While Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security, the transition from theory to physical hardware introduces side-channel vulnerabilities that traditional error metrics often fail to characterize. This paper presents a high-fidelity simulation framework for intrusion detection in decoy-state QKD, modeled as a minimax game between a learning-based defender and a physically constrained, adaptive adversary. The defender utilizes block-level telemetry (comprising decoy-state residuals, timing-histogram moments, and detector imbalances) to trigger alarms that gate key distillation . Unlike heuristic thresholds, our optimization objective is strictly operational: missed detections are penalized based on the resulting degradation of the finite-key secret fraction calculated via three-intensity decoy estimators and entropy-accumulation (EAT) penalties. The emulated adversary performs an automated search over time-shift, detector-blinding, photon number splitting (PNS), and Trojan-horse families, subject to hardware-limited feasibility bands. Concurrently, the defender co-trains one-class and temporal detectors (LSTM/TCN) using hard-negative mining to minimize the missed-attack rate at a calibrated false-alarm rate ($\text{FAR}$). Under adaptive attack scenarios, the system preserves $82\text{--}92\%$ of the honest finite-key rate while discarding only approximately $1.2\%$ of traffic, representing a net gain of $+20\text{--}35$ percentage points in usable secret bits over non-adversarial baselines. These results demonstrate that optimizing detection directly for secret-bit retention provides a robust, physically grounded layer of defense against adaptive side-channel strategies in practical QKD deployments.
While Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security, the transition from theory to physical hardware introduces side-channel vulnerabilities that traditional error metrics often fail to characterize. This paper presents a high-fidelity simulation framework for intrusion detection in decoy-state QKD, modeled as a minimax game between a learning-based defender and a physically constrained, adaptive adversary. The defender utilizes block-level telemetry (comprising decoy-state residuals, timing-histogram moments, and detector imbalances) to trigger alarms that gate key distillation . Unlike heuristic thresholds, our optimization objective is strictly operational: missed detections are penalized based on the resulting degradation of the finite-key secret fraction calculated via three-intensity decoy estimators and entropy-accumulation (EAT) penalties. The emulated adversary performs an automated search over time-shift, detector-blinding, photon number splitting (PNS), and Trojan-horse families, subject to hardware-limited feasibility bands. Concurrently, the defender co-trains one-class and temporal detectors (LSTM/TCN) using hard-negative mining to minimize the missed-attack rate at a calibrated false-alarm rate (FAR). Under adaptive attack scenarios, the system preserves 82–92% of the honest finite-key rate while discarding only approximately 1.2% of traffic, representing a net gain of +20–35 percentage points in usable secret bits over non-adversarial baselines. These results demonstrate that optimizing detection directly for secret-bit retention provides a robust, physically grounded layer of defense against adaptive side-channel strategies in practical QKD deployments.
Abstract We present a game-theoretic reinforcement learning framework for analyzing adversarial behavior in BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD). Unlike traditional security proofs that assume a worst-case eavesdropper, our approach models an adaptive attacker and corresponding defensive strategies. We develop a fast analytical QKD simulator capturing key metrics such as gain, Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), decoy-state statistics, and multiple attack types including intercept-resend, photon-number splitting, time-shift, and dark-count attacks. The interaction between Bob and an adaptive eavesdropper Eve is formulated as a repeated zero-sum game and trained using deep reinforcement learning. Eve learns to maximize information gain while remaining stealthy, whereas Bob learns counter- measures that minimize information leakage while preserving secret key rate (SKR). Experimental results show an emergent arms race, where Bob reduces Eve’s achievable information by nearly 50% while maintaining practical SKR, leading to a stable equilibrium. This work demonstrates that reinforcement learning is a pow- erful tool for exploring adaptive security in QKD and provides a foundation for studying more realistic adversarial scenarios in quantum communication systems.
ABSTRACT The emergence of quantum computing poses significant risks to the security of modern communication networks as it breaks today's public‐key cryptographic algorithms. Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a promising solution by harnessing the principles of quantum mechanics to establish secure keys. However, practical QKD implementations remain vulnerable to hardware imperfections and advanced attacks such as photon number splitting and Trojan‐Horse attacks. In this work, we investigate the potential of quantum machine learning (QML) to detect popular QKD attacks. In particular, we propose a hybrid quantum long short‐term memory (QLSTM) model to improve the detection of common QKD attacks. By combining quantum‐enhanced learning with classical deep learning, the model captures complex temporal patterns in QKD data, improving detection accuracy. To evaluate the proposed model, we introduce a realistic QKD dataset that simulates typical QKD operations, along with seven attack scenarios: Intercept‐and‐resend, photon‐number splitting (PNS), Trojan‐Horse attacks on the random number generator (RNG), detector blinding, wavelength‐dependent Trojan‐Horse and combined attacks. The dataset includes quantum security metrics such as quantum bit error rate (QBER), measurement entropy, signal and decoy loss rates and time‐based metrics, ensuring an accurate representation of real‐world conditions. Our results demonstrate the promising performance of the quantum machine learning approach compared to traditional classical machine learning models, highlighting the potential of hybrid techniques to enhance the security of future quantum communication networks. The proposed hybrid QLSTM model achieved an accuracy of 94.7.0% after 50 training epochs, outperforming classical deep learning models such as LSTM, CNN, ANN, random forest and RNN. However, our evaluation is conducted on a semi‐realistic, simulation‐generated decoy‐state BB84 dataset with simplified models of attacks and device imperfections, so the reported performance should be interpreted as a proof‐of‐concept rather than a final assessment on field‐deployed QKD systems.
This paper evaluates the robustness of an LSTM-based intrusion detection system (IDS) designed for BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) against trainable quantum circuit learning (QCL) attacks and classical fast gradient sign method (FGSM) perturbations. Using the repository-provided experimental outputs as the only source of truth, we first establish the baseline defender performance with 88.5% accuracy and 0.990 AUROC. We then show that both FGSM and QCL attacks reduce detection performance, with FGSM (ε=0.2) causing a 28.6 pp accuracy drop and the selected QCL attacker (6Q-2L, ε=0.2) causing a 9.1 pp accuracy drop. However, the QCL attacker produces a more severe downstream impact on approximate secure key rate: QCL reduces the mean SKR by 40.2% (from 0.082 to 0.049), compared with a 7.9% reduction under FGSM (from 0.082 to 0.076), reflecting a complementary threat profile in the security metric that matters most. The QCL architecture ablation identifies a feasible E3 (6Q-2L) configuration with 6 qubits and 2 layers as the downstream attacker used in later experiments. Adversarial fine-tuning substantially recovers clean and attacked performance, reducing the robustness gap while preserving acceptable clean accuracy. Finally, an approximate, feature-level BB84 secret key rate (SKR) analysis indicates that attack-induced QBER increases correspond to lower estimated SKR, and that fine-tuning partially mitigates this degradation. The study therefore demonstrates a practical robustness trade-off: trainable QCL attacks can materially weaken an IDS, but targeted adversarial fine-tuning restores much of the lost robustness without claiming any quantum advantage or a full cryptographic break.
The increasing interconnection of smart-grid operational technology, industrial-edge services, and utility information systems creates a critical need for resilient and continuously monitored industrial cyber-physical communication. Although quantum key distribution (QKD) can strengthen session-key establishment for advanced metering infrastructure, distributed energy resources, substation automation, supervisory control, and utility-core services, practical QKD deployments remain vulnerable to implementation-level side-channel attacks that can compromise the cryptographic protection layer without directly targeting conventional network packets. This paper presents a QKD-secured industrial smart-grid cyber-physical system framework for simulating and detecting adaptive side-channel attacks. The proposed 36-node industrial communication architecture integrates AMI devices, DER controllers, PMU and substation automation components, industrial-edge gateways, QKD modules, key-management services, SCADA and utility-core servers, security-operation-center components, and adversarial access points. A 100,000-record cyber-quantum dataset is generated across 12 operating conditions comprising normal communication and 11 adaptive QKD side-channel attacks: detector blinding, time shift, wavelength switching, Trojan-horse probing, photon-number splitting, decoy-state spoofing, RNG bias, calibration manipulation, local-oscillator manipulation, synchronization spoofing, and combined adaptive quantum hacking. Each scenario introduces coupled primary and secondary perturbations across optical, detector, timing, synchronization, randomness, calibration, photon-statistical, leakage, key-generation, encryption, and industrial-network-performance features. To support intelligent industrial security monitoring, the proposed Quantum-aware Mamba–Kolmogorov–Arnold Network (Q-MambaKAN) organizes device, network, QKD, side-channel, encryption, and risk evidence into an ordered cyber-quantum representation processed through selective state-space learning, side-channel attention, nonlinear KAN mapping, adaptive fusion, and multi-task prediction heads. Results show that the QBER increases from 0.071 during normal operation to 0.426 under combined adaptive quantum hacking, while encryption success decreases from 98.1% to 0%. Q-MambaKAN achieves a 99.48% binary detection accuracy, a 99.70% binary F1-score, a 97.60% multiclass macro-F1, and a risk RMSE of 0.021.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is widely regarded as a highly secure quantum encryption approach since it applies theoretical principles of quantum mechanics as a medium of security, unlike classical encryption processes that rely on complex mathematics. However, practical QKD systems are vulnerable due to imperfect photon source hardware, communication channel, and detector implementation. These hardware imperfections open side channels that an adversary can exploit without violating principles of quantum mechanics. This review provides a comprehensive overview of the current QKD protocols, quantum hacking strategies and their operating principles, vulnerable hardware components and their mitigation techniques. This paper further investigates how state-of-the-art paradigms based on artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), along with key subfields—such as deep learning (DL), deep reinforcement learning (DRL), and quantum machine learning (QML)—are reshaping the domain. In particular, this paper analyzes their dual roles as enablers of sophisticated attacks and as instruments for attack detection and mitigation. By jointly addressing the challenges in quantum communication and adaptive learning, as well as attack and detection architectures, this survey elucidates both the capabilities and the limitations of contemporary attack-detection mechanisms in the field. This survey seeks to establish a unified framework that conceptually integrates physical-layer quantum hacking with AI-/ML-based security, emphasizing their dual function as both an intelligent defensive layer and a potential tool for advanced threats.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is increasingly recognized as a robust solution to the vulnerabilities posed by quantum computing to classical encryption systems. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation of the BB84 protocol, the foundational QKD scheme, through simulated quantum communication using IBM’s Qiskit framework. The study models quantum key exchange under both ideal and adversarial conditions, including channel noise and intercept-resend attacks. The Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) was measured as a function of noise intensity and eavesdropping, confirming that QBER increases predictably in compromised channels. A threshold of 11% QBER was used to determine the viability of secure key generation. Final key retention rates were analyzed across multiple channel scenarios, revealing BB84’s sensitivity to both photon loss and adversarial interference.\n\nSecurity vulnerabilities such as photon-number-splitting and detector blinding were assessed, and countermeasures including decoy-state protocols and authenticated classical channels were proposed. Four key performance graphs were generated to visualize system behavior under realistic operational conditions. The results support BB84’s theoretical advantage in ensuring information-theoretic security while acknowledging real-world limitations in transmission range and hardware reliability. The paper concludes by addressing future improvements in QKD systems, including satellite-based distribution, quantum repeaters, and device-independent implementations. Through simulation-driven analysis, this study validates BB84 as a practical defense against quantum-enabled attacks and underscores the need for continued development and standardization in post-quantum cryptographic infrastructure.