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Frontiers in Computer Science

A Hybrid Quantum-Resistant Resumption framework for zero-RTT TLS 1.3

Tahera Begum Abdul, Kondapalli Venkata Ramana

Published Jul 23, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Introduction Zero-round-trip-time (0-RTT) resumption is a central performance feature of TLS 1.3, cutting reconnection latency by letting clients attach early application data to pre-shared keys derived from previously issued session tickets. Latency-sensitive deployments—web services, API gateways, IoT fleets-rely heavily on this mechanism. However, today's session tickets derive their symmetric keys from a purely classical X25519 exchange, leaving them exposed to Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL) attacks: an adversary who records the ticket exchange today gains the ability to decrypt all associated 0-RTT early data retroactively once a cryptographically capable quantum machine exists. This paper introduces HQRT (Hybrid Quantum-Resistant Resumption for TLS 1.3), which folds a hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 encapsulation directly into the NewSessionTicket lifecycle, rendering tickets quantum-safe without adding any extra round trip. Methods At the core of HQRT is a Hybrid Resumption Master Secret, constructed jointly from classical and post-quantum shared secrets and integrated into the existing TLS 1.3 key schedule as a drop-in addition. The paper supports this construction with a formal, game-based security model proving HNDL resistance, and extends the replay-protection analysis to quantum adversaries. A working proof-of-concept was implemented on OpenSSL 3.x via the OQS provider, with benchmarking conducted across server, desktop, and IoT hardware. Results The latency penalty introduced by HQRT is just 4–9%, with a throughput loss of 6.5% relative to classical 0-RTT-a stark contrast to the 81–89% overhead imposed by full post-quantum handshakes. Across multi-session workloads, the amortised overhead falls by 34–97%, and latency-distribution tails diverge from the classical baseline by under a millisecond. Discussion These results demonstrate that HQRT offers a deployable, incremental route to quantum-safe TLS resumption, delivering HNDL resistance and quantum-safe replay protection at a fraction of the cost of full post-quantum handshakes, while leaving existing certificate infrastructure untouched.

DOI
10.3389/fcomp.2026.1848687

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Introduction Zero-round-trip-time (0-RTT) resumption is a central performance feature of TLS 1.3, cutting reconnection latency by letting clients attach early application data to pre-shared keys derived from previously issued session tickets. Latency-sensitive deployments—web services, API gateways, IoT fleets-rely heavily on this mechanism. However, today's session tickets derive their symmetric keys from a purely classical X25519 exchange, leaving them exposed to Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL) attacks: an adversary who records the ticket exchange today gains the ability to decrypt all associated 0-RTT early data retroactively once a cryptographically capable quantum machine exists. This paper introduces HQRT (Hybrid Quantum-Resistant Resumption for TLS 1.3), which folds a hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 encapsulation directly into the NewSessionTicket lifecycle, rendering tickets quantum-safe without adding any extra round trip. Methods At the core of HQRT is a Hybrid Resumption Master Secret, constructed jointly from classical and post-quantum shared secrets and integrated into the existing TLS 1.3 key schedule as a drop-in addition. The paper supports this construction with a formal, game-based security model proving HNDL resistance, and extends the replay-protection analysis to quantum adversaries. A working proof-of-concept was implemented on OpenSSL 3.x via the OQS provider, with benchmarking conducted across server, desktop, and IoT hardware. Results The latency penalty introduced by HQRT is just 4–9%, with a throughput loss of 6.5% relative to classical 0-RTT-a stark contrast to the 81–89% overhead imposed by full post-quantum handshakes. Across multi-session workloads, the amortised overhead falls by 34–97%, and latency-distribution tails diverge from the classical baseline by under a millisecond. Discussion These results demonstrate that HQRT offers a deployable, incremental route to quantum-safe TLS resumption, delivering HNDL resistance and quantum-safe replay protection at a fraction of the cost of full post-quantum handshakes, while leaving existing certificate infrastructure untouched.
The fifth-generation (5G) core network adopts a Service-Based Architecture (SBA), in which Network Functions (NFs) communicate over Service-Based Interfaces (SBIs) using HTTP/2 secured with TLS 1.3. Current deployments rely on classical cryptography, which is vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly under the Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) threat model. To address this, we propose Quantum-Safe Service-Based Architecture (Q-SBA), a hybrid post-quantum TLS framework that secures SBI communication by integrating Module Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM-768) and Module Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA-65) with classical primitives within a TLS 1.3 handshake with mutual authentication. The framework is implemented on a containerized OpenAirInterface (OAI) 5G core and evaluated across N11, N12, N8, and N10 interfaces. Results show that hybrid PQC introduces a controlled performance trade-off: handshake latency reaches 14–15 ms (≈2× classical TLS), while throughput sustains 273–289 connections per second, both within 5G control-plane requirements. Packet-level analysis confirms successful negotiation of hybrid cryptographic groups across all interfaces, demonstrating that quantum-resilient security can be integrated into 5G core networks without affecting protocol correctness or interoperability.
Quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical cryptographic schemes widely used in modern networks, particularly RSA and ECC, which are vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm. To address this challenge, this study conducts a post-quantum security evaluation of TLS 1.3 by implementing hybrid X25519+Kyber key exchange and ML-DSA digital signatures. The objective is to assess the performance, overhead, and effectiveness of hybrid TLS in ensuring long-term data confidentiality within enterprise environments. The research method involves building a server–client testbed using OpenSSL with the oqs-provider, applying network load simulations under various latencies, and measuring key metrics including handshake latency, CPU utilization, certificate size, and client compatibility. The results indicate that hybrid TLS 1.3 with X25519+Kyber introduces only moderate handshake latency, while ML-DSA increases certificate size but remains manageable for deployment in modern enterprise systems. The conclusion of this study is that combining X25519+Kyber with ML-DSA offers an effective transition path towards quantum-safe networks without significantly sacrificing system performance..
Classical public-key cryptography (RSA-2048, ECDH) is vulnerable to Shor's algorithm on quantum computers, with harvest-now-decrypt-later threats already targeting archived cloud traffic for future decryption. While NIST's 2024 ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) standards provide quantumresistant primitives, uniform PQC deployment across diverse cloud workloads remains computationally inefficient and lacks validated hybrid security and scalability. This paper introduces AH-KEM, an adaptive hybrid key encapsulation mechanism for TLS 1.3-compatible cloud communication. The AH-KEM algorithm determines a risk rating for each session from three dimensions-sensitivity of the data, expected length of the session, and network exposure-and then uses a deterministic method to choose among four modes of cryptography, which include Classical-only (X25519/ECDSA), Parallel-Hybrid (X25519/ML-KEM-512/ML-DSA-44), PQC-Dominant(ML-KEM-768/ML-DSA-65), and Full-Hybrid (X25519/ML-KEM-1024/ML-DSA-87). The safe dual-PRF combiner combines the classical and post-quantum shared keys to obtain a single session key that is secure in the Quantum Random Oracle Model if either KEM used is secure. Implemented in Python with FIPS-compliant software stubs on a Lenovo LOQ 15APH8 (AMD Ryzen 7 7840HS), AH-KEM demonstrates that, when both are generated fresh per session to satisfy forward secrecy, ML-KEM-768 key generation is over 11, 000× faster than RSA-2048 (0.004 ms vs. 44.335 ms); note RSA keys are not conventionally regenerated per session in deployed TLS, so this comparison isolates the cost of per-session ephemeral generation rather than RSA's typical amortized cost. Full-Hybrid end-to-end handshake latency is 0.514 ms (a sub-millisecond overhead); servers sustain zero errors at 250 concurrent clients; and risk classification achieves 100.0% accuracy over 10,000 sessions.
The advancement of quantum computing creates a big threat to classical cryptographic protocols, including TLS, which is responsible for secure internet communications. While recent industry and academic efforts have focused on integrating lattice-based post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) such as Kyber+X25519 into hybrid TLS handshakes, these approaches often prioritize performance at the cost of cryptanalytic diversity. Code-based KEMs, despite their proven security measure they remain underexplored in hybrid frameworks due to some limitations like large key sizes and integration complexity. This paper proposes a novel hybrid TLS framework that explicitly incorporates code-based post-quantum cryptography—specifically McEliece—alongside classical key exchange mechanisms. The framework introduces a dual-handshake mechanism, adaptive parameter selection, and seamless fallback negotiation, enabling flexible deployment across heterogeneous networks while ensuring backward compatibility. Integration with Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs) and multifactor authentication further increases entropy quality and session security. We implemented and evaluated the framework using an OpenSSL-OQS integration. We measure handshake latency, CPU utilization, memory usage, and throughput across emulated and real-world testbeds. Results show that the proposed hybrid approach achieves up to 30% lower latency and significantly reduced resource overhead compared to pure post-quantum TLS variants, while maintaining near-classical efficiency levels. Mathematical modeling formalizes these trade-offs which offers a foundation for optimizing deployment in both resource-constrained IoT devices and high-performance servers. By advancing cryptographic diversity and aligning with emerging NIST and IETF standardization efforts, the proposed framework provides a practical pathway toward quantum-resilient secure communication.It shows that code-based post-quantum cryptography can be added to current TLS systems without any problems, keeping security, performance, and compatibility in mind as we get ready for the quantum age.
The transition to post-quantum cryptography is particularly challenging for resource-constrained IoT devices, where improved cryptographic resilience must be balanced against latency, energy, and reliability constraints. This paper presents an empirical evaluation of TLS 1.3 authentication overhead on ESP32 under three key-exchange modes: classical X25519, full post-quantum ML-KEM-768, and hybrid X25519+ML-KEM-768. The study contributes the first direct large-scale comparison of these regimes on Xtensa-class hardware using wolfSSL and introduces IoT-QARS, an extension of the PAREK risk model that incorporates measured deployment overhead. Across 3,000 recorded sessions, including 2,938 successful handshakes, ML-KEM-768 reduced mean handshake latency by 43% and connection energy by 34% relative to X25519, while the hybrid mode increased latency and energy by only 11% and 7%, respectively. However, full PQC exhibited a 3.8% connectionfailure rate, likely caused by larger cryptographic payloads and buffer constraints. Applied to an industrial sensor profile, IoTQARS identifies hybrid deployment as the most practical nearterm migration option and highlights TCP-buffer tuning as a prerequisite for reliable full-PQC adoption. These results provide actionable guidance for post-quantum migration in embedded and industrial IoT environments.
The rapid advances in quantum computing pose a threat to classical cryptographic schemes such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA. In the 5G user plane, the N3 interface between the gNodeB (gNB) and the User Plane Function (UPF) typically relies on IPsec for security, which often suffers from deployment challenges, including limited flexibility and significant performance overhead. To overcome both the quantum threat and these challenges, we propose a quantum-resistant security layer by integrating the Post-Quantum Datagram Transport Layer Security (PQ-DTLS) 1.3 protocol into the 5G N3 interface. The proposed solution supports hybrid key exchange schemes that combine classical key exchange and Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ-KEM), ensuring confidentiality against both classical and quantum adversaries. Benchmarks of key exchange schemes show that ML-KEM-512 and X25519 achieve the minimum DTLS handshake latency of only 2.5 ms. Moreover, ML-KEM-512 exhibits the lowest CPU utilization time of 1.32 ms. Furthermore, the proposed solution maintains throughput and RTT comparable to the lightweight WireGuard protocol. Finally, we provide a formal security analysis of the hybrid key exchange, demonstrating its robustness against both classical attacks and future quantum "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" threats.