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International Conference on Advanced Network Technologies and Applications (APAN)

Securing East-West Traffic in 5G Core with Hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptography over TLS 1.3

Gunasekaran Raja, Pooja Vetriselvan, Suganthi Mani, Janani Alagar Ramanujam, Keerthi Parthipan, Paventhan Arumugam

Published Aug 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The fifth-generation (5G) core network adopts a Service-Based Architecture (SBA), in which Network Functions (NFs) communicate over Service-Based Interfaces (SBIs) using HTTP/2 secured with TLS 1.3. Current deployments rely on classical cryptography, which is vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly under the Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) threat model. To address this, we propose Quantum-Safe Service-Based Architecture (Q-SBA), a hybrid post-quantum TLS framework that secures SBI communication by integrating Module Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM-768) and Module Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA-65) with classical primitives within a TLS 1.3 handshake with mutual authentication. The framework is implemented on a containerized OpenAirInterface (OAI) 5G core and evaluated across N11, N12, N8, and N10 interfaces. Results show that hybrid PQC introduces a controlled performance trade-off: handshake latency reaches 14–15 ms (≈2× classical TLS), while throughput sustains 273–289 connections per second, both within 5G control-plane requirements. Packet-level analysis confirms successful negotiation of hybrid cryptographic groups across all interfaces, demonstrating that quantum-resilient security can be integrated into 5G core networks without affecting protocol correctness or interoperability.

DOI
10.1109/apan70967.2026.11709595

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The fifth-generation (5G) core network adopts a Service-Based Architecture (SBA), in which Network Functions (NFs) communicate over Service-Based Interfaces (SBIs) using HTTP/2 secured with TLS 1.3. Current deployments rely on classical cryptography, which is vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly under the Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) threat model. To address this, we propose Quantum-Safe Service-Based Architecture (Q-SBA), a hybrid post-quantum TLS framework that secures SBI communication by integrating Module Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM-768) and Module Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA-65) with classical primitives within a TLS 1.3 handshake with mutual authentication. The framework is implemented on a containerized OpenAirInterface (OAI) 5G core and evaluated across N11, N12, N8, and N10 interfaces. Results show that hybrid PQC introduces a controlled performance trade-off: handshake latency reaches 14–15 ms (≈2× classical TLS), while throughput sustains 273–289 connections per second, both within 5G control-plane requirements. Packet-level analysis confirms successful negotiation of hybrid cryptographic groups across all interfaces, demonstrating that quantum-resilient security can be integrated into 5G core networks without affecting protocol correctness or interoperability.
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The transition to a cloud-native 5G Service-Based Architecture (SBA) improves scalability but exposes control-plane signaling to emerging quantum threats, including Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) attacks. While NIST has standardized post-quantum cryptography (PQC), practical, deployable integration in operational 5 G cores remains underexplored. This work experimentally integrates NIST-standardized ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA into an open-source 5G core (free5GC) using a sidecar proxy pattern, preserving unmodified network functions (NFs). Implemented on free 5 GC, we compare three deployments: (i) native HTTPS/TLS, (ii) TLS sidecar, and (iii) PQC-enabled sidecar. Measurements at the HTTP/2 request-response boundary over repeated independent runs show that PQC increases end-toend Service-Based Interface (SBI) latency to∼54ms\sim \mathbf{5 4 m s}∼54ms, adding a deterministic48−49ms\mathbf{4 8}-\mathbf{4 9 m s}48−49msoverhead relative to the classical baseline, while maintaining tightly bounded variance(IQR≤0.2ms(I Q R \leq 0.2 \text{ms}(IQR≤0.2ms,CV<0.4%C V<0.4 \%CV<0.4%). We also quantify the impact of Certification Authority (CA) security levels, identifying certificate validation as a tunable contributor to overall delay. Overall, the results demonstrate that sidecar-based PQC insertion enables a nondisruptive and operationally predictable migration path for quantum-resilient5G\mathbf{5 G}5Gsignaling.
Quantum computing is reshaping the security landscape of modern telecommunications. The cryptographic foundations that secure todays 5G systems, including RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman (DH), are all susceptible to attacks enabled by Shors algorithm. Protecting 5G networks against future quantum adversaries has therefore become an urgent engineering and research priority. In this paper we introduce QORE, a quantum-secure 5G and Beyond 5G (B5G) Core framework that provides a clear pathway for transitioning both the 5G Core Network Functions and User Equipment (UE) to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The framework uses the NIST-standardized lattice-based algorithms Module-Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) and Module-Lattice Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) and applies them across the 5G Service-Based Architecture (SBA). A Hybrid PQC (HPQC) configuration is also proposed, combining classical and quantum-safe primitives to maintain interoperability during migration. Experimental validation shows that ML-KEM achieves quantum security with minor performance overhead, meeting the low-latency and high-throughput requirements of carrier-grade 5G systems. The proposed roadmap aligns with ongoing 3GPP SA3 and SA5 study activities on the security and management of post-quantum networks as well as with NIST PQC standardization efforts, providing practical guidance for mitigating quantum-era risks while safeguarding long-term confidentiality and integrity of network data.
As mobile networks evolve toward future disaggregated architectures and 6G systems, quantum computing poses an existential threat to the current cryptographic foundations underpinning Service-Based Architecture (SBA) deployments. This paper presents a standards-driven analysis of integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) into future mobile core networks, directly informing ongoing NIST, IETF, and 3GPP standardization efforts. We examine current security specifications and identify critical vulnerabilities in SBA interfaces that are susceptible to “harvest-now, decrypt-later” attacks. Our framework maps PQC algorithm recommendations to existing standards clauses, proposing concrete specification updates for future release adoption. We assess the impact of standardization by validating the performance of NIST-standardized post-quantum algorithms across representative SBA interfaces, demonstrating that quantum-safe migrations can meet operational requirements for future mobile cores. Experimental results indicate that selected post-quantum configurations deliver acceptable performance for control-plane functions, supporting edge-cloud continuum deployments. We present a standards migration roadmap that addresses PKI lifecycle management, inter-operator security protocols, and coordination requirements between standards bodies.
The rapid advances in quantum computing pose a threat to classical cryptographic schemes such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA. In the 5G user plane, the N3 interface between the gNodeB (gNB) and the User Plane Function (UPF) typically relies on IPsec for security, which often suffers from deployment challenges, including limited flexibility and significant performance overhead. To overcome both the quantum threat and these challenges, we propose a quantum-resistant security layer by integrating the Post-Quantum Datagram Transport Layer Security (PQ-DTLS) 1.3 protocol into the 5G N3 interface. The proposed solution supports hybrid key exchange schemes that combine classical key exchange and Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ-KEM), ensuring confidentiality against both classical and quantum adversaries. Benchmarks of key exchange schemes show that ML-KEM-512 and X25519 achieve the minimum DTLS handshake latency of only 2.5 ms. Moreover, ML-KEM-512 exhibits the lowest CPU utilization time of 1.32 ms. Furthermore, the proposed solution maintains throughput and RTT comparable to the lightweight WireGuard protocol. Finally, we provide a formal security analysis of the hybrid key exchange, demonstrating its robustness against both classical attacks and future quantum "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" threats.