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Evaluating the Robustness of LSTM-Based Intrusion Detection Against Quantum Circuit Learning Attacks in BB84 Quantum Key Distribution

Ansh Rai

Published Jul 3, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper evaluates the robustness of an LSTM-based intrusion detection system (IDS) designed for BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) against trainable quantum circuit learning (QCL) attacks and classical fast gradient sign method (FGSM) perturbations. Using the repository-provided experimental outputs as the only source of truth, we first establish the baseline defender performance with 88.5% accuracy and 0.990 AUROC. We then show that both FGSM and QCL attacks reduce detection performance, with FGSM (ε=0.2) causing a 28.6 pp accuracy drop and the selected QCL attacker (6Q-2L, ε=0.2) causing a 9.1 pp accuracy drop. However, the QCL attacker produces a more severe downstream impact on approximate secure key rate: QCL reduces the mean SKR by 40.2% (from 0.082 to 0.049), compared with a 7.9% reduction under FGSM (from 0.082 to 0.076), reflecting a complementary threat profile in the security metric that matters most. The QCL architecture ablation identifies a feasible E3 (6Q-2L) configuration with 6 qubits and 2 layers as the downstream attacker used in later experiments. Adversarial fine-tuning substantially recovers clean and attacked performance, reducing the robustness gap while preserving acceptable clean accuracy. Finally, an approximate, feature-level BB84 secret key rate (SKR) analysis indicates that attack-induced QBER increases correspond to lower estimated SKR, and that fine-tuning partially mitigates this degradation. The study therefore demonstrates a practical robustness trade-off: trainable QCL attacks can materially weaken an IDS, but targeted adversarial fine-tuning restores much of the lost robustness without claiming any quantum advantage or a full cryptographic break.

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.21153655

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This paper evaluates the robustness of an LSTM-based intrusion detection system (IDS) designed for BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) against trainable quantum circuit learning (QCL) attacks and classical fast gradient sign method (FGSM) perturbations. Using the repository-provided experimental outputs as the only source of truth, we first establish the baseline defender performance with 88.5% accuracy and 0.990 AUROC. We then show that both FGSM and QCL attacks reduce detection performance, with FGSM (ε=0.2) causing a 28.6 pp accuracy drop and the selected QCL attacker (6Q-2L, ε=0.2) causing a 9.1 pp accuracy drop. However, the QCL attacker produces a more severe downstream impact on approximate secure key rate: QCL reduces the mean SKR by 40.2% (from 0.082 to 0.049), compared with a 7.9% reduction under FGSM (from 0.082 to 0.076), reflecting a complementary threat profile in the security metric that matters most. The QCL architecture ablation identifies a feasible E3 (6Q-2L) configuration with 6 qubits and 2 layers as the downstream attacker used in later experiments. Adversarial fine-tuning substantially recovers clean and attacked performance, reducing the robustness gap while preserving acceptable clean accuracy. Finally, an approximate, feature-level BB84 secret key rate (SKR) analysis indicates that attack-induced QBER increases correspond to lower estimated SKR, and that fine-tuning partially mitigates this degradation. The study therefore demonstrates a practical robustness trade-off: trainable QCL attacks can materially weaken an IDS, but targeted adversarial fine-tuning restores much of the lost robustness without claiming any quantum advantage or a full cryptographic break.
Abstract Quantum supervised learning (QSL) is increasingly investigated for intrusion detection, yet its behavior under adversarial manipulation remains insufficiently characterized in network-security settings. This study presents a controlled white-box evaluation of a four-qubit variational QSL intrusion detector and a matched classical multilayer perceptron (MLP) on the UNSW-NB15 benchmark. Categorical encoding, standardization, principal component analysis to four dimensions, and scaling to [0, π] were applied consistently. A clean QSL model and a PGD-aware QSL model using 50% clean, 25% FGSM, and 25% PGD samples were evaluated against FGSM and seven-step PGD attacks at ε = 0.02π, 0.05π, and 0.10π over ten matched random seeds. Clean and adversarially trained MLP controls used the same representation and attack protocol. PGD-aware QSL improved accuracy over clean QSL from 9.10% to 26.90% at PGD 0.05π and from 2.60% to 20.73% at PGD 0.10π, with large paired effect sizes. The improvement was accompanied by a clean-accuracy reduction from 70.73% to 61.57%. Robust MLP retained higher absolute adversarial accuracy, reaching 64.27% and 50.50% at PGD 0.05π and 0.10π, respectively. The results demonstrate that adversarial training materially strengthens the tested QSL model but do not support a quantum-advantage claim. The study provides a reproducible robustness benchmark emphasizing attack validation, repeated seeds, effect sizes, and classical controls. The implementation notebook and supporting experimental outputs used for reproducibility are publicly archived on Zenodo (Bhoge et al. 2026).
This repository provides the reproducibility package for a controlled study of adversarial robustness in quantum supervised learning (QSL) for network intrusion detection using the UNSW-NB15 benchmark. The experiment evaluates a four-qubit variational QSL intrusion detector together with a matched classical multilayer perceptron (MLP) baseline. The shared preprocessing pipeline applies categorical encoding, feature extraction, principal component analysis to four dimensions, and scaling to the interval [0, π]. Experiments are conducted over ten matched random seeds. White-box Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attacks are evaluated at perturbation budgets ε/π = 0.02, 0.05, and 0.10. The robust QSL training protocol uses a mixture of 50% clean, 25% FGSM, and 25% PGD samples. PGD uses three steps during adversarial training and seven steps during final evaluation. The repository contains the principal experiment notebooks, repeated-seed robustness results, attack diagnostics, statistical summaries, confidence intervals, paired statistical tests, effect-size analyses, and quantum-versus-classical comparison outputs. Across ten matched seeds, PGD-aware adversarial training improves QSL accuracy from 9.10% to 26.90% under PGD at ε = 0.05π and from 2.60% to 20.73% at ε = 0.10π. This improvement is accompanied by a reduction in clean QSL accuracy from 70.73% to 61.57%. The adversarially trained classical MLP retains higher absolute robustness, achieving 64.27% and 50.50% accuracy at PGD 0.05π and 0.10π, respectively. These results demonstrate that PGD-aware adversarial training materially strengthens the evaluated QSL model but do not establish quantum advantage. The repository is intended to support transparent reproduction, independent verification, and further research on adversarial robustness in quantum machine learning for cybersecurity.
Quantum Machine Learning (QML) integrates quantum computational principles into learning algorithms, offering the potential for improved representational capacity and computational efficiency. Nevertheless, the security and robustness of QML systems remain largely underexplored, particularly under adversarial conditions. We present the first comprehensive systematization of adversarial robustness in QML, integrating conceptual organization with empirical evaluation across black-, gray-, and white-box threat models. We implement five representative attacks across all three threat models: a label-flipping data poisoning attack under blackbox; an encoder-level indiscriminate data poisoning attack and a proxy-model-based clean-label backdoor attack under gray-box; and a circuit-level backdoor attack (QTrojan) and gradient-based evasion attacks (FGSM and PGD) under whitebox. We evaluate the attacks using a Quantum Multilayer Perceptron (QMLP) trained on MNIST and AZ-Class across circuit depths of 2, 5, 10 and 50 layers and two encoding schemes (angle and amplitude). Our extensive evaluations reveal a fundamental accuracy-robustness trade-off. In particular, amplitude encoding yields the highest clean accuracy (92.6 % on MNIST, 67% on AZ-Class); however, it collapses under adversarial perturbations and depolarizing noise, while shallow angle-encoded models remain substantially more stable. In addition, QUID is highly effective under noiseless conditions but is weakened by noise, whereas the proxy-model backdoor persists unless the circuit itself is overwhelmed, highlighting that noise is an asymmetric and unreliable passive defense. Furthermore, the circuit-level backdoor fails in the multi-class setting, indicating a scalability constraint. Finally, QMLP models are more robust than Classical Multi-Layer Perceptron (CMLP) models under label-flipping attacks but are substantially more vulnerable to gradient-based evasion, motivating the need for quantumspecific defenses. We conclude by proposing a threat-aware, noise-resilient design framework for secure and robust QML deployment.
While Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security, the transition from theory to physical hardware introduces side-channel vulnerabilities that traditional error metrics often fail to characterize. This paper presents a high-fidelity simulation framework for intrusion detection in decoy-state QKD, modeled as a minimax game between a learning-based defender and a physically constrained, adaptive adversary. The defender utilizes block-level telemetry (comprising decoy-state residuals, timing-histogram moments, and detector imbalances) to trigger alarms that gate key distillation . Unlike heuristic thresholds, our optimization objective is strictly operational: missed detections are penalized based on the resulting degradation of the finite-key secret fraction calculated via three-intensity decoy estimators and entropy-accumulation (EAT) penalties. The emulated adversary performs an automated search over time-shift, detector-blinding, photon number splitting (PNS), and Trojan-horse families, subject to hardware-limited feasibility bands. Concurrently, the defender co-trains one-class and temporal detectors (LSTM/TCN) using hard-negative mining to minimize the missed-attack rate at a calibrated false-alarm rate (FAR\text{FAR}FAR). Under adaptive attack scenarios, the system preserves 82–92%82\text{--}92\%82–92% of the honest finite-key rate while discarding only approximately 1.2%1.2\%1.2% of traffic, representing a net gain of +20–35+20\text{--}35+20–35 percentage points in usable secret bits over non-adversarial baselines. These results demonstrate that optimizing detection directly for secret-bit retention provides a robust, physically grounded layer of defense against adaptive side-channel strategies in practical QKD deployments.
Quantum machine learning, noted for its remarkable advancements in enhancing computational speed and augmenting data processing efficacy, is acquiring considerable recognition within the scientific community. Despite the noteworthy advancements of quantum machine learning, it shares with its traditional counterpart a susceptibility to adversarial threats. This presents a significant challenge and underscores the need for robust countermeasures in this emerging field of study. Developing effective adversarial attack algorithms, such as the Quantum Fast Gradient Sign Method (QFGSM), is crucial to opening the path for exploring robust defense mechanisms against these threats. However, unlike traditional machine learning, the quantum field currently lacks the effective techniques to orchestrate adversarial attacks. This study introduces and assesses the QFGSM, a adversarial attack algorithm tailored for QNNs. Additionally, we evaluate the effect of random noise and its quantum version on these models, providing a comprehensive comparison to understand the efficacy of adversarial attack methods. The evaluation is conducted on both traditional Neural Networks (NNs) and QNNs using the ClaMP dataset, a cybersecurity-focused dataset, and involves performance metrics like Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and F1 score. Our findings underscore the differential resilience of NNs and QNNs under adversarial attacks and reveal the contrasting effects of FGSM, QFGSM, and random noise-based methods. Our study reveals that Quantum Neural Networks (QNNs) show significant vulnerability to our proposed Quantum Fast Gradient Sign Method (QFGSM) compared to random noise, indicating a need for quantum-specific defenses in the face of this advanced adversarial attack algorithm.
In today's rapidly evolving cyber landscape, the growing sophistication of attacks, including the rise of zero-day exploits, poses critical challenges for network intrusion detection. Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) often struggle with the complexity and high dimensionality of modern cyber threats. Quantum Machine Learning (QML) seamlessly integrates the computational power of quantum computing with the adaptability of machine learning, offering an innovative approach to solving intricate and highdimensional challenges. A key factor in QML's performance is the method used to encode classical data into quantum states, as it defines how data is represented and processed in quantum circuits. QML offers promising advances for IDS, particularly through hybrid quantum-classical models. This study presents an in-depth comparative analysis of quantum-classical data encoding techniques for QML-based IDS. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to comprehensively evaluate the performance impact of different quantum encoding methods and provide a thorough evaluation of their impacts on the overall model performances. To achieve this, we first present a comprehensive evaluation of quantum and classical data encoding techniques, focusing on four key encoding techniques namely, Amplitude Embedding, Angle Embedding, Instantaneous Quantum Polynomial (IQP) Encoding, and Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm (QAOA) Embedding. Then, we develop a hybrid quantum-classical QML model to analyze how each encoding affects classification performance for malicious traffic. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments using two well-known, real-world network attack datasets to assess the accuracy and efficiency of each encoding approach. Our obtained results show notable differences in classification accuracy, underscoring the importance of encoding choice in optimizing QML-based IDS. This study aims to advance the application of quantum methodologies in network security by identifying effective encoding strategies for intrusion detection.