Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Oxford University Press eBooks

The Argument from Entanglement

Alyssa Ney

Published May 19, 2021• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract In quantum mechanics, entangled states are not exotic or rare. Rather, entanglement is the norm and so the metaphysical consequences of entanglement are a central issue for anyone wishing to provide an ontological interpretation of the various formulations of quantum mechanics. This chapter presents the argument for wave function realism from quantum entanglement, which says that wave function realism is necessary if one wants an ontological interpretation that does not conflate distinct quantum states. It explains quantum entanglement and how postulating a wave function in higher dimensions can help to metaphysically ground the phenomenon. The chapter ultimately concludes that the argument from quantum entanglement fails as there are several rival positions that can also explain quantum entanglement and recover the distinctions between different entangled states. These include the primitive ontology approach, various other holisms, ontic structural realism, spacetime state realism, and the multi-field approach.

DOI
10.1093/oso/9780190097714.003.0002

Related papers

In Defense of the Metaphysics of Entanglement

David Glick, George Darby

Quantum entanglement has long been thought to have deep metaphysical consequences. For example, it has been claimed to show that Humeansupervenience is false or to involve a novel form of ontological holism. One way to avoid confronting the metaphysical consequences is to adopt some form of antirealism. This chapter discusses two prominent strands in recent literature—wavefunction realism and “Super-Humeanism”—which appear quite different but, as the authors see it, are instances of a more general strategy. In effect, what these attempt to do is to diffuse the puzzle of entanglement by eliminating it. These interpretative movements are advertised as equally realist, but, the chapter claims, fail to take an appropriately realist attitude towards entanglement. What the chapter advocates instead is a genuine metaphysics of entanglement: instead of eliminating entanglement, develop a metaphysics that accounts for and explains it.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Apr 30, 2020•3 citations

A Preliminary Case for Wave Function Realism

Alyssa Ney

Abstract This chapter explains the use of wave functions in quantum mechanics in order to develop a preliminary argument for wave function realism, one that is commonly found in the physics and philosophy of physics literature. It distinguishes ontological questions about the status of the wave function from the more discussed measurement problem for quantum mechanics, and explains how wave function realism is an approach to ontology that is compatible with several rival solutions to the measurement problem. The chapter then presents an initial, but not ultimately decisive, argument for wave function realism based on the ubiquity of wave function representations in quantum physics.

Oxford University Press eBooks•May 19, 2021•0 citations

The Virtues of Separability and Locality

Alyssa Ney

Abstract This chapter presents the argument for wave function realism that it is the only realist interpretation of quantum theories that can maintain a fundamentally separable and local metaphysics. It is commonly seen as a consequence of entanglement and Bell’s Theorem that quantum mechanics entails quantum nonseparability and nonlocality. Yet although all rival realist ontological interpretations of quantum mechanics involve either a nonseparable or a nonlocal fundamental metaphysics, the metaphysics of wave function realism is fundamentally both separable and local, although the view also makes room for nonfundamental nonseparability and nonlocality. The chapter considers several arguments that could explain why one should prefer interpretations of quantum theories that are separable and local, and concludes with a defense of intuitions in quantum interpretation.

Oxford University Press eBooks•May 19, 2021•0 citations

The World in the Wave Function: A Metaphysics for Quantum Physics

Alyssa Ney

Abstract What are the ontological implications of quantum theories, that is, what do they tell us about the fundamental objects that make up our world? How should quantum theories make us reevaluate our classical conceptions of the basic constitution of material objects and ourselves? Is there fundamental quantum nonlocality? This book articulates several rival approaches to answering these questions, ultimately defending the wave function realist approach. Wave function realism is a way of interpreting quantum theories so that the central object they describe is the quantum wave function, interpreted as a field in an extremely high-dimensional space. According to this approach, the nonseparability and nonlocality we seem to find in quantum mechanics are ultimately manifestations of a more intuitive, separable, and local picture in higher dimensions.

•May 19, 2021•113 citations

Scientific Realism and Primitive Ontology

Valia Allori

In this paper I wish to connect the recent debate in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wave-function to the historical debate in the philosophy of science regarding the tenability of scientific realism. Being realist about quantum mechanics is particularly challenging when focusing on the wave-function. According to the wave-function ontology approach, the wave-function is a concrete physical entity. In contrast, according to an alternative viewpoint, namely the primitive ontology approach, the wave-function does not represent physical entities. In this paper, I argue that the primitive ontology approach can naturally be interpreted as an instance of the so-called ‘explanationism’ realism, which has been proposed as a response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism. If my arguments are sound, then one could conclude that: (1) contrarily to what is commonly though, if explanationism realism is a good response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument, it can be straightforwardly extended also to the quantum domain; (2) the primitive ontology approach is in better shape than the wave-function ontology approach in resisting the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism.

•Oct 31, 2016•0 citations

Scientific Realism and Primitive Ontology Or: The Pessimistic Induction and the Nature of the Wave Function

Valia Allori

In this paper, I wish to connect the recent debate in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wave function to the historical debate in the philosophy of science regarding the tenability of scientific realism. Advocating realism about quantum mechanics is particularly challenging when focusing on the wave function. According to the wave function ontology approach, the wave function is a concrete physical entity. In contrast, according to an alternative viewpoint, namely the primitive ontology approach, the wave function does not represent physical objects. In this paper, I argue that the primitive ontology approach can naturally be interpreted as an instance of the so-called explanationist realism, which has been proposed as a response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism. If my arguments are sound, then one could conclude that: (1) contrary to what is commonly thought, if explanationism realism is a good response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument, it can be straightforwardly extended also to the quantum domain; (2) the primitive ontology approach is in better shape than the wave function ontology approach in resisting the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism.

Lato Sensu Revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences•Sep 27, 2018•12 citations
Abstract In quantum mechanics, entangled states are not exotic or rare. Rather, entanglement is the norm and so the metaphysical consequences of entanglement are a central issue for anyone wishing to provide an ontological interpretation of the various formulations of quantum mechanics. This chapter presents the argument for wave function realism from quantum entanglement, which says that wave function realism is necessary if one wants an ontological interpretation that does not conflate distinct quantum states. It explains quantum entanglement and how postulating a wave function in higher dimensions can help to metaphysically ground the phenomenon. The chapter ultimately concludes that the argument from quantum entanglement fails as there are several rival positions that can also explain quantum entanglement and recover the distinctions between different entangled states. These include the primitive ontology approach, various other holisms, ontic structural realism, spacetime state realism, and the multi-field approach.
Quantum entanglement has long been thought to have deep metaphysical consequences. For example, it has been claimed to show that Humeansupervenience is false or to involve a novel form of ontological holism. One way to avoid confronting the metaphysical consequences is to adopt some form of antirealism. This chapter discusses two prominent strands in recent literature—wavefunction realism and “Super-Humeanism”—which appear quite different but, as the authors see it, are instances of a more general strategy. In effect, what these attempt to do is to diffuse the puzzle of entanglement by eliminating it. These interpretative movements are advertised as equally realist, but, the chapter claims, fail to take an appropriately realist attitude towards entanglement. What the chapter advocates instead is a genuine metaphysics of entanglement: instead of eliminating entanglement, develop a metaphysics that accounts for and explains it.
Abstract This chapter explains the use of wave functions in quantum mechanics in order to develop a preliminary argument for wave function realism, one that is commonly found in the physics and philosophy of physics literature. It distinguishes ontological questions about the status of the wave function from the more discussed measurement problem for quantum mechanics, and explains how wave function realism is an approach to ontology that is compatible with several rival solutions to the measurement problem. The chapter then presents an initial, but not ultimately decisive, argument for wave function realism based on the ubiquity of wave function representations in quantum physics.
Abstract This chapter presents the argument for wave function realism that it is the only realist interpretation of quantum theories that can maintain a fundamentally separable and local metaphysics. It is commonly seen as a consequence of entanglement and Bell’s Theorem that quantum mechanics entails quantum nonseparability and nonlocality. Yet although all rival realist ontological interpretations of quantum mechanics involve either a nonseparable or a nonlocal fundamental metaphysics, the metaphysics of wave function realism is fundamentally both separable and local, although the view also makes room for nonfundamental nonseparability and nonlocality. The chapter considers several arguments that could explain why one should prefer interpretations of quantum theories that are separable and local, and concludes with a defense of intuitions in quantum interpretation.
Abstract What are the ontological implications of quantum theories, that is, what do they tell us about the fundamental objects that make up our world? How should quantum theories make us reevaluate our classical conceptions of the basic constitution of material objects and ourselves? Is there fundamental quantum nonlocality? This book articulates several rival approaches to answering these questions, ultimately defending the wave function realist approach. Wave function realism is a way of interpreting quantum theories so that the central object they describe is the quantum wave function, interpreted as a field in an extremely high-dimensional space. According to this approach, the nonseparability and nonlocality we seem to find in quantum mechanics are ultimately manifestations of a more intuitive, separable, and local picture in higher dimensions.
In this paper I wish to connect the recent debate in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wave-function to the historical debate in the philosophy of science regarding the tenability of scientific realism. Being realist about quantum mechanics is particularly challenging when focusing on the wave-function. According to the wave-function ontology approach, the wave-function is a concrete physical entity. In contrast, according to an alternative viewpoint, namely the primitive ontology approach, the wave-function does not represent physical entities. In this paper, I argue that the primitive ontology approach can naturally be interpreted as an instance of the so-called ‘explanationism’ realism, which has been proposed as a response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism. If my arguments are sound, then one could conclude that: (1) contrarily to what is commonly though, if explanationism realism is a good response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument, it can be straightforwardly extended also to the quantum domain; (2) the primitive ontology approach is in better shape than the wave-function ontology approach in resisting the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism.
In this paper, I wish to connect the recent debate in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wave function to the historical debate in the philosophy of science regarding the tenability of scientific realism. Advocating realism about quantum mechanics is particularly challenging when focusing on the wave function. According to the wave function ontology approach, the wave function is a concrete physical entity. In contrast, according to an alternative viewpoint, namely the primitive ontology approach, the wave function does not represent physical objects. In this paper, I argue that the primitive ontology approach can naturally be interpreted as an instance of the so-called explanationist realism, which has been proposed as a response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism. If my arguments are sound, then one could conclude that: (1) contrary to what is commonly thought, if explanationism realism is a good response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument, it can be straightforwardly extended also to the quantum domain; (2) the primitive ontology approach is in better shape than the wave function ontology approach in resisting the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism.