The integration of NIST-standardized lattice-based cryptographic algorithms (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) into TLS 1.3 enables post-quantum secure authentication for Industrial IoT (IIoT) environments. This work implements these algorithms within the X.509 certificate infrastructure and evaluates their performance on resource-constrained IIoT hardware (Raspberry Pi 4). Experimental measurements covering key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation, and signature operations were obtained using a liboqs-enabled TLS 1.3 stack. The results show that PQ TLS 1.3 achieves comparable handshake latency to conventional TLS on IIoT-class gateways, with certificate size identified as the dominant overhead. These findings confirm the practicality of post-quantum authentication in IIoT systems while acknowledging limitations related to the hardware scope and simulated networking. Future work will extend validation to field deployments and additional PQC candidates.
The integration of NIST-standardized lattice-based cryptographic algorithms (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) into TLS 1.3 enables post-quantum secure authentication for Industrial IoT (IIoT) environments. This work implements these algorithms within the X.509 certificate infrastructure and evaluates their performance on resource-constrained IIoT hardware (Raspberry Pi 4). Experimental measurements covering key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation, and signature operations were obtained using a liboqs-enabled TLS 1.3 stack. The results show that PQ TLS 1.3 achieves comparable handshake latency to conventional TLS on IIoT-class gateways, with certificate size identified as the dominant overhead. These findings confirm the practicality of post-quantum authentication in IIoT systems while acknowledging limitations related to the hardware scope and simulated networking. Future work will extend validation to field deployments and additional PQC candidates.
The imminent threat of quantum computing necessitates the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to secure critical infrastructure, particularly within mobile Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environments. This study validates the feasibility of such an integration through a detailed performance analysis of a PQC-secured communication architecture. A virtualized testbed was developed to simulate a network of Mobile Manufacturing Trucks (MMTs), acting as IIoT clients using Node-RED, transmitting real-time sensor data to a central Security Operations Center (SOC) running a Mosquitto MQTT broker. The security of the data channel is enhanced via an applicationlayer hybrid scheme that augments a standard TLS connection with the NIST-standardized ML-KEM-768 key encapsulation mechanism, orchestrated by distributed C-based cryptographic services. Performance evaluations of this end-to-end system yielded highly positive results. The mean end-to-end responsiveness was measured at 108.80 ms, successfully meeting the sub- 300 ms requirement for real-time industrial applications. Analysis of the latency distribution revealed a realistic network jitter profile, with a small number of outliers, while the majority of transmissions remained well below 150 ms. Furthermore, CPU utilization on all virtual machines remained minimal, confirming the computational efficiency of ML-KEM for resource-constrained edge devices. These findings provide strong quantitative evidence that a hybrid PQC approach is a viable and performant solution for securing mobile IIoT systems, aligning with the principles of the IEC 62443 standard. This work establishes a practical blueprint for deploying quantum-resistant protocols, with future research directed toward hardware-based validation, the integration of PQC digital signatures, and AI-driven anomaly detection.
The recent introduction of Google’s Willow quantum chip has demonstrated remarkable computational capabilities, solving problems in microseconds that would take classical computers millions of years. As quantum computers advance toward cryptographic relevance, existing encryption algorithms become vulnerable to attacks that could break them within seconds or minutes, rendering current cryptographic protections ineffective. This necessitates the establishment of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards to secure systems in the quantum era. This study evaluates the performance of NIST-standardized PQC algorithms ML-KEM (512, 768, 1024) and ML-DSA (2, 3, 5) on a Raspberry Pi 4 Model B, representing baseline IoT device capabilities. Using the Liboqs library, each algorithm was executed across 1000 iterations in a real-world wireless network environment connected to a router, accounting for practical network conditions such as packet loss, latency, and jitter to assess computational feasibility under resource-constrained conditions. Experimental results demonstrate the practical viability of PQC algorithms in IoT environments. ML-KEM-512 achieves encapsulation in 55.76 μs and decapsulation in 56.15 μs, with key generation in 123.78 μs (median), while ML-DSA-44 completes signature generation in 379.83 μs and verification in 159.38 μs. These findings confirm that both ML-KEM and ML-DSA algorithms offer efficient and rapid performance, making them suitable candidates for securing IoT devices against quantum threats.
The rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) has introduced millions of resource-constrained devices into critical infrastructures, consumer environments, and industrial systems. These devices rely on lightweight communication protocols such as MQTT to support low-power, intermittent, and bandwidth-limited operation. However, common TLS algorithms used to secure MQTT communications are vulnerable to quantum attacks made feasible by Shor's algorithm. As a result, IoT infrastructures must evaluate and adopt post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) methods capable of providing long-term resilience. This report investigates the implementation of PQC algorithms within an MQTT-based IoT networks using three Raspberry Pis. Specifically, it integrates the FALCON digital signature scheme, one of NIST's selected post-quantum signature algorithms, to maintain message authenticity and integrity across resource-constrained MQTT clients and brokers. By measuring system performance, the research characterizes the practical trade-offs of deploying lattice-based PQC on lightweight hardware.
This paper presents a system-level evaluation of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in two representative communication scenarios: IoT telemetry over hybrid TLS 1.3 and industrial OPC UA SecureChannel with hybrid PQC protection. In the IoT use case, an ESP32-based client communicates with a wolfSSL gateway using hybrid TLS 1.3 with combined classical and post-quantum key exchange (elliptic-curve P-521 + ML-KEM-1024), post-quantum ML-DSA-44 certificates, and AES-128-GCM for record protection; the classical baseline uses X25519 for key exchange and ECDSA P-256 for authentication. In the OPC UA use case the asyncua stack is extended with Kyber768 and Dilithium3, retaining RSA-based X. 509 certificates for compatibility. The results show that PQC overhead is concentrated mainly in the handshake phase. In TLS, connection latency increases from 2.19 s to 4.08 s (+86.4%) and handshake size from 1.6 KB to 16.84 KB (+938.9%). In OPC UA, connection latency increases from 0.072 s to 0.133 s (+84%), handshake size from 10.63 KB to 24.84 KB (+133%), and peak memory usage from 488.6 KB to 528.4 KB (+8.1%). These results show that hybrid PQC can be deployed in both constrained IoT and industrial communication systems today, with the main trade-off limited to connection establishment.
The transition to post-quantum cryptography is particularly challenging for resource-constrained IoT devices, where improved cryptographic resilience must be balanced against latency, energy, and reliability constraints. This paper presents an empirical evaluation of TLS 1.3 authentication overhead on ESP32 under three key-exchange modes: classical X25519, full post-quantum ML-KEM-768, and hybrid X25519+ML-KEM-768. The study contributes the first direct large-scale comparison of these regimes on Xtensa-class hardware using wolfSSL and introduces IoT-QARS, an extension of the PAREK risk model that incorporates measured deployment overhead. Across 3,000 recorded sessions, including 2,938 successful handshakes, ML-KEM-768 reduced mean handshake latency by 43% and connection energy by 34% relative to X25519, while the hybrid mode increased latency and energy by only 11% and 7%, respectively. However, full PQC exhibited a 3.8% connectionfailure rate, likely caused by larger cryptographic payloads and buffer constraints. Applied to an industrial sensor profile, IoTQARS identifies hybrid deployment as the most practical nearterm migration option and highlights TCP-buffer tuning as a prerequisite for reliable full-PQC adoption. These results provide actionable guidance for post-quantum migration in embedded and industrial IoT environments.
The threat of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer contributes to an increasing interest in the field of post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Compared to existing research efforts regarding the integration of PQC into the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, industrial communication protocols have so far been neglected. Since industrial cyber-physical systems (CPS) are typically deployed for decades, protection against such long-term threats is needed. In this work, we propose two novel solutions for the integration of post-quantum (PQ) primitives (digital signatures and key establishment) into the industrial protocol Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA): a hybrid solution combining conventional cryptography with PQC and a solution solely based on PQC. Both approaches provide mutual authentication between client and server and are realized with certificates fully compliant to the X.509 standard. We implement the two solutions and measure and evaluate their performance across three different security levels. All selected algorithms (Kyber, Dilithium, and Falcon) are candidates for standardization by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We show that Falcon is a suitable option – especially – when using floating-point hardware provided by our ARM-based evaluation platform. Our proposed hybrid solution provides PQ security for early adopters but comes with additional performance and communication requirements. Our solution solely based on PQC shows superior performance across all evaluated security levels in terms of handshake duration compared to conventional OPC UA but comes at the cost of increased handshake sizes. In addition to our performance evaluation, we provide a proof of security in the symbolic model for our two PQC-based variants of OPC UA. For this proof, we use the cryptographic protocol verifier ProVerif and formally verify confidentiality and authentication properties of our quantum-resistant variants.