The rapid advancement of quantum computing presents an urgent threat to 5G networks, particularly across sensitive roaming boundaries. While existing quantum-safe solutions typically require intrusive modifications to core network functions, this paper introduces a highly crypto-agile, non-intrusive proxy architecture to secure the N32 control-plane and N9 user-plane roaming interfaces. By deliberately isolating cryptographic operations within local, containerized proxies, our design avoids complex dependency upgrades on the running 5G core. To maximize practical deployability, we developed proof-of-concept prototypes based on OpenSSL 3.5.4 offering two distinct, highly configurable variants. The first enables immediate, software-only integration utilizing Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) suites (ML-KEM/ML-DSA, BIKE/Falcon). The second deploys autonomous agents in a custom Pre-Shared Key (PSK) configuration fed by out-of-band Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), enabling dynamically enforced cryptoperiods and seamless Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) fallback mechanism based on real-time key availability. We evaluate this architecture using a comprehensive open-source testbed combining Open5GS and QKDNetSim. To assess practical deployability, we measured control-plane registration times, cryptographic data volume, user-plane delay, and QKD key consumption against legacy HTTP(S) baselines. Experimental results demonstrate that these quantum-safe architectures perform comparably to, or better than, legacy security. The PQC proxies maintained competitive cold-start registration times (261–285 ms), successfully balancing computational and bandwidth trade-offs. Notably, the QKD-assisted PSK configuration achieved the highest efficiency, reducing median registration time to 258.2 ms (a 4.5% improvement over legacy HTTPS) and restricting handshake data volume to 12.3 kB by bypassing heavy asymmetric certificate authentication. Furthermore, all prototypes successfully secured the traditionally unencrypted GPRS Tunnelling Protocol user plane (GTP-U) traffic traversing the N9 interface with a practically negligible delay increase ( $\sim 300~\mu $ s). Finally, the study highlights critical transport-layer constraints, such as TCP-in-TCP congestion interference, underscoring the necessity of DTLS 1.3 to optimize practical, quantum-resilient telecommunications infrastructure.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing presents an urgent threat to 5G networks, particularly across sensitive roaming boundaries. While existing quantum-safe solutions typically require intrusive modifications to core network functions, this paper introduces a highly crypto-agile, non-intrusive proxy architecture to secure the N32 control-plane and N9 user-plane roaming interfaces. By deliberately isolating cryptographic operations within local, containerized proxies, our design avoids complex dependency upgrades on the running 5G core. To maximize practical deployability, we developed proof-of-concept prototypes based on OpenSSL 3.5.4 offering two distinct, highly configurable variants. The first enables immediate, software-only integration utilizing Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) suites (ML-KEM/ML-DSA, BIKE/Falcon). The second deploys autonomous agents in a custom Pre-Shared Key (PSK) configuration fed by out-of-band Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), enabling dynamically enforced cryptoperiods and seamless Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) fallback mechanism based on real-time key availability. We evaluate this architecture using a comprehensive open-source testbed combining Open5GS and QKDNetSim. To assess practical deployability, we measured control-plane registration times, cryptographic data volume, user-plane delay, and QKD key consumption against legacy HTTP(S) baselines. Experimental results demonstrate that these quantum-safe architectures perform comparably to, or better than, legacy security. The PQC proxies maintained competitive cold-start registration times (261–285 ms), successfully balancing computational and bandwidth trade-offs. Notably, the QKD-assisted PSK configuration achieved the highest efficiency, reducing median registration time to 258.2 ms (a 4.5% improvement over legacy HTTPS) and restricting handshake data volume to 12.3 kB by bypassing heavy asymmetric certificate authentication. Furthermore, all prototypes successfully secured the traditionally unencrypted GPRS Tunnelling Protocol user plane (GTP-U) traffic traversing the N9 interface with a practically negligible delay increase ( ∼300μ s). Finally, the study highlights critical transport-layer constraints, such as TCP-in-TCP congestion interference, underscoring the necessity of DTLS 1.3 to optimize practical, quantum-resilient telecommunications infrastructure.
The rapid advances in quantum computing pose a threat to classical cryptographic schemes such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA. In the 5G user plane, the N3 interface between the gNodeB (gNB) and the User Plane Function (UPF) typically relies on IPsec for security, which often suffers from deployment challenges, including limited flexibility and significant performance overhead. To overcome both the quantum threat and these challenges, we propose a quantum-resistant security layer by integrating the Post-Quantum Datagram Transport Layer Security (PQ-DTLS) 1.3 protocol into the 5G N3 interface. The proposed solution supports hybrid key exchange schemes that combine classical key exchange and Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ-KEM), ensuring confidentiality against both classical and quantum adversaries. Benchmarks of key exchange schemes show that ML-KEM-512 and X25519 achieve the minimum DTLS handshake latency of only 2.5 ms. Moreover, ML-KEM-512 exhibits the lowest CPU utilization time of 1.32 ms. Furthermore, the proposed solution maintains throughput and RTT comparable to the lightweight WireGuard protocol. Finally, we provide a formal security analysis of the hybrid key exchange, demonstrating its robustness against both classical attacks and future quantum "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" threats.
The fifth-generation (5G) core network adopts a Service-Based Architecture (SBA), in which Network Functions (NFs) communicate over Service-Based Interfaces (SBIs) using HTTP/2 secured with TLS 1.3. Current deployments rely on classical cryptography, which is vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly under the Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) threat model. To address this, we propose Quantum-Safe Service-Based Architecture (Q-SBA), a hybrid post-quantum TLS framework that secures SBI communication by integrating Module Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM-768) and Module Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA-65) with classical primitives within a TLS 1.3 handshake with mutual authentication. The framework is implemented on a containerized OpenAirInterface (OAI) 5G core and evaluated across N11, N12, N8, and N10 interfaces. Results show that hybrid PQC introduces a controlled performance trade-off: handshake latency reaches 14–15 ms (≈2× classical TLS), while throughput sustains 273–289 connections per second, both within 5G control-plane requirements. Packet-level analysis confirms successful negotiation of hybrid cryptographic groups across all interfaces, demonstrating that quantum-resilient security can be integrated into 5G core networks without affecting protocol correctness or interoperability.
Abstract: This study advances a unifying systems perspective on quantum-safe network security by synthesizing recent progress in quantum cryptography with practical integration patterns across carrier-grade infrastructures. Concept analysis distinguishes the roles of quantum key distribution (QKD), device-independent variants, quantum authentication, and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) within zero-trust architectures. Building on this, a layered framework—spanning physical/entanglement resources, key management, crypto-agility, control plane orchestration, and policy/compliance—is articulated to support end-to-end, composable guarantees. The problem addressed is the realization of verifiable, quantum-resilient security under operational constraints involving latency, key-rate variability, and heterogeneous trust assumptions. Methodology combines a structured literature synthesis with formal composability mapping to universal composability principles, adversarial threat modeling for quantum-enabled attackers, and testbed/simulation evaluation of hybrid QKD–PQC pipelines across L2–L3 segments and 5G/6G backhaul scenarios. Key results indicate that (i) selective QKD deployment on high-value links coupled with PQC at endpoints enhances resilience while preserving crypto-agility; (ii) automated key-lifecycle orchestration reduces exposure windows; and (iii) device-independent assurances strengthen guarantees where trust relaxation is necessary. The impact is a deployment-ready reference architecture, measurable integration metrics, and guidance aligned with emerging standards for critical infrastructure and national networks. The implications extend to procurement, compliance, and roadmap planning for quantum-era network security. Keywords: quantum-safe cryptography, quantum key distribution (QKD), post-quantum cryptography (PQC), hybrid QKD–PQC, composable security, device-independent QKD, zero-trust networks, key management and orchestration, 5G/6G backhaul, network security architecture, standards and interoperability
The rise of quantum computing poses a critical threat to current cryptographic protocols, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which are vulnerable to attacks such as Shor’s algorithm. As 5G networks rely heavily on public key infrastructure, the risk of compromise in the quantum era is significant. Transitioning to post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) primitives is therefore an urgent priority. This paper presents a practical framework for integrating PQC into 5G control plane communication, specifically over Service-Based Interfaces (SBIs). Using the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalist algorithm Dilithium3, we implement PQC-enabled Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshakes via a modular proxy built in Python. The proxy intercepts inter-service traffic and offloads cryptographic operations to a containerized environment using liboqs. Importantly, this integration does not require altering existing 5G functions. System-level metrics, including CPU (Central Processing Unit) usage, memory, latency, and jitter, were benchmarked before and after PQC integration. Results show performance overhead remains within acceptable bounds, confirming deployment viability. This work proposes a hybrid migration strategy that enables backward compatibility and cryptographic agility. It provides a scalable and testable foundation for securing 5G networks in the quantum era while aligning with emerging European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and NIST guidelines for post-quantum transition.
The evolving 5G architecture, moving from proprietary monolithic hardware towards the disaggregated and modular Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN), introduces new, critical interfaces requiring robust security. While IPSec is a prevalent solution for securing IP communications, the advent of quantum computing threatens its traditional cryptographic underpinnings; it may be deprecated in the near future. To address this, we propose a quantum-safe Open RAN framework for securing fronthaul (i.e., Radio Unit-Distributed Unit) and backhaul (i.e., Centralized Unit-5G core) interfaces. Our framework employs a hybrid key exchange scheme, combining post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum keys as cryptographic material, designed for seamless integration with TLS, IKEv2/IPSec, and MACSec standards, and compatible with ETSI QKD 004 and 014 APIs. Furthermore, we present a novel key distribution protocol for Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDN). This protocol incorporates encapsulation techniques inspired by onion routing, combined with PQC, to ensure confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and anonymity. It also leverages post-quantum public key encryption to protect shared secrets from intermediate nodes within the QKDN, mitigating intermediary attacks. We have deployed a proof-of-concept of our proposal, experimentally validating both air-based and fiber-based QKD, primarily using ML-KEM and ML-DSA standards for PQC algorithms.
6G networks will require quantum-secure cryptography deployed across core infrastructure, edge nodes, resource-constrained IoT devices. Although post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms have been standardized by NIST, their practical deployability in bandwidth and latency limited wireless systems remains unclear. This paper presents a practical evaluation of NIST selected PQC schemes, including ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and Falcon. Benchmarks conducted with OpenSSL and the OQS provider on heterogeneous platforms show that while computational performance is acceptable, ciphertext and signature size expansion significantly impact handshake reliability and bandwidth efficiency, particularly at the network edge. The results highlight key system-level trade-offs and motivate the need for PQC optimization and deployment-aware design for future quantum-secure 6G networks.