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arXiv:0907.5294 · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Quantum Mechanics on Spacetime I: Spacetime State Realism

David Wallace, Christopher G. Timpson

Published Nov 24, 2010• 264 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

What ontology does realism about the quantum state suggest? The main extant view in contemporary philosophy of physics is wave-function realism. We elaborate the sense in which wave-function realism does provide an ontological picture, and defend it from certain objections that have been raised against it. However, there are good reasons to be dissatisfied with wave-function realism, as we go on to elaborate. This motivates the development of an opposing picture: what we call spacetime state realism, a view which takes the states associated to spacetime regions as fundamental. This approach enjoys a number of beneficial features, although, unlike wave-function realism, it involves non-separability at the level of fundamental ontology. We investigate the pros and cons of this non-separability, arguing that it is a quite acceptable feature, even one which proves fruitful in the context of relativistic covariance. A companion paper discusses the prospects for combining a spacetime-based ontology with separability, along lines suggested by Deutsch and Hayden. 1 Introduction2 Prolegomena3 Wave-function Realism4 Problems with Wave-function Realism5 Spacetime State Realism6 Locality7 Non-unitary Dynamics on the Spacetime Ontology8 Relativity and Poincaré Covariance9 Finding the Appearances10 Conclusion

DOI
10.1093/bjps/axq010

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What ontology does realism about the quantum state suggest? The main extant view in contemporary philosophy of physics is wave-function realism. We elaborate the sense in which wave-function realism does provide an ontological picture, and defend it from certain objections that have been raised against it. However, there are good reasons to be dissatisfied with wave-function realism, as we go on to elaborate. This motivates the development of an opposing picture: what we call spacetime state realism, a view which takes the states associated to spacetime regions as fundamental. This approach enjoys a number of beneficial features, although, unlike wave-function realism, it involves non-separability at the level of fundamental ontology. We investigate the pros and cons of this non-separability, arguing that it is a quite acceptable feature, even one which proves fruitful in the context of relativistic covariance. A companion paper discusses the prospects for combining a spacetime-based ontology with separability, along lines suggested by Deutsch and Hayden. 1 Introduction2 Prolegomena3 Wave-function Realism4 Problems with Wave-function Realism5 Spacetime State Realism6 Locality7 Non-unitary Dynamics on the Spacetime Ontology8 Relativity and Poincaré Covariance9 Finding the Appearances10 Conclusion
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
The phrase “Wave Function Realism” (WFR) has come to be used for a family of views according to which quantum theory motivates us to think that quantum wave functions are fields on a space of extremely high dimension, which is in some sense more fundamental that ordinary three-dimensional space or four-dimensional spacetime. With an aim at gaining clarity about the nature of the project, I distinguish between varieties of Wave Function Realism that one might hold. I focus on two axes of distinction. One has to do with the nature of the project. Is it an Interpretive project, one of accepting standard quantum theory pretty much as we have it, and exploring its implications for ontology? Or is it a Constructive project, which finds standard quantum theory wanting in crucial aspects, and seeks to construct a new theory that will satisfy some set of metaphysical constraints? The other has to do with how radical the claims are that are made about the nature of spacetime. Does the fundamental space on which the wave functions of WFR are defined have intrinsic structure corresponding to the low-dimensional spacetime structure? I call versions of WFR on which this is so “Mild” versions, as on such a view any sense in which the low-dimensional spatial structure is non-fundamental would be at best a highly attenuated one. A more radical view, which I call “Spicy,” has it that the fundamental space has no intrinsic structure corresponding to our low dimension spacetime, and that such structure is emergent from the structure and evolution of certain sort of wave functions. Judging from what they say about the view, it seems that proponents of WFR intend it to be Interpretive and Spicy. I will argue that there can be no such position. Standard quantum mechanics makes such heavy use of low-dimensional spacetime structure that an Interpretive version of WFR must be Extremely Mild. A Spicy but Constructive version has yet to be formulated.
Abstract What are the ontological implications of quantum theories, that is, what do they tell us about the fundamental objects that make up our world? How should quantum theories make us reevaluate our classical conceptions of the basic constitution of material objects and ourselves? Is there fundamental quantum nonlocality? This book articulates several rival approaches to answering these questions, ultimately defending the wave function realist approach. Wave function realism is a way of interpreting quantum theories so that the central object they describe is the quantum wave function, interpreted as a field in an extremely high-dimensional space. According to this approach, the nonseparability and nonlocality we seem to find in quantum mechanics are ultimately manifestations of a more intuitive, separable, and local picture in higher dimensions.
The purpose of the present chapter is to respond to a thread of recent criticism against one candidate framework for interpreting quantum theories, a framework introduced and defended by David Albert and Barry Loewer: wave function realism, a framework for interpreting the ontology of quantum theories according to which what appears to be a nonseparable metaphysics ofentangled objects acting instantaneously across spatial distances is a manifestation of a more fundamental separable and local metaphysics in higher dimensions. Thechapterconsiders strategies for extending the wave function realist interpretation of quantum mechanics to the case of relativistic quantum theories, responding to arguments that this cannot be done.