Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

ICTACT Journal on Communication Technology

POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR SECURE 5G AND IOT: LATTICE-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEMES

M Poomani, Bikash Chandra Saha

Published Sep 1, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The impending advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers threatens classical public-key primitives that underpin 5G and IoT security, including key exchange, authentication, and device onboarding. Ultra-dense networks, constrained endpoints, and long device lifetimes heighten exposure to “harvest-now, decrypt-later” risks. Mobile operators and IoT platform providers need migration ready cryptography that fits radio-access latency budgets, scales to billions of low-power nodes, and integrates cleanly with 3GPP and IETF protocols without degrading quality of service. Many post quantum options impose prohibitive bandwidth and compute costs or lack deployment guidance tuned to network slices and massive machine-type communications. We propose a lattice-based encryption and key-encapsulation framework grounded in Module-LWE/LWR assumptions. The design pairs an IND-CCA-secure KEM for control plane bootstrapping with lightweight AEAD for user-plane data, delivered through a hybrid handshake combining classical ECDH with a post-quantum KEM to ensure continuity during transition. Parameter tiers align with eMBB, URLLC, and mMTC device classes. Implementation emphasizes constant-time polynomial arithmetic, NTT-accelerated convolution, centered-binomial noise sampling, public-key compression, and stateless hash-based signatures for attestation. A gNB-assisted enrollment workflow and session-key rotation via 5G NAS/RRC are specified. Analytical modeling and prototype measurements indicate sub-millisecond encapsulation on ARM Cortex-M33 microcontrollers and ~1.5 ms on RAN baseband paths, while handshake message growth remains within existing NAS and RRC budgets. In ns-3 simulations of dense mMTC topologies, the hybrid handshake achieves >99.99% success under 1% packet loss, and energy profiling shows <5% battery impact for weekly rekeying. Security analysis demonstrates resistance to known lattice attacks at NIST Levels 3–5, forward secrecy via ephemeral KEMs, downgrade resistance through authenticated algorithm negotiation, and post compromise security with frequent rekeying.

DOI
10.21917/ijct.2025.0537

Related papers

A Hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptographic Framework for Secure 5G/6G and Massive IoT Networks

Mohammed Amin Almaiah, Ansam Khraisat, Udit Mamodiya

The imminent maturity of large-scale quantum computing threatens the confidentiality and authenticity guarantees of the public-key primitives-RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography that currently secure next-generation communication networks, including 5G/6G core and radio-access segments, software-defined edge infrastructures, and massive Internet-of-Things (IoT) deployments. “Harvest-now, decrypt-later” adversaries put long-lived network traffic at risk much before cryptographically relevant quantum machines come into existence. This paper presents QR-SecNet, a Quantum-Resistant Security Framework that combines a lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism (ML-KEM), a stateless hash-based signature scheme (SLH-DSA) and a classical elliptic-curve exchange within a single hybrid handshake so that the security of a session depends on the hardness of at least one of two mathematically unrelated problems. The framework also includes a crypto-agility controller, which is able to negotiate cipher suites based on device capabilities and network conditions, mitigates downgrade attacks, and supports incremental migration, maintaining interoperability with legacy endpoints. QR-SecNet was evaluated on an emulated 5G/6G network testbed against five representative baselines-RSA-3072, ECDHE-P256, a standalone ML-KEM exchange, a standalone ML-DSA signature scheme, and Classic McEliece using latency, throughput, computational cost, and estimated post-quantum security margin as metrics. Results show that QR-SecNet completes a hybrid handshake in 11.8 ms on average, sustains a throughput of 1,740 connections per second, and preserves at least 128 bits of classical and 192 bits of post-quantum security margin, outperforming standalone post-quantum baselines in latency by 17-46% while remaining within 2.1 ms of the fastest single-primitive scheme.

Journal of Information and Cybersecurity•Sep 18, 2026•1 citation

Lightweight Post-Quantum Cryptography for Resource-Constrained Edge Devices

Thakur Sai Kumari, Ramya Perumal, K. Rajkumar +3 more

Quantum computing is also posing a serious challenge to the classical cryptographic algorithms like RSA and ECC as they have vulnerability to quantum algorithms such as Shor and Grover. This is a serious problem to Internet of Things (IoT) and edge computing systems, where billions of devices work with strict resource constraints in processing power, memory and energy. To resolve this, we are introducing a minimal postquantum cryptography model to be used in edge platforms with constraints on their resources. This framework combines fierce encapsulation of key (Kyber512) on a lattice with traditional ECDH in a hybrid system of key establishment, along with the Ascon AEAD encryption algorithm to provide effective data hiding and integrity provision. Furthermore, rekeying and forward secrecy on a lightweight basis is possible to reconfigure a layer with negligible overhead on a secure transmission with forward secrecy. The experimental data with ARM Cortex-M and RISC-V architectures and 128-bit post-quantum security has shown that the proposed system can reduce the latency by up to 30 percent and the energy usage by up to 35 percent and considerably better throughput than PQC-only implementations. These findings validate the fact that hybrid PQC solutions have the potential to provide high-resistance quantum with minimal overhead and thus are best suited to IoT and edge applications. The paper offers a viable and extensible security design in conformance with the NIST PQC and IETF migration policies, which can support secure communication in the post-quantum era.

IEEE International Conference on ICT in Business Industry & Government (ICTBIG)•Dec 12, 2025•0 citations

HYBRID POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHIC FRAMEWORK FOR SECURE AND SCALABLE NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS

The accelerating maturation of quantum computing technology-exemplified by IBM's Eagle, Osprey, and Condor processors surpassing 1,000+ physical qubits-represents a strategic and existential threat to the public-key cryptographic foundations of modern digital infrastructure.The mathematical intractability assumptions underlying RSA (integer factorization), Diffie-Hellman (discrete logarithm), and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem) are rendered computationally negligible by Shor's polynomial-time quantum algorithm.Simultaneously, Grover's unstructured quantum search algorithm halves the effective security of all symmetric encryption schemes, requiring doubling of key lengths.The consequent "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) attack paradigm-wherein encrypted communications are archived today for future quantum decryption-transforms post-quantum cryptographic migration from a future concern into an immediate operational imperative for all communications with confidentiality lifetimes exceeding five years.This paper presents a comprehensive Hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptographic (HPQC) framework that systematically integrates NIST-finalized post-quantum algorithms-CRYSTALS-Kyber (FIPS 203) for Key Encapsulation Mechanisms, CRYSTALS-Dilithium (FIPS 204) and SPHINCS+ (FIPS 205) for digital signatureswith classical cryptographic primitives (ECDH P-256/X25519, ECDSA, AES-256-GCM) in a layered, crypto-agile, formally proven, and operationally deployable security architecture.Twenty mathematical formulae are derived and presented, covering Shor/Grover complexity bounds, Module-LWE and Module-SIS hardness parameters, hybrid HKDF-SHA-512 key derivation, IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA security reductions, forward secrecy entropy bounds, and crypto-agility rotation period calculations.Formal Theorems 1 and 2 establish the security of the hybrid KEM and hybrid signature constructions respectively.Simulated performance benchmarks across three hardware tiers (Intel Xeon server, ARM Cortex-A72 edge gateway, ARM Cortex-M4 IoT device) demonstrate 23-31% TLS 1.3 handshake latency overhead over classical baselines with full quantum resistance.Seven comparative tables and five architectural figures support the engineering-ready deployment guidance provided across 5G/6G, massive IoT, SDN, and cloud-native environments.A four-phase crypto-agile migration roadmap aligned with NIST FIPS 203/204/205, NIST SP 800-208, NSA CNSA 2.0, BSI TR-02102, and ENISA PQC guidance is presented for enterprise network operators and security architects.

International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering Technology and Science•Jun 20, 2026•0 citations

A Post-Quantum Cryptographic Framework for High-Level Security Protocols in 6G

Pasindu Udugahapattuwa, Chamitha de Alwis, Engin Zeydan +2 more

Sixth Generation (6 G) networks will support critical, latency-sensitive, and large-scale services, making them attractive targets for quantum-capable adversaries. To address this, the paper proposes a conceptual Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) framework for high-level security protocols in 6G, including Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3, Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2), Secure Shell (SSH), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using security-by-design principles, hybrid classical-post-quantum migration, and optimization for resourceconstrained and heterogeneous environments. The framework defines key metrics such as handshake latency, computational and memory overhead, energy consumption, interoperability, and resistance to quantum and classical attacks, and analyzes risks introduced by hybrid protocol complexity, side channels, and implementation flaws. The framework is illustrated via a reference hybrid TLS 1.3 design using National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)-standardized Module-LatticeBased Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) and Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) and an evaluation methodology based on Open Secure Sockets Layer (OpenSSL)/liboqs, outlining how future prototypes can measure latency, bandwidth, and computational overhead under UltraReliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC) and Massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC) constraints. By combining requirements analysis, design patterns, and evaluation methodology, this work supports quantum-safe 6 G infrastructure with scalable, reliable, and long-term secure deployment, providing a blueprint for future empirical validation rather than reporting completed measurements.

Joint European Conference on Networks and Communications & 6G Summit (EuCNC/6G Summit)•Jun 1, 2026•3 citations

Securing East-West Traffic in 5G Core with Hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptography over TLS 1.3

Gunasekaran Raja, Pooja Vetriselvan, Suganthi Mani +3 more

The fifth-generation (5G) core network adopts a Service-Based Architecture (SBA), in which Network Functions (NFs) communicate over Service-Based Interfaces (SBIs) using HTTP/2 secured with TLS 1.3. Current deployments rely on classical cryptography, which is vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly under the Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) threat model. To address this, we propose Quantum-Safe Service-Based Architecture (Q-SBA), a hybrid post-quantum TLS framework that secures SBI communication by integrating Module Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM-768) and Module Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA-65) with classical primitives within a TLS 1.3 handshake with mutual authentication. The framework is implemented on a containerized OpenAirInterface (OAI) 5G core and evaluated across N11, N12, N8, and N10 interfaces. Results show that hybrid PQC introduces a controlled performance trade-off: handshake latency reaches 14–15 ms (≈2× classical TLS), while throughput sustains 273–289 connections per second, both within 5G control-plane requirements. Packet-level analysis confirms successful negotiation of hybrid cryptographic groups across all interfaces, demonstrating that quantum-resilient security can be integrated into 5G core networks without affecting protocol correctness or interoperability.

International Conference on Advanced Network Technologies and Applications (APAN)•Aug 1, 2026•0 citations

PostCrypt: Energy-Efficient Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Framework for Secure 5G/6G Network Slicing

R. Swaminathan, R Saravanakumar

Securing network slices in beyond-5G environments remains an open challenge when quantum-capable adversaries enter the threat model. Classical key agreement protocols were not originally designed to be resistant to algebraic attacks by large-scale quantum processors. In principle, it seems like a simple idea to replace these with lattice-based or hash-based ones. In reality, each extra key exchange byte increases round-trip time, uses battery resources, and consumes baseband processing cycles. This trade-off is even more difficult to make when using slice-specific quality-of-service contracts. The extra cryptographic load is absorbed differently in a delay-tolerant massive machine-type communication slice than in a safety-critical vehicle-to-everything channel with single-digit millisecond bounds. A coordinated cipher suite is provided by PostCrypt to solve this gap. Kyber-768 is responsible for session key negotiation, SPHINCS+ for stateless signature verification and Advanced Encryption Standard-256-Galois/Counter Mode for the data plane. The evaluation uses the OAI-6G Testbed Logs dataset with real gNB and user equipment traces across four network slices. Experimental results show that PostCrypt achieves the best performance with 3.5 ms latency in ultra-reliable low-latency communication, $-0.7 \%$ throughput loss in vehicle-to-everything, $3.9 \%$ central processing unit overhead, and 15.6 mJ energy use. These results show that PostCrypt gives quantum-safe protection with lower operational cost for future fifth-generation and sixth-generation networks.

International Conference on Computing, Communication, Security and Intelligent Systems (IC3SIS)•May 1, 2026•0 citations
The impending advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers threatens classical public-key primitives that underpin 5G and IoT security, including key exchange, authentication, and device onboarding. Ultra-dense networks, constrained endpoints, and long device lifetimes heighten exposure to “harvest-now, decrypt-later” risks. Mobile operators and IoT platform providers need migration ready cryptography that fits radio-access latency budgets, scales to billions of low-power nodes, and integrates cleanly with 3GPP and IETF protocols without degrading quality of service. Many post quantum options impose prohibitive bandwidth and compute costs or lack deployment guidance tuned to network slices and massive machine-type communications. We propose a lattice-based encryption and key-encapsulation framework grounded in Module-LWE/LWR assumptions. The design pairs an IND-CCA-secure KEM for control plane bootstrapping with lightweight AEAD for user-plane data, delivered through a hybrid handshake combining classical ECDH with a post-quantum KEM to ensure continuity during transition. Parameter tiers align with eMBB, URLLC, and mMTC device classes. Implementation emphasizes constant-time polynomial arithmetic, NTT-accelerated convolution, centered-binomial noise sampling, public-key compression, and stateless hash-based signatures for attestation. A gNB-assisted enrollment workflow and session-key rotation via 5G NAS/RRC are specified. Analytical modeling and prototype measurements indicate sub-millisecond encapsulation on ARM Cortex-M33 microcontrollers and ~1.5 ms on RAN baseband paths, while handshake message growth remains within existing NAS and RRC budgets. In ns-3 simulations of dense mMTC topologies, the hybrid handshake achieves >99.99% success under 1% packet loss, and energy profiling shows <5% battery impact for weekly rekeying. Security analysis demonstrates resistance to known lattice attacks at NIST Levels 3–5, forward secrecy via ephemeral KEMs, downgrade resistance through authenticated algorithm negotiation, and post compromise security with frequent rekeying.
The imminent maturity of large-scale quantum computing threatens the confidentiality and authenticity guarantees of the public-key primitives-RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography that currently secure next-generation communication networks, including 5G/6G core and radio-access segments, software-defined edge infrastructures, and massive Internet-of-Things (IoT) deployments. “Harvest-now, decrypt-later” adversaries put long-lived network traffic at risk much before cryptographically relevant quantum machines come into existence. This paper presents QR-SecNet, a Quantum-Resistant Security Framework that combines a lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism (ML-KEM), a stateless hash-based signature scheme (SLH-DSA) and a classical elliptic-curve exchange within a single hybrid handshake so that the security of a session depends on the hardness of at least one of two mathematically unrelated problems. The framework also includes a crypto-agility controller, which is able to negotiate cipher suites based on device capabilities and network conditions, mitigates downgrade attacks, and supports incremental migration, maintaining interoperability with legacy endpoints. QR-SecNet was evaluated on an emulated 5G/6G network testbed against five representative baselines-RSA-3072, ECDHE-P256, a standalone ML-KEM exchange, a standalone ML-DSA signature scheme, and Classic McEliece using latency, throughput, computational cost, and estimated post-quantum security margin as metrics. Results show that QR-SecNet completes a hybrid handshake in 11.8 ms on average, sustains a throughput of 1,740 connections per second, and preserves at least 128 bits of classical and 192 bits of post-quantum security margin, outperforming standalone post-quantum baselines in latency by 17-46% while remaining within 2.1 ms of the fastest single-primitive scheme.
Quantum computing is also posing a serious challenge to the classical cryptographic algorithms like RSA and ECC as they have vulnerability to quantum algorithms such as Shor and Grover. This is a serious problem to Internet of Things (IoT) and edge computing systems, where billions of devices work with strict resource constraints in processing power, memory and energy. To resolve this, we are introducing a minimal postquantum cryptography model to be used in edge platforms with constraints on their resources. This framework combines fierce encapsulation of key (Kyber512) on a lattice with traditional ECDH in a hybrid system of key establishment, along with the Ascon AEAD encryption algorithm to provide effective data hiding and integrity provision. Furthermore, rekeying and forward secrecy on a lightweight basis is possible to reconfigure a layer with negligible overhead on a secure transmission with forward secrecy. The experimental data with ARM Cortex-M and RISC-V architectures and 128-bit post-quantum security has shown that the proposed system can reduce the latency by up to 30 percent and the energy usage by up to 35 percent and considerably better throughput than PQC-only implementations. These findings validate the fact that hybrid PQC solutions have the potential to provide high-resistance quantum with minimal overhead and thus are best suited to IoT and edge applications. The paper offers a viable and extensible security design in conformance with the NIST PQC and IETF migration policies, which can support secure communication in the post-quantum era.
The accelerating maturation of quantum computing technology-exemplified by IBM's Eagle, Osprey, and Condor processors surpassing 1,000+ physical qubits-represents a strategic and existential threat to the public-key cryptographic foundations of modern digital infrastructure.The mathematical intractability assumptions underlying RSA (integer factorization), Diffie-Hellman (discrete logarithm), and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem) are rendered computationally negligible by Shor's polynomial-time quantum algorithm.Simultaneously, Grover's unstructured quantum search algorithm halves the effective security of all symmetric encryption schemes, requiring doubling of key lengths.The consequent "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) attack paradigm-wherein encrypted communications are archived today for future quantum decryption-transforms post-quantum cryptographic migration from a future concern into an immediate operational imperative for all communications with confidentiality lifetimes exceeding five years.This paper presents a comprehensive Hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptographic (HPQC) framework that systematically integrates NIST-finalized post-quantum algorithms-CRYSTALS-Kyber (FIPS 203) for Key Encapsulation Mechanisms, CRYSTALS-Dilithium (FIPS 204) and SPHINCS+ (FIPS 205) for digital signatureswith classical cryptographic primitives (ECDH P-256/X25519, ECDSA, AES-256-GCM) in a layered, crypto-agile, formally proven, and operationally deployable security architecture.Twenty mathematical formulae are derived and presented, covering Shor/Grover complexity bounds, Module-LWE and Module-SIS hardness parameters, hybrid HKDF-SHA-512 key derivation, IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA security reductions, forward secrecy entropy bounds, and crypto-agility rotation period calculations.Formal Theorems 1 and 2 establish the security of the hybrid KEM and hybrid signature constructions respectively.Simulated performance benchmarks across three hardware tiers (Intel Xeon server, ARM Cortex-A72 edge gateway, ARM Cortex-M4 IoT device) demonstrate 23-31% TLS 1.3 handshake latency overhead over classical baselines with full quantum resistance.Seven comparative tables and five architectural figures support the engineering-ready deployment guidance provided across 5G/6G, massive IoT, SDN, and cloud-native environments.A four-phase crypto-agile migration roadmap aligned with NIST FIPS 203/204/205, NIST SP 800-208, NSA CNSA 2.0, BSI TR-02102, and ENISA PQC guidance is presented for enterprise network operators and security architects.
Sixth Generation (6 G) networks will support critical, latency-sensitive, and large-scale services, making them attractive targets for quantum-capable adversaries. To address this, the paper proposes a conceptual Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) framework for high-level security protocols in 6G, including Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3, Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2), Secure Shell (SSH), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using security-by-design principles, hybrid classical-post-quantum migration, and optimization for resourceconstrained and heterogeneous environments. The framework defines key metrics such as handshake latency, computational and memory overhead, energy consumption, interoperability, and resistance to quantum and classical attacks, and analyzes risks introduced by hybrid protocol complexity, side channels, and implementation flaws. The framework is illustrated via a reference hybrid TLS 1.3 design using National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)-standardized Module-LatticeBased Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) and Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) and an evaluation methodology based on Open Secure Sockets Layer (OpenSSL)/liboqs, outlining how future prototypes can measure latency, bandwidth, and computational overhead under UltraReliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC) and Massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC) constraints. By combining requirements analysis, design patterns, and evaluation methodology, this work supports quantum-safe 6 G infrastructure with scalable, reliable, and long-term secure deployment, providing a blueprint for future empirical validation rather than reporting completed measurements.
The fifth-generation (5G) core network adopts a Service-Based Architecture (SBA), in which Network Functions (NFs) communicate over Service-Based Interfaces (SBIs) using HTTP/2 secured with TLS 1.3. Current deployments rely on classical cryptography, which is vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly under the Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) threat model. To address this, we propose Quantum-Safe Service-Based Architecture (Q-SBA), a hybrid post-quantum TLS framework that secures SBI communication by integrating Module Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM-768) and Module Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA-65) with classical primitives within a TLS 1.3 handshake with mutual authentication. The framework is implemented on a containerized OpenAirInterface (OAI) 5G core and evaluated across N11, N12, N8, and N10 interfaces. Results show that hybrid PQC introduces a controlled performance trade-off: handshake latency reaches 14–15 ms (≈2× classical TLS), while throughput sustains 273–289 connections per second, both within 5G control-plane requirements. Packet-level analysis confirms successful negotiation of hybrid cryptographic groups across all interfaces, demonstrating that quantum-resilient security can be integrated into 5G core networks without affecting protocol correctness or interoperability.
Securing network slices in beyond-5G environments remains an open challenge when quantum-capable adversaries enter the threat model. Classical key agreement protocols were not originally designed to be resistant to algebraic attacks by large-scale quantum processors. In principle, it seems like a simple idea to replace these with lattice-based or hash-based ones. In reality, each extra key exchange byte increases round-trip time, uses battery resources, and consumes baseband processing cycles. This trade-off is even more difficult to make when using slice-specific quality-of-service contracts. The extra cryptographic load is absorbed differently in a delay-tolerant massive machine-type communication slice than in a safety-critical vehicle-to-everything channel with single-digit millisecond bounds. A coordinated cipher suite is provided by PostCrypt to solve this gap. Kyber-768 is responsible for session key negotiation, SPHINCS+ for stateless signature verification and Advanced Encryption Standard-256-Galois/Counter Mode for the data plane. The evaluation uses the OAI-6G Testbed Logs dataset with real gNB and user equipment traces across four network slices. Experimental results show that PostCrypt achieves the best performance with 3.5 ms latency in ultra-reliable low-latency communication, −0.7%-0.7 \%−0.7% throughput loss in vehicle-to-everything, 3.9%3.9 \%3.9% central processing unit overhead, and 15.6 mJ energy use. These results show that PostCrypt gives quantum-safe protection with lower operational cost for future fifth-generation and sixth-generation networks.