A Theoretical Framework for an Earth-to-Moon Quantum Uplink Architecture (revised)A link-budget framework for a direct decoy-state BB84 uplink at 1550 nm from Hanle, Ladakh, to a 0.5 m lunar receiver, with adaptive optics, a core–halo beam model and log-normal fading. At night the link gives about 90 bit/s of secure key (80–101 bit/s over the lunar distance range), averaging about 1.3 Mbit per day.This revision corrects the point-ahead angle, models the Earth-shine background seen by the lunar receiver (daytime operation is ruled out), adds finite-key effects, and removes overstated security claims. Includes the verification script.
A Theoretical Framework for an Earth-to-Moon Quantum Uplink Architecture (revised)A link-budget framework for a direct decoy-state BB84 uplink at 1550 nm from Hanle, Ladakh, to a 0.5 m lunar receiver, with adaptive optics, a core–halo beam model and log-normal fading. At night the link gives about 90 bit/s of secure key (80–101 bit/s over the lunar distance range), averaging about 1.3 Mbit per day.This revision corrects the point-ahead angle, models the Earth-shine background seen by the lunar receiver (daytime operation is ruled out), adds finite-key effects, and removes overstated security claims. Includes the verification script.
A Mathematical Framework for a Lunar-to-Mars Quantum Key Distribution Architecture (revised)A link-budget framework for a direct, single-hop entanglement-based (BBM92) QKD link at 1550 nm from a lunar terminal to a Martian receiver, using 10 m apertures on a 30–40 year technology horizon. The link gives about 6 bit/s of secure key at the mean distance and about 115 bit/s near opposition. Key generation stops when the Martian dust optical depth exceeds about 2.8, and the link is unavailable for roughly two to three months around each solar conjunction.This revision derives the QBER from a single noise model, models dust by optical depth, adds the solar-conjunction outage, and corrects the relativistic clock drift to include solar gravity (433 µs/day). Includes the verification script.
Satellite-based free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a practical framework for achieving secure global communication beyond the limitations of optical fibers. In this work, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and secure key rate of four representative protocols-BB84, B92, BBM92, and E91 are investigated over low earth orbit (LEO) links in both uplink and downlink configurations. The optical link is modeled using a Gaussian beam formalism, incorporating the effects of diffraction, pointing errors, atmospheric turbulence, and background noise contributions. The protocols are examined under day and night-time operating conditions, and their dependence on the zenith angle is analyzed. The findings show that downlink links generally exhibit lower QBER and higher secure key rates than uplinks, and among prepare-and-measure schemes, BB84 consistently outperforms B92, while in entanglement-based approaches, BBM92 achieves higher key rates than E91.
Received optical power determines photon arrival flux, but photon arrival flux does not certify a quantum key. This paper gives a deployment-independent interface from a classical free-space optical (FSO) link budget to phase-randomized weak coherent pulse BB84, decoy-state estimation, and composable finite-key postprocessing. The channel interface separates geometric collection, atmospheric extinction, residual pointing, and detector efficiency, and states when common geometric and pointing expressions are approximations. The finite-key output follows the decoy-state analysis of Lim et al., with key- and test-basis counts estimated separately and an infinite-decoy asymptotic reference. The numerical study covers a five-level attenuation sweep, basis- and vacuum-probability sensitivities, a conditional Chernoff comparison, and integer-count Monte Carlo. For 3.33×108 emitted pulses, the Hoeffding-based predicted one-kilobit-per-second distance limits are 2.727, 1.883, 1.472, 1.236, and 0.962 km from very clear to dense-fog parameterizations. These are conditional performance predictions, not experimental security certificates. Satellite, drone, high-altitude-platform, terrestrial, and train links enter through the same interface but require their own propagation, acquisition, and device inputs. The framework integrates established security tools into an engineering procedure without claiming a new security proof or a universal range.
Quantum key distribution is sold on security, never on energy. This paper prices a stated decoy-state BB84 link end to end: the secret-key rate is computed from the standard asymptotic decoy-state yield model (Lo, Ma and Chen 2005; Ma et al. 2005) at a 1 GHz clock, mean photon number 0.5, 0.2 dB/km fibre loss, and published detector classes, and divided into the stated total wall-plug power including detector cooling and classical post-processing. With InGaAs avalanche photodiodes (190 W total) the link delivers 7.68 Mbit/s at zero distance at 2.48e-05 J per secret bit and 57.37 kbit/s at 100 km at 3.31e-03 J per bit, with no key beyond about 134 km. With superconducting nanowire detectors (1690 W total, including a 1500 W closed-cycle cryocooler) it delivers 44.72 Mbit/s at zero distance at 3.78e-05 J per bit, 431.62 kbit/s at 100 km at 3.92e-03 J per bit, and 41.32 kbit/s at 150 km at 4.09e-02 J per bit, with no key beyond about 222 km. Energy per bit rises by a factor of 133.8 (avalanche) and 103.6 (nanowire) between 0 km and 100 km. A stated classical X25519 handshake costs 1.00e-03 J, or 3.91e-06 J per key bit, so the quantum link is 848 times (avalanche) and 1002 times (nanowire) as expensive per key bit at 100 km. Information-theoretic key security costs microjoules per bit at short range and millijoules per bit at 100 km, rising exponentially thereafter. Model calculations are labelled SIMULATED, NOT MEASURED. The deposit includes the paper PDF and text, the computation script (compute.py) that produces every number in the paper, and its outputs (results.json, results.txt).
In this paper, we present a novel analysis of the feasibility of quantum key distribution between a LEO satellite and a ground station. First of all, we study signal propagation through a turbulent atmosphere for uplinks and downlinks, discussing the contribution of beam spreading and beam wandering. Then we introduce a model for the background noise of the channel during night-time and day-time, calculating the signal-to-noise ratio for different configurations. We also discuss the expected error-rate due to imperfect polarization compensation in the channel. Finally, we calculate the expected key generation rate of a secure key for different configurations (uplink, downlink) and for different protocols (BB84 with and without decoy states, entanglement-based Ekert91 protocol).
Establishing information-theoretically secure communication between arbitrary locations on Earth is a central goal of quantum networking, for which space-based distribution of quantum entanglement is a leading approach. Modelling and analysis of the performance of satellite entanglement pair distribution is therefore important for the architecture and design of future constellations and space systems. However, entanglement-based quantum key distribution in the absence of quantum repeaters, is especially prone to finite-key effects due to low coincident count rates compared to trusted-node single-path links. Quantifying these effects under realistic orbital conditions is therefore essential for the design of practical satellite quantum communication systems. Here, we develop a high-fidelity model of pair distribution from a low-Earth-orbit satellite that captures orbital dynamics, elevation-dependent loss, background noise, and extraneous detector effects. Integrating this with a finite-key security framework for the BBM92 protocol, we optimise the secret key length across different overpass geometries, orbital altitudes, and optical ground station (OGS) separations. We show that secure key generation remains feasible in early clear daytime conditions using baseline parameters representative of current technologies, while showing that modest system improvements could further extend daytime operation. Finally, we evaluate the annual secret key performance for representative intercity-scale OGS pairings. Our results provide quantitative performance bounds and practical design guidelines for near-term entanglement-based satellite QKD, enabling informed trade-offs between satellite payload complexity, ground infrastructure, and achievable secure key throughput.