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The Price of a Secret Bit: Energy per Delivered Key Bit in Quantum Key Distribution

William Alexander Aldred

Published Nov 10, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum key distribution is sold on security, never on energy. This paper prices a stated decoy-state BB84 link end to end: the secret-key rate is computed from the standard asymptotic decoy-state yield model (Lo, Ma and Chen 2005; Ma et al. 2005) at a 1 GHz clock, mean photon number 0.5, 0.2 dB/km fibre loss, and published detector classes, and divided into the stated total wall-plug power including detector cooling and classical post-processing. With InGaAs avalanche photodiodes (190 W total) the link delivers 7.68 Mbit/s at zero distance at 2.48e-05 J per secret bit and 57.37 kbit/s at 100 km at 3.31e-03 J per bit, with no key beyond about 134 km. With superconducting nanowire detectors (1690 W total, including a 1500 W closed-cycle cryocooler) it delivers 44.72 Mbit/s at zero distance at 3.78e-05 J per bit, 431.62 kbit/s at 100 km at 3.92e-03 J per bit, and 41.32 kbit/s at 150 km at 4.09e-02 J per bit, with no key beyond about 222 km. Energy per bit rises by a factor of 133.8 (avalanche) and 103.6 (nanowire) between 0 km and 100 km. A stated classical X25519 handshake costs 1.00e-03 J, or 3.91e-06 J per key bit, so the quantum link is 848 times (avalanche) and 1002 times (nanowire) as expensive per key bit at 100 km. Information-theoretic key security costs microjoules per bit at short range and millijoules per bit at 100 km, rising exponentially thereafter. Model calculations are labelled SIMULATED, NOT MEASURED. The deposit includes the paper PDF and text, the computation script (compute.py) that produces every number in the paper, and its outputs (results.json, results.txt).

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.24111643

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Quantum key distribution is sold on security, never on energy. This paper prices a stated decoy-state BB84 link end to end: the secret-key rate is computed from the standard asymptotic decoy-state yield model (Lo, Ma and Chen 2005; Ma et al. 2005) at a 1 GHz clock, mean photon number 0.5, 0.2 dB/km fibre loss, and published detector classes, and divided into the stated total wall-plug power including detector cooling and classical post-processing. With InGaAs avalanche photodiodes (190 W total) the link delivers 7.68 Mbit/s at zero distance at 2.48e-05 J per secret bit and 57.37 kbit/s at 100 km at 3.31e-03 J per bit, with no key beyond about 134 km. With superconducting nanowire detectors (1690 W total, including a 1500 W closed-cycle cryocooler) it delivers 44.72 Mbit/s at zero distance at 3.78e-05 J per bit, 431.62 kbit/s at 100 km at 3.92e-03 J per bit, and 41.32 kbit/s at 150 km at 4.09e-02 J per bit, with no key beyond about 222 km. Energy per bit rises by a factor of 133.8 (avalanche) and 103.6 (nanowire) between 0 km and 100 km. A stated classical X25519 handshake costs 1.00e-03 J, or 3.91e-06 J per key bit, so the quantum link is 848 times (avalanche) and 1002 times (nanowire) as expensive per key bit at 100 km. Information-theoretic key security costs microjoules per bit at short range and millijoules per bit at 100 km, rising exponentially thereafter. Model calculations are labelled SIMULATED, NOT MEASURED. The deposit includes the paper PDF and text, the computation script (compute.py) that produces every number in the paper, and its outputs (results.json, results.txt).
Quantum key distribution turns the disturbance of quantum states into an alarm: any eavesdropping on the quantum channel raises the error rate, and the secret key rate falls as errors rise. This paper designs a decoy-state BB84 terminal for a 20 km fibre link and computes the value of stabilising the encoding interferometer against a torsion phase reference. Stabilisation that reduces the quantum bit error rate from 3.0 percent to 1.5 percent raises the asymptotic secret key rate by a factor of 1.27, to 47046 kbit per second at a 1 GHz clock. The calculation uses the standard decoy-state rate formula with the stated channel and detector parameters. The terminal is a design study; no key has been generated.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides physical-layer security based on quantum state disturbance rather than computational complexity. However, operational viability depends heavily on physical channel parameters, optical loss, finite-key statistical bounds, and network key-sharing constraints. This paper presents a multi-metric, quantitative evaluation of a three-intensity decoy-state BB84 QKD link and its application within a time-shared star network. Using a Monte Carlo sampling framework (n=60 replications per configuration), we evaluate link distance (0–200 km), attenuation (0.18-0.30 dB/km), detector efficiency (10-40%), dark count probability (10-8-10-5 per gate), eavesdropping intensity (0-50%), privacy-amplification block size (106-109 pulses), and simultaneous user pair load (1-20 pairs). Under baseline settings (0.20 dB/km, 25% detector efficiency, 500 MHz pulse rate, signal intensity μ=0.50, 1.5% misalignment, block size N=5×107), the secure key rate (SKR) drops from 12.83 Mbit/s at 0 km to 295.63 kbit/s at 80 km, reaching non-positive values at 200 km due to finite statistical penalties. Intercept-resend attacks degrade secrecy, suppressing output to zero at ∼20% interception intensity (QBER=6.51%). In the shared network, a target demand of 20 kbit/s per user pair experiences depletion when active pairs exceed 12, despite a positive aggregate link generation rate. The findings demonstrate that QKD viability requires joint evaluation of SKR, QBER, finite-key confidence, latency, and multi-user key supply dynamics.
This report reviews two quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols: the BB84 protocol and the measurement device independent (MDI) QKD protocol. The goal of this report is to recreate the security proof of the BB84 protocol, to generate the secret key rate for a practical application of the BB84 protocol, both with and without decoy states, and to review the MDI-QKD protocol and look at the advantages it has for practical QKD. The proof security of the BB84 protocol is done by designing an equivalent theoretical protocol and proving its security by bounding the information of the eavesdropper to an exponentially small number. The best distance over which secret key rate can be generated with the practical model of the BB84 protocol that is presented in this report, is 165 km. This is achieved by employing decoy states and is more than three times as far as the model can achieve without decoy states, which gave a distance of 52 km at best. The zero distance key rate of the model with decoy states is R = 1.21 · 10-2 bits per pulse (bpp), at best. This is an order of magnitude larger than R =1.02 · 10-3 bpp, which is what the model without decoy states could produce. The decoy state method is therefore an improvement for practical QKD. By reviewing the MDI-QKD protocol it can be concluded that because it eliminates the measurement device side channels, it is very useful for practical QKD, since it makes security analysis simpler and more precise. It also necessarily employs decoy states, which improves the secret key rate. MDI-QKD therefore is a promising protocol to use for future quantum communications.
In a commercial entanglement-distribution system over telecom fibre, the single-photon detectors are the largest part of the hardware cost. In entanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD), both photons of each pair must be detected. With two telecom photons, each arm needs either an InGaAs single-photon avalanche diode (SPAD) of low efficiency or a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) with its own cryostat. We study a highly nondegenerate photon-pair source that needs a telecom detector on one arm only. Two periodically poled KTiOPO4_44​ (ppKTP) crystals pumped at 405~nm emit pairs at 548 and 1550~nm. A Si-SPAD with 82\% efficiency detects the 548~nm photon at the source node, and only the 1550~nm photon travels through fibre. A first, unoptimised module in a polarisation-correlated configuration generates about 1.5×1061.5\times10^61.5×106 pairs/s per mW of pump power. It collects 13\% of the pairs on the 548~nm arm and 23\% on the 1550~nm arm. In an asymptotic BBM92 model, we compare its links with generic 2×15502\times15502×1550~nm links that use a bright published source at the same pump power. At 50~km, our link with one SNSPD costs about 25\% more per secret bit than the generic link with one SNSPD. With optimistic target values of 52\% collection and twice the brightness, it costs about 40\% as much as the generic link with two SNSPDs. Our link without a cryostat then costs about 70\% less than the generic link with one SNSPD. If every link runs at its own best pump power, the two-SNSPD link is again the cheapest. The source can also serve clock synchronisation and detector calibration, which need only time-correlated pairs. All key rates assume the entangled configuration of the source, which is under development.
We report the first gigahertz clocked decoy-protocol quantum key distribution (QKD). Record key rates have been achieved thanks to the use of self-differencing InGaAs avalanche photodiodes designed specifically for high speed single photon detection. The system is characterized with a secure key rate of 1.02 Mbit/s for a fiber distance of 20 km and 10.1 kbit/s for 100 km. As the present advance relies upon compact non-cryogenic detectors, it opens the door towards practical and low cost QKD systems to secure broadband communication in future.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has the potential for widespread real-world applications. To date no secure long-distance experiment has demonstrated the truly practical operation needed to move QKD from the laboratory to the real world due largely to limitations in synchronization and poor detector performance. Here we report results obtained using a fully automated, robust QKD system based on the Bennett Brassard 1984 protocol (BB84) with low-noise superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) and decoy levels. Secret key is produced with unconditional security over a record 144.3 km of optical fibre, an increase of more than a factor of five compared to the previous record for unconditionally secure key generation in a practical QKD system.