arXiv:2609.30874
From Received Power to Certified Secret Keys: A General Method for Bridging Classical FSO Link Budgets and Decoy-State QKD
Hasan Abbas Al-Mohammed
Abstract
Received optical power determines photon arrival flux, but photon arrival flux does not certify a quantum key. This paper gives a deployment-independent interface from a classical free-space optical (FSO) link budget to phase-randomized weak coherent pulse BB84, decoy-state estimation, and composable finite-key postprocessing. The channel interface separates geometric collection, atmospheric extinction, residual pointing, and detector efficiency, and states when common geometric and pointing expressions are approximations. The finite-key output follows the decoy-state analysis of Lim et al., with key- and test-basis counts estimated separately and an infinite-decoy asymptotic reference. The numerical study covers a five-level attenuation sweep, basis- and vacuum-probability sensitivities, a conditional Chernoff comparison, and integer-count Monte Carlo. For $3.33 \times 10^8$ emitted pulses, the Hoeffding-based predicted one-kilobit-per-second distance limits are 2.727, 1.883, 1.472, 1.236, and 0.962 km from very clear to dense-fog parameterizations. These are conditional performance predictions, not experimental security certificates. Satellite, drone, high-altitude-platform, terrestrial, and train links enter through the same interface but require their own propagation, acquisition, and device inputs. The framework integrates established security tools into an engineering procedure without claiming a new security proof or a universal range.
AI Summary
The paper addresses how a classical free-space optical (FSO) link budget can supply channel parameters for decoy-state BB84 without identifying received photon flux with secret-key rate. It combines geometric collection, atmospheric extinction, residual pointing and detector efficiency with phase-randomized weak coherent pulses, basis-specific decoy estimation and the established composable finite-key analysis of Lim et al. It distinguishes approximate collection and pointing formulas from Gaussian aperture integrals; no new security proof is claimed. Numerical predictions use $3.33\times10^8$ pulses over 33.3 s at 10 MHz, signal/decoy intensities $0.5/0.1$, and security parameters $\varepsilon_{\rm sec}=10^{-10}$ and $\varepsilon_{\rm cor}=10^{-15}$. For extinction coefficients $0.2,2,4,6,10$ dB/km, expected-count Hoeffding calculations give 1-kbit/s distance limits of $2.727,1.883,1.472,1.236,0.962$ km. At 3.7 km under the lowest attenuation, the infinite-decoy asymptotic reference is 1629 bit/s, while the finite block yields 5574 bits. Probability sweeps find the greatest threshold distance at $p_X=0.60$ on the tested grid. A conditional Chernoff comparison extends the lowest-attenuation limit to 3.500 km; Poisson-count simulations characterize variability. These are conditional performance predictions, not experimental security certificates. Certification requires observed counts, actual disclosure, authenticated communication and validated devices. The static channel omits deployment-specific fading, acquisition, backgrounds and device effects. Chernoff comparisons assume independent Bernoulli trials, and the asymptotic reference assumes infinite decoys rather than the simulated two-decoy implementation. Other geometries require substituted propagation and tracking inputs; other QKD protocols require different security analyses.
Central claim may not hold: Equation (s1) subtracts the vacuum-count lower bound from Eq. (s0) where a vacuum-count upper bound is required, potentially overestimating the guaranteed single-photon population and invalidating the stated justification for the finite-key lengths and distance limits.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.