dynamical, or explanatory—that closure asserts of it. Both become unstable when the term physical is indexed to competing quantum ontologies. Wave-function realism treats the quantum state as a field on a high-dimensional space, whereas primitive-ontology, spacetime-state, multi-field, and nomological approaches characterize the fundamental ontology differently. I distinguish spatiotemporal-domain closure from fundamental-physical closure and separate causal closure from dynamical and explanatory completeness. Conditional on wave-function realism, spacetime-restricted closure fails if ordinary spacetime is derivative, but theory-relative closure may remain true once the wave function is counted as physical. The apparent conflict therefore does not establish a trans-domain causal breach. It reveals a formulation dilemma for causal arguments for physicalism: a spacetime-restricted closure principle is too narrow to accommodate serious quantum ontologies, while a theory-relative principle requires an independent, non-question-begging criterion of physicality—and an explicit bridge from dynamical to causal completeness—before it can exclude nonphysical mental causes. Quantum ontology thus converts the familiar problem of characterizing the physical from a deferrable objection into a structural requirement on causal arguments for physicalism, without supporting interactionist dualism. It also explains why appeals to Hilbert space, the PBR theorem, the Born rule, or Bohmian guidance cannot by themselves yield the stronger conclusion.