This paper presents a system-level evaluation of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in two representative communication scenarios: IoT telemetry over hybrid TLS 1.3 and industrial OPC UA SecureChannel with hybrid PQC protection. In the IoT use case, an ESP32-based client communicates with a wolfSSL gateway using hybrid TLS 1.3 with combined classical and post-quantum key exchange (elliptic-curve P-521 + ML-KEM-1024), post-quantum ML-DSA-44 certificates, and AES-128-GCM for record protection; the classical baseline uses X25519 for key exchange and ECDSA P-256 for authentication. In the OPC UA use case the asyncua stack is extended with Kyber768 and Dilithium3, retaining RSA-based X. 509 certificates for compatibility. The results show that PQC overhead is concentrated mainly in the handshake phase. In TLS, connection latency increases from 2.19 s to 4.08 s (+86.4%) and handshake size from 1.6 KB to 16.84 KB (+938.9%). In OPC UA, connection latency increases from 0.072 s to 0.133 s (+84%), handshake size from 10.63 KB to 24.84 KB (+133%), and peak memory usage from 488.6 KB to 528.4 KB (+8.1%). These results show that hybrid PQC can be deployed in both constrained IoT and industrial communication systems today, with the main trade-off limited to connection establishment.
This paper presents a system-level evaluation of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in two representative communication scenarios: IoT telemetry over hybrid TLS 1.3 and industrial OPC UA SecureChannel with hybrid PQC protection. In the IoT use case, an ESP32-based client communicates with a wolfSSL gateway using hybrid TLS 1.3 with combined classical and post-quantum key exchange (elliptic-curve P-521 + ML-KEM-1024), post-quantum ML-DSA-44 certificates, and AES-128-GCM for record protection; the classical baseline uses X25519 for key exchange and ECDSA P-256 for authentication. In the OPC UA use case the asyncua stack is extended with Kyber768 and Dilithium3, retaining RSA-based X. 509 certificates for compatibility. The results show that PQC overhead is concentrated mainly in the handshake phase. In TLS, connection latency increases from 2.19 s to 4.08 s (+86.4%) and handshake size from 1.6 KB to 16.84 KB (+938.9%). In OPC UA, connection latency increases from 0.072 s to 0.133 s (+84%), handshake size from 10.63 KB to 24.84 KB (+133%), and peak memory usage from 488.6 KB to 528.4 KB (+8.1%). These results show that hybrid PQC can be deployed in both constrained IoT and industrial communication systems today, with the main trade-off limited to connection establishment.
The threat of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer contributes to an increasing interest in the field of post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Compared to existing research efforts regarding the integration of PQC into the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, industrial communication protocols have so far been neglected. Since industrial cyber-physical systems (CPS) are typically deployed for decades, protection against such long-term threats is needed. In this work, we propose two novel solutions for the integration of post-quantum (PQ) primitives (digital signatures and key establishment) into the industrial protocol Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA): a hybrid solution combining conventional cryptography with PQC and a solution solely based on PQC. Both approaches provide mutual authentication between client and server and are realized with certificates fully compliant to the X.509 standard. We implement the two solutions and measure and evaluate their performance across three different security levels. All selected algorithms (Kyber, Dilithium, and Falcon) are candidates for standardization by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We show that Falcon is a suitable option – especially – when using floating-point hardware provided by our ARM-based evaluation platform. Our proposed hybrid solution provides PQ security for early adopters but comes with additional performance and communication requirements. Our solution solely based on PQC shows superior performance across all evaluated security levels in terms of handshake duration compared to conventional OPC UA but comes at the cost of increased handshake sizes. In addition to our performance evaluation, we provide a proof of security in the symbolic model for our two PQC-based variants of OPC UA. For this proof, we use the cryptographic protocol verifier ProVerif and formally verify confidentiality and authentication properties of our quantum-resistant variants.
The transition to post-quantum cryptography is particularly challenging for resource-constrained IoT devices, where improved cryptographic resilience must be balanced against latency, energy, and reliability constraints. This paper presents an empirical evaluation of TLS 1.3 authentication overhead on ESP32 under three key-exchange modes: classical X25519, full post-quantum ML-KEM-768, and hybrid X25519+ML-KEM-768. The study contributes the first direct large-scale comparison of these regimes on Xtensa-class hardware using wolfSSL and introduces IoT-QARS, an extension of the PAREK risk model that incorporates measured deployment overhead. Across 3,000 recorded sessions, including 2,938 successful handshakes, ML-KEM-768 reduced mean handshake latency by 43% and connection energy by 34% relative to X25519, while the hybrid mode increased latency and energy by only 11% and 7%, respectively. However, full PQC exhibited a 3.8% connectionfailure rate, likely caused by larger cryptographic payloads and buffer constraints. Applied to an industrial sensor profile, IoTQARS identifies hybrid deployment as the most practical nearterm migration option and highlights TCP-buffer tuning as a prerequisite for reliable full-PQC adoption. These results provide actionable guidance for post-quantum migration in embedded and industrial IoT environments.
The integration of NIST-standardized lattice-based cryptographic algorithms (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) into TLS 1.3 enables post-quantum secure authentication for Industrial IoT (IIoT) environments. This work implements these algorithms within the X.509 certificate infrastructure and evaluates their performance on resource-constrained IIoT hardware (Raspberry Pi 4). Experimental measurements covering key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation, and signature operations were obtained using a liboqs-enabled TLS 1.3 stack. The results show that PQ TLS 1.3 achieves comparable handshake latency to conventional TLS on IIoT-class gateways, with certificate size identified as the dominant overhead. These findings confirm the practicality of post-quantum authentication in IIoT systems while acknowledging limitations related to the hardware scope and simulated networking. Future work will extend validation to field deployments and additional PQC candidates.
The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices that use the Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol poses significant security challenges in the emerging quantum computing era. Current Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementations rely on classical cryptographic algorithms vulnerable to Shor's algorithm. This paper proposes PQ-MQTT, a hybrid post-quantum secure communication protocol that integrates ML-KEM-768 with X25519 for key encapsulation and a lightweight session-key derivation mechanism optimized for resource-constrained IoT publishers. We present a formal security analysis under the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM), demonstrating resilience against store-now-decryptlater attacks. Experimental evaluation on the Raspberry Pi 4, ESP32, and Arduino Nano 33 platforms shows that PQ-MQTT achieves handshake latencies of127.3ms,412.7ms, and1,847.2ms, respectively, with 18.2 KB of additional memory overhead. A comparative analysis of pure post-quantum and classical TLS implementations shows energy reductions of23.5%−40.5%relative to pure PQC, achieved through our hybrid optimization approach, while maintaining 94.2 % throughput efficiency.
Most of todays Internet connections are protected through the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Its client-server handshake mechanism provides authentication, privacy and data integrity between communicating applications. It is also the security base for the 5G connectivity. While currently considered secure, the dawn of quantum computing represents a threat for TLS. In order to prepare for such an event, TLS must integrate quantum-secure (post-quantum) cryptography (PQC). The use of hybrid approaches, that combines PQC and traditional cryptography are recommended by security agencies. Efficient PQC integration at TLS requires the exploration of a wide set of design parameters and platforms. To this end this work presents the following contributions. First, wide evaluation of PQC-enhanced TLS hybrid protocols, using end-to-end communication latency as metric. Second, the exploration and benchmarking in constrained embedded devices. Third, a wide traffic analysis, including the impact and behavior of PQC-enhanced hybrid TLS in real practical scenarios.
Post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms are being developed to guard against quantum-computing attacks, but their behavior in constrained Internet of Things (IoT) environments remains an important topic of discussion. In this work, we study the impact of deploying PQC protocols in IoT networks using the Open Quantum Safe (liboqs) framework. In particular, key encapsulation and digital signature schemes are evaluated in terms of their computational performance, communication costs, and energy consumption. Our results indicate that although PQC operations can be completed in microseconds using general-purpose processors, substantially larger key and ciphertext sizes introduce significant communication overhead. When mapped to common IoT protocols such as Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), IEEE 802.15.4 (Zigbee), and LoRa, these larger payloads must be divided into multiple packets. In low-payload LoRa networks, for example, ML-KEM handshakes can require up to 62 packets. This level of fragmentation increases latency and energy consumption, thus potentially affecting reliability. Furthermore, when packet delivery probabilities approaching 99% are achieved, handshake success rates can drop to values approaching 50%. These results suggest that communication metrics, rather than computational performance, pose key challenges to PQC deployment in constrained IoT settings.